Positioning

On the day of the accident the aircraft left Bristol under the command of the company's chief pilot for a flight to Edinburgh via East Midlands Airport. After conveying passengers to Edinburgh it was scheduled to position empty at Newcastle Airport to collect passengers for Bristol. Weather briefing had been obtained and a thorough flight plan covering the outward and return flights had been filed before the aircraft left Bristol in the morning. As there were no passengers on the flight from Edinburgh to Newcastle, the captain decided to make use of this sector to continue the other pilot's training for command of the HS-125. Accordingly, the trainee captain was flying the aircraft from the left hand seat. Prior to takeoff he was briefed that a failure of one of the engines (he was not told which one), would be simulated on takeoff and for the purpose of the exercise the rudder bias system would be switched 'OFF'. The pilots decided that no flap would be used for the takeoff which was started from the end of runway 13. The point where the aircraft became airborne was approximately 2,700 feet from the start of the roll, which was normal for the aircraft's weight and configuration, with both engines operating. The training captain called 'rotate' at approximately 120 knots, which was slightly faster than the calculated figure and when the aircraft had reached a height of approximately 12 feet and had accelerated to about 130 knots, he pulled back the thrust lever of the port engine to simulate a failure. He considered that the trainee pilot's reaction to the emergency was slow and was just about to apply right rudder to counteract the yaw when the trainee pilot applied considerable force to the left rudder and locked his leg in position. The captain immediately applied full right aileron and opened the port thrust lever but he was unable to prevent a high rate of roll developing to the left. Approximately 700 feet after the point where the aircraft became airborne the port wing tip struck the runway, fracturing the port fuel tank and spilling out fuel. The aircraft left the runway at an angle of approximately 30 degrees to the left and travelled across the grass, becoming partially inverted before settling back sideways on the ground on its undercarriage. The sideways movement of the aircraft pulled off the nose gear and the aircraft then gyrated across the airfield sustaining further structural damage before coming to rest on its main wheels and tail facing approximately in the opposite direction to the direction of takeoff. During the aircraft's gyrations on the ground, fuel, which was centrifuged out of the fractured port tank, ignited and a flash fire occurred. When the aircraft finally came to rest there was a small residual fire in the port wing which was very quickly extinguished by the airport fire service.

While taking off from an airstrip located somewhere in the Libyan Desert, the single engine aircraft crashed and burst into flames. The airplane was destroyed and the pilot, sole on board, was killed. Owned by Pilatus, the airplane was operated for Air Libya.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Luton to Wolverhampton to carry two members of the Dowty Group (owner of the aircraft) who wanted to fly to France. A first attempt to land was abandoned due to poor weather conditions and the crew climbed to 2,500 feet before initiating a second attempt to land that was also abandoned. During the third attempt, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft struck the roof of a house and crashed in flames 600 yards short of runway 25 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed as well as the house and both crew members were killed plus one people in the house. Two other person on the ground were injured.

On a positioning flight from Ust'-Maya to Yakutsk at night with the center of gravity being out of the envelope (too far forward), the right propeller developed negative thrust (due to a malfunction) shortly after takeoff. The crew was unable to counteract as the altitude was too low and the aircraft crashed in a forest located 1,350 metres behind the runway threshold and 310 metres to the right of the runway extended centerline. All 5 crew members were killed.

On approach to Weyers Cave-Shenandoah Valley Airport, the crew informed ATC that both engines failed and that he was unable to maintain the prescribed altitude. Shortly later, the aircraft struck a hill located few miles from the airfield, probably as the crew was trying to make an emergency landing. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and both pilots were killed.

On a positioning flight from Chelyabinsk to Magnitogorsk, the crew encountered below-minima weather conditions (heavy snow falls and limited visibility). While cruising at an altitude of 300 meters, the pilot lost control of the aircraft that crashed in a snow-covered field located near Tokmasskiy, some 18 km northeast of Uyskoye. The wreckage was found 6 km off course and both pilots were killed.

The aircraft was originally planned to fly a non-scheduled international flight from Stockholm-Arlanda to Palma de Mallorca. During the take-off run No. 4 engine did not function properly; the take-off was aborted and the aircraft was taxiied back to the apron. Inspection of the engine revealed damage to the compressor. After consultation with the Spantax Operations Department in Madrid, it was decided to ferry the aircraft on three engines to Zurich, where No. 4 engine would be changed. The technical preparation of the aircraft for the ferry flight was supervised by a ground engineer from Spantax. Meanwhile, the flight crew planned the flight. As the ATS briefing office at Arlanda was closed after 2100 hours, the co-pilot phoned the ATS flight plan to Stockholm Control Centre (ACC) . Neither when phoning the flight plan nor at the weather briefing did the crew advise that the flight was a 3-engine ferry flight. However, the Air Traffic Controller (Tower) in some other way had been informed about the nature of the flight. At 2208 hours the crew received a taxi clearance to Runway 08, but as they considered that this runway was too short for a 3-engine take-off , they requested permission to use Runway 19 and this was granted. Another advantage of using Runway 19 was that it made it possible to join the outbound track with minor heading changes. During taxiing the aircraft and the engine anti-icing system were checked according to the checklist. (After checking the engine anti-icing was switched OFF.) At 2221 hours the flight was cleared to take-off, and at 2224 hours the crew reported "Rolling". According to the pilot-in-command,maximum EPR take-off power was set on engines Nos. 1, 2 and 3 with brakes on, then, after having checked the instruments, No. 1 engine was throttled back to 85 per cent and the brakes were released. When the aircraft had rolled for 5-10 seconds the nose wheel skidded to the right and to regain heading he had to retard throttle No. 1 to 80-60 per cent. When back on the centre line he slowly opened the throttle again. Maximum EPR take-off power was set when the aircraft reached a speed of 100 kt. He rotated the aircraft at the calculated speed Vr - 134 kt (27° of flaps) and it became airborne. He retracted the gear when positive climb was indicated. Just after lift off he was blinded by the aircraft landing lights illuminating unexpectedly low clouds over the runway. Initially he kept the speed at V2 (145 kt) and noticed a rate- of-climb of 800 ft/min. He had to apply extremely hard left rudder to centre the turn indicator (ball). He did not observe any bank or turn tendency, but noted that the indicated airspeed (IAS) was not increasing normally and shortly thereafter that the rate-of-climb and speed decreased. The pilot-in-command felt they urgently needed more power, but all happened very quickly and shortly after he had noticed the speed drop the aircraft collided with the terrain. From the time take-off power had been set on the runway the throttle positions were not changed. The co-pilot stated that they had to taxi down the runway to avoid ice patches on the first part of the runway. He could not say how far they taxiied and it was not possible to determine it in any other way. During preparation for take-off he asked the pilot-in-command if they should use 10° flaps, but the decision of the pilot- in-command to uae 27° was not changed. He completed the pre-take-off instrument check and did not notice any abnormal readings. The three gyro horizons indicated no differences. When rolling he kept the control column forward, to increase the friction on the nose wheel, and gave full left aileron. Gradually he decreased the pressure on the column and reduced left aileron deflection. At V1 the pilot-in-command took mr the controls. The co-pilot kept his left hand on the throttles and verified that no changes were made on throttles Nos. 2 and 3 after takeoff power was set, but he noticed that the pilot-in-command had to vary the No. 1 throttle setting several times during the roll. After lift-off when the gear was retracted the co-pilot received a message from the tower giving the take-off time and instruction to change over to STOCKHOLM RADAR on 124.1 MHz. He never acknowledged the message but when leaning forward to select the new frequency he noticed on his horizon a banking to the right of 4 to 60. He also observed the gyro horizon of the pilot-in-command indicating o bank to the right. Zhe speed had dropped to 10 kt belau V2 and he called: "The speed, the speed". Ifc felt no buffeting in the aircraft aud noted no tendency to Dutch roll. Be also stated that he observed a power drop of about 2 per cent below EPR take-off power. Shortly after the first contact with the treetops the banking to the right had increased to 10-lSO and the co-pilot retarded the throttles. The flight and the ground engineers sitting in the cockpit observed nothing abnormal until the crash. None of them observed any indications of power changes on the instruments. No buffeting was felt in the aircraft, neither were any warning signals heard. Whilst in a right bank of 4-6° the aircraft collided with tree-tops approximately 26 m above and 1 060 m from the far end of Runway 19, or about 1 800 m from the point of lift-off, having turned through about 25 degrees from the runway heading. The aircraft came to a final stop approximately 500 m after first contact with the trees on a heading of 240°. The aircraft was destroyed and five occupants were killed while five others were injured.

A first AN-2 registered CCCP-35082 departed Penza Airport at 1012LT on a positioning flight to Kazan. The AN-2 registered CCCP-35083 departed three minutes later on the same routing with one passenger and two pilots on board. For unknown reason, the crew of CCCP-35083 wanted to reach the first crew so they accelerated and joined the first aircraft about 20 minutes later. Due to poor judgement, the engine of CCCP-35083 struck the base of the tail of CCCP-35082. Out of control, it nosed down and crashed inverted in an open field located near Lunino. The airplane was destroyed and all three occupants were killed. The other aircraft was able to land without further problem.

Shortly after takeoff from Bromma Airport, the airplane encountered difficulties to gain height. It stalled then crashed onto a building located by the airport. The aircraft was destroyed upon impact and both crew members were killed. There were no casualties on the ground.

While cruising under VFR mode by night, the crew requested an IFR clearance to ATC. Awaiting for it, the crew became lost and disoriented when the airplane struck the slope of a mountain located near Kerhonkson. Both pilots were slightly injured and the aircraft was destroyed.