Private

The crew departed Porlamar-Del Caribe-General en Jefe Santiago Mariño Airport on a ferry flight to Caracas-Oscar Machado Zuloaga Airport. After takeoff, while climbing, the crew encountered unknown technical problems and was cleared to return for an emergency landing. After touchdown, the aircraft was unable to stop within the remaining distance. It overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest, bursting into flames. Both pilots were seriously injured and suffered burns. The aircraft was partially destroyed by fire.

The pilot departed on an instrument flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers. While enroute at a cruise altitude about 6,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot discussed routing and weather avoidance with the controller. The controller advised the pilot there was a gap in the line of weather showing light precipitation, and that the pilot could pass through it and then proceed on course. The controller assigned the pilot a heading, which the pilot initially acknowledged, but shortly thereafter, he advised the controller that the airplane was pointed directly at a convective cell. The controller explained that the heading would keep the pilot out of the heavy precipitation and that he would then turn the airplane through an area of light precipitation. The pilot responded, saying that the area seemed to be closing in fast, the controller acknowledged and advised the pilot if he did not want to accept that routing, he could be rerouted. The pilot elected to turn toward a gap that he saw and felt he could fly straight through it. The controller acknowledged and advised the pilot that course would take him through moderate precipitation starting in about one mile extending for about four miles; the pilot acknowledged. Radar information indicated that the airplane entered an area of heavy to very heavy precipitation, likely a rain shower updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a preaccident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The airplane was equipped with the capability to display weather radar "mosaic" imagery created from Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD) data and it is likely that the pilot was using this information to navigate around precipitation when the airplane encountered a rain shower updraft with likely severe turbulence. Due to latencies inherent in processes used to detect and deliver the NEXRAD data from the ground site, as well as the frequency of the mosaic-creation process used by the service provider, NEXRAD data can age significantly by the time the mosaic image is created. The pilot elected to navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight based on the data displayed to him instead of the routing suggested by the controller, which resulted in the penetration of a rain shower updraft, a loss of airplane control, and a subsequent inflight breakup.

On Thursday, 20 February 2020, the Piper PA-60-602P aircraft, with registration EC-HRJ, took off from Sabadell Airport (LELL) bound for Pamplona Airport (LEPP). At 17:51:43 hours local time, when the aircraft was in the vicinity of the SURCO waypoint, a sudden change in course from 300º to 317º was observed on the aircraft's radar trace. Moments later, at 17:53:12, the pilot of the aircraft contacted the Madrid air control units to report problems with one of his engines, adding verbatim: “I’m not sure if I’ve lost the turbo”. In a subsequent communication with the same air traffic controller, at 17:57:22 h, the pilot stated: "I’ve lost an engine”. At 17:57:58 h, the pilot contacted the controller of the Pamplona control tower. The controller asked him if he required any assistance, and the pilot replied that he did not. At 18:16:15 h, the pilot told the control tower controller that he was on right base for runway 33. The controller cleared him to land and asked him to notify him when he was on final. At 18:19:40 h, the control tower controller alerted the airport Fire Extinguishing Service (SEI) when he saw the aircraft crash and a column of smoke coming from the wreckage area. The aircraft had impacted the ground during the final approach manoeuvre. As it fell, it hit and severed a power line. The pilot, who was the sole occupant of the aircraft, was killed during the accident. The impact and subsequent fire completely destroyed the aircraft.

The pilot and two passengers departed on an instrument flight rules cross-country flight in night instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The pilot was instructed by air traffic control to climb to 12,000 ft, and then cleared to climb to FL230. The pilot reported to the controller that the airplane encountered freezing drizzle and light rime icing during the climb from 6,500 ft to 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl). As the airplane climbed through 11,600 ft msl, the pilot reported that they had an issue with faulty deicing equipment and needed to return to the airport. The controller instructed the pilot to descend and cleared the airplane back to the airport. When asked by the controller if there was an emergency, the pilot stated that they “blew a breaker,” and were unable to reset it. As the controller descended the airplane toward the airport, the pilot reported that they were having issues with faulty instruments. At this time, the airplane was at an altitude of about 4,700 ft. The controller instructed the pilot to maintain 5,000 ft, and the pilot responded that he was “pulling up.” There was no further communication with the pilot. Review of the airplane’s radar track showed the airplane’s departure from the airport and the subsequent turn and southeast track toward its destination. The track appeared as a straight line before a descending, right turn was observed. The turn radius decreased before the flight track ended. The airplane impacted terrain in a right-wing-low attitude. The wreckage was scattered and highly fragmented along a path that continued for about 570 ft. Examination of the wreckage noted various pieces of the flight control surfaces and cables in the wreckage path. Control continuity could not be established due the fragmentation of the wreckage; however, no preimpact anomalies were found. Examination of the left and right engines found rotational signatures and did not identify any pre-impact anomalies. A review of maintenance records noted two discrepancies with the propeller deice and surface deice circuit breakers, which were addressed by maintenance personnel. Impact damage and fragmentation prevented determination of which circuit breaker(s) the pilot was having issues with or an examination of any deicing systems on the airplane. The radio transmissions and transponder returns reflected in the radar data indicate that the airplane’s electrical system was operational before the accident. It is likely that the pilot’s communications with the controller and attempted troubleshooting of the circuit breakers introduced distractions from his primary task of monitoring the flight instruments while in IMC. Such interruptions would make him vulnerable to misleading vestibular cues that could adversely affect his ability to effectively interpret the instruments and maintain control of the airplane. The pilot’s report of “faulty instruments” during a decreasing radius turn and his initial distraction with the circuit breakers and radio communications is consistent with the effects of spatial disorientation.

While on an instructional flight in icing and instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), the pilots indicated that they were having instrumentation difficulties to air traffic control. They initially reported a problem with the autopilot, then a navigational issue, which they later indicated were resolved, and finally they reported it was a problem with the left side attitude indicator. After air traffic control cleared them to their destination, the airplane entered a descending left turn, which continued into a 360° descending turn. An inflight breakup resulted, with the wreckage being scattered over 7,000 ft of wooded terrain. Examination of the engines revealed there were no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation prior to the accident. Control cable continuity was established from the flight controls in the cockpit to all flight control surfaces through multiple overload failures. The pitot-static system was examined, and no blockages were noted. Since there was rotational scoring noted on the vertical gyro and the directional gyro, it’s likely they were operating at the time of the accident. Furthermore, the left side attitude indicator examination revealed that there were no anomalies with the instrument. Examination of the deice valves for the deicing boots revealed that the left wing deice valve did not operate. Corrosion was visible in all three valves and it could not be determined if the corrosion was a result of postimpact environmental exposure. Furthermore, since the cockpit switch positions were compromised in the accident, it could not be determined if the pilots were operating the deicing system at the time of the accident. However, most of the pilot reports (PIREPs) in the area indicated light icing and the airplane performed a 6,000 ft per minute climb just before the loss of control. Given this information, it is unlikely the icing conditions made the airplane uncontrollable. A review of the pilots’ flight experience revealed that the pilot in the left seat did not hold a type rating for the accident airplane model but was scheduled to attend flight training to obtain such a type rating. The pilot in the right seat, who also held a flight instructor certificate, did hold a type rating for the airplane. Given that the remarks section of the filed flight plan described the flight as a “training flight” and the left-seat pilot’s plan to obtain a type rating for the accident airplane model, it is likely the pilot in the left seat was the flying pilot for the majority of the flight. Although the right-seat pilot's autopsy noted coronary artery disease, the condition was poorly described. The circumstances of the accident are not consistent with sudden physical impairment or incapacitation; therefore, it is unlikely it contributed to the event. Toxicology testing identified diphenhydramine, which can cause significant sedation, in the right-seat pilot’s blood. However, the level present at the time of the accident was too low to quantify. Therefore, it is unlikely effects from diphenhydramine contributed to the accident. Prior to entering the descending right turn, air traffic control noted that the airplane was not following assigned headings and altitudes and the pilots’ reported having autopilot problems. Subsequently, the pilots’ reported they were using the right attitude indicator as they had difficulties with the left-side indicator. Information was insufficient to evaluate whether the reported difficulties were the result of a malfunction of the autopilot or the pilots’ management of the autopilot system. However, the reported difficulties likely increased the pilots’ workload, may have diverted their attention while operating in IMC and icing conditions, resulting in task saturation, and may have increased their susceptibility to spatial disorientation. It is also possible that the onset of spatial disorientation was the beginning of the pilots’ difficulties maintaining the airplane’s flight track and what they perceived to be an instrumentation problem. Regardless, since the left seat pilot was not rated to fly the airplane, the right seat pilot’s workload would have increased by having to diagnose the issue, assess the situation, and maintain positive airplane control. The airplane’s track data are consistent with the known effects of spatial disorientation, leading to an inflight loss of control and subsequent inflight breakup.

The pilot was conducting a cross-country flight at a cruise altitude of 10,500 ft mean sea level when the left engine lost all power. He secured the engine and elected to continue to his destination. Shortly thereafter, the right engine lost all power. After selecting an airport for a forced landing, he overflew the runway and entered the pattern. The pilot stated that on short final, after extending the landing gear, "the plane quit flying and the airspeed went to nothing." The airplane landed 200 to 300 yards short of the runway threshold, resulting in substantial damage to the wings and fuselage. During a postaccident examination, only tablespoons of fuel were drained from the left tank. Due to the position of the airplane, the right tank could not be drained; however, when power was applied to the airplane, both fuel quantity gauges indicated empty fuel tanks. Neither fuel tank was breached during the accident, and there was no discoloration present on either of the wings or engine nacelles to indicate a fuel leak; therefore, the loss of engine power is consistent with fuel exhaustion.

The pilot was conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach in instrument meteorological conditions at the conclusion of a cross-country flight. The airplane had been cleared to land, but the tower controller canceled the landing clearance because the airplane appeared not to be established on the localizer as it approached the locator outer marker. The approach controller asked the pilot if he was having an issue with the airplane’s navigation indicator, and the pilot replied, “yup.” Rather than accept the controller’s suggestion to use approach surveillance radar (ASR) approach instead of the ILS approach, the pilot chose to fly the ILS approach again. The pilot was vectored again for the ILS approach, and the controller issued an approach clearance after he confirmed that the pilot was receiving localizer indications on the airplane’s navigation equipment. The airplane joined the localizer and proceeded toward the runway while descending. The pilot was instructed to contact the tower controller; shortly afterward, the airplane entered a left descending turn away from the localizer centerline. At that time, the airplane was about 3 nautical miles from the locator outer marker. The pilot then told the tower controller, “we’ve got a prob.” The tower controller told the pilot to climb and maintain 3,000 ft msl and to turn left to a heading of 180°. The pilot did not respond. During the final 5 seconds of recorded track data, the airplane’s descent rate increased rapidly from 1,500 to about 5,450 ft per minute. The airplane impacted terrain about 1 nm left of the localizer centerline in a left-wing-down and slightly nose down attitude at a groundspeed of about 90 knots. A postimpact fire ensued. Although the pilot was instrument rated, his recent instrument flight experience could not be determined with the available evidence for this investigation. Most of the fuselage, cockpit, and instrument panel was destroyed during the postimpact fire, but examination of the remaining wreckage revealed no anomalies. Acoustic analysis of audio sampled from doorbell security videos was consistent with the airplane's propellers rotating at a speed of 2,500 rpm before a sudden reduction in propeller speed to about 1,200 rpm about 2 seconds before impact. The airplane’s flightpath was consistent with the airplane’s avionics receiving a valid localizer signal during both instrument approaches. However, about 5 months before the accident, the pilot told the airplane’s current maintainer that the horizontal situation indicator (HSI) displayed erroneous heading indications. The maintainer reported that a replacement HSI was purchased and shipped directly to the pilot to be installed in the airplane; however, the available evidence for the investigation did not show whether the malfunctioning HSI was replaced before the flight. The HSI installed in the airplane at the time of the accident sustained significant thermal and fire damage, which prevented testing. During both ILS approaches, the pilot was cleared to maintain 3,000 ft mean sea level (msl) until the airplane was established on the localizer. During the second ILS approach, the airplane descended immediately, even though the airplane was below the lower limit of the glideslope. Although a descent to the glideslope intercept altitude (2,100 ft msl) would have been acceptable after joining the localizer, such a descent was not consistent with how the pilot flew the previous ILS approach, during which he maintained the assigned altitude of 3,000 ft msl until the airplane intercepted the glideslope. If the HSI provided erroneous heading information during the flight, it could have increased the pilot’s workload during the instrument approach and contributed to a breakdown in his instrument scan and his ability to recognize the airplane’s deviation left of course and descent below the glideslope; however, it is unknown if the pilot had replaced the HSI.

The pilot departed on a local flight with two passengers. Several witnesses reported that they heard the airplane’s engine backfiring and sputtering and subsequently heard the engine quit. The surviving passenger, who was seated in the front right seat, stated that the engine lost power and there was nowhere to land. The airplane subsequently impacted heavily wooded terrain about 1 mile from the departure airport. Postaccident examination of the engine revealed that the No. 7 cylinder intake valve was stuck open. The No. 2 cylinder front spark plug was defective, and the Nos. 2- and 4-cylinders’ ignition wires were frayed, worn, and displayed arcing, which likely led to erratic operation or a lack of ignition in these two cylinders. The culmination of these issues most likely led to the engine running rough, backfiring, and subsequently losing total power. An annual inspection was accomplished on the airframe and engine about 2 months before the
accident. General maintenance practices and the inspection should have identified the anomalies that were found during the postaccident engine examination.

On final approach to Charallave-Óscar Machado Zuloaga Airport in marginal weather conditions, the twin engine airplane crashed in unknown circumstances about 8 km from the runway threshold. The aircraft was destroyed and all nine occupants were killed.

On 09 December 2019, a private Piper Aerostar PA-60-602P aircraft (registration C-FQYW, serial number 60-8265020), departed Cabo San Lucas International Airport (MMSL), Baja California Sur, Mexico, with 3 people on board, for a 2-day trip to Nanaimo Airport (CYCD), British Columbia (BC). As planned the aircraft stopped for an overnight rest at Chino Airport (KCNO), California, U.S. At 1142, on 10 December 2019, the aircraft departed KCNO on a visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan to Bishop Airport (KBIH), California, U.S., for a planned fuel stop. The aircraft departed KBIH at approximately 1425 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan to CYCD. On 10 December 2019, night started at 1654. At 1741, the Vancouver area control centre air traffic controller advised the pilot that an aerodrome special meteorological report (SPECI) had been issued for CYCD at 1731. The SPECI reported visibility as 2 ½ statute miles (SM) in light drizzle and mist, with an overcast ceiling of 400 feet above ground level (AGL). The pilot informed the controller that he would be conducting an instrument landing system (ILS) approach for Runway 16. At 1749, when the aircraft was approximately 32 nautical miles (NM) south of CYCD, the pilot contacted the controller to inquire about the weather conditions at Victoria International Airport (CYYJ), BC. The controller informed the pilot that a SPECI was issued for CYYJ at 1709 and it reported the visibility as 5 SM in mist, a broken ceiling at 600 feet AGL, and an overcast layer at 1200 feet AGL. The controller provided the occurrence flight with pilot observations from another aircraft that had landed at CYCD approximately 15 minutes before. That crew had reported being able to see the Runway 16 approach lights at minimums, i.e., at 373 feet AGL. Between 1753 and 1802, the controller provided vectors to the pilot in order to intercept the ILS localizer. At 1803, the controller observed that the aircraft had not intercepted the localizer for Runway 16. The aircraft had continued to the southwest, past the localizer, at an altitude of 2100 feet above sea level (ASL) and a ground speed of 140 knots. The controller queried the pilot to confirm that he was still planning to intercept the ILS for Runway 16. The pilot confirmed that he would be intercepting the ILS as planned. The aircraft made a heading correction and momentarily lined up with the localizer before beginning a turn to the west. At 1804:03, the pilot requested vectors from the controller and informed him that he “just had a fail.” The controller responded with instructions to “turn left heading zero nine zero, tight left turn.” The pilot asked the controller to repeat the heading. The controller responded with instructions to “…turn right heading three six zero.” The pilot acknowledged the heading; however, the aircraft continued turning right beyond the assigned heading while climbing to 2500 feet ASL and slowing to a ground speed of 80 knots. The aircraft then began to descend, picking up speed as it was losing altitude. At 1804:33, the aircraft descended to 1800 feet ASL and reached a ground speed of 160 knots. At 1804:40, the pilot informed the air traffic controller that the aircraft had lost its attitude indicator.Footnote6 At the same time, the aircraft was climbing into a 2nd right turn. At 1804:44, the air traffic controller asked the pilot what he needed from him; the pilot replied he needed a heading. The controller provided the pilot with a heading of three six zero. At 1804:47, the aircraft reached an altitude of 2700 feet ASL and a ground speed of 60 knots. The aircraft continued its right turn and began to lose altitude. The controller instructed the pilot to gain altitude if he was able to; however, the pilot did not acknowledge the instruction. The last encoded radar return for the aircraft was at 1805:26, when the aircraft was at 300 feet ASL and travelling at a ground speed of 120 knotsControl of the aircraft was lost. The aircraft collided with a power pole and trees in a wooded park area on Gabriola Island, BC, and then impacted the ground. The aircraft broke into pieces and caught fire. The 3 occupants on board received fatal injuries. As a result of being damaged in the accident, the emergency locator transmitter (Artex ME406, serial number 188-00293) did not activate.