Crash of a Beechcraft 200 Super King Air in Squamish: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jul 28, 2005 at 0840 LT
Operator:
Registration:
C-FCGL
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Vancouver – Smithers
MSN:
BB-190
YOM:
1976
Flight number:
NT202
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
2700
Captain / Total hours on type:
100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1200
Copilot / Total hours on type:
80
Circumstances:
A Raytheon Beechcraft King Air 200 (registration C-FCGL, serial number BB190) operating as NTA202 (Northern Thunderbird Air), departed Vancouver, British Columbia, at 0824 Pacific daylight time on 28 July 2005 for a visual flight rules flight to Smithers, British Columbia, with a crew of two on board. The aircraft did not arrive at its destination, and a search was commenced later that same day. The aircraft was found on 30 July 2005. The crash site was in a narrow canyon at an elevation of about 3900 feet above sea level, in an area of steeply rising terrain. Both occupants were fatally injured. A post-crash fire destroyed most of the aircraft. The emergency locator transmitter was destroyed in the fire and no signal was detected. The crash occurred at about 0840 Pacific daylight time.
Probable cause:
Findings as to Causes and Contributing Factors:
1. The aircraft was flown up a narrow canyon into rapidly rising terrain for reasons that could not be determined. The aircraft’s proximity to terrain and the narrowness of the canyon precluded a turn, and the aircraft’s climb rate was insufficient to clear the rising terrain.
2. The pilot decision-making training received by the crew members was ineffective because they were unprepared for the unique hazards and special operating techniques associated with flying low in mountainous terrain.
Finding as to Risk:
1. The company operations manual (COM) gave no guidance to the crew for the operation of a visual flight rules (VFR) flight, except for the provision that it should not be conducted closer to obstacles than 500 feet vertically and horizontally.
Final Report:

Crash of a Swearingen SA226T Merlin IIIB in Teterboro

Date & Time: May 31, 2005 at 1130 LT
Registration:
N22DW
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Nantucket – Teterboro
MSN:
T-317
YOM:
1979
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
2676
Captain / Total hours on type:
1400.00
Aircraft flight hours:
4698
Circumstances:
During takeoff from the departure airport, as the pilot advanced the throttles, the aircraft made a "sudden turn to the right." The pilot successfully aborted the takeoff, performed an engine run-up, and then took off without incident. The pilot experienced no anomalies during the second takeoff or the flight to the destination airport. As he reduced the power while in the traffic pattern, at the destination airport, the left engine accelerated to 60 percent power. The pilot reported to the tower that he had "one engine surging and another engine that seems like I lost control or speed." The pilot advanced and retarded the throttles and the engines responded appropriately, so he continued the approach. As the pilot flared the airplane for landing, the left engine surged to 65 percent power with the throttle lever in the "idle" position. The airplane immediately turned to the right; the right wing dropped and impacted the ground. Disassembly of the engines revealed no anomalies to account for surging, or for an uncommanded increase in power or lack of throttle response. Functional testing of the fuel control units and fuel pumps revealed the flight idle fuel flow rate was 237 and 312 pounds per hour (pph), for the left and right engines, respectively. These figures were higher than the new production specification of 214 pph. According to the manufacturer, flight idle fuel flow impacts thrust produced when the power levers are set to the flight idle position and differences in fuel flow can result in an asymmetrical thrust condition.
Probable cause:
The pilot's improper decision to depart with a known deficiency, which resulted in a loss of control during landing at the destination airport. A factor was the fuel control units' improper flight idle fuel flow rate.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 350 Super King Air in El Junquito: 2 killed

Date & Time: May 24, 2005 at 1600 LT
Registration:
YV-783CP
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Caracas – Charallave
MSN:
FL-313
YOM:
2001
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew was performing a ferry flight from Caracas-Maiquetía-Simón Bolívar Airport to Charallave. While cruising in poor weather conditions, the twin engine aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located near El Junquito, about 35 km northwest of Charallave-Óscar Machado Zuloaga Airport. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Controlled flight into terrain.

Crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Navajo Chieftain off Pompano Beach

Date & Time: Oct 21, 2004 at 1748 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N61518
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Moss Town – Fort Lauderdale
MSN:
31-7552022
YOM:
1975
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
4500
Aircraft flight hours:
19269
Circumstances:
Before the start of the trip, the pilot was reportedly given $500.00 cash by the operator to purchase fuel. The pilot stated that the first leg of the flight from KFLL to MYEF departed with the main fuel tanks full and approximately 10 gallons in each of the auxiliary fuel tanks. There were no deviations en-route, and the uneventful flight lasted a reported 1 hour 40 minutes. After landing in Exuma International Airport, the main fuel tanks contained slightly more than 1/2 fuel capacity. Ten gallons of fuel were added to each of the two auxiliary fuel tanks at MYEF, no additional fuel was purchased. The flight departed for KFLL, and during the climb to 10,000 feet, he leaned the fuel/air mixture. During the cruise portion of the flight, the fuel in the auxiliary fuel tanks was consumed then he switched to the main fuel tanks to supply fuel to the engines. The flight crossed the DEKAL intersection at 4,000 feet, which is about 31 nautical miles southeast of KFLL, continued, and the right engine manifold pressure decreased, the cylinder head temperature reached red line indication, and the engine sputtered. He declared an emergency with air traffic control and the controller provided vectors to KFLL which he verbally acknowledged but did not comply with. While operating single engine, with the engine operating at full power, he reported no discrepancies with the left engine. He reported he could reach KFLL but was concerned about flying over a populated area at a low altitude, and was losing altitude. Contrary to the statement made by the pilot that he was not able to maintain altitude while flying single-engine, the airplane was capable of a rate of climb greater than 170 feet-per-minute if flown properly. He elected to ditch the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean; the airplane was not recovered. The operator was asked repeatedly by NTSB for historical fuel receipts and flight hours for N61518 but did not comply. NTSB review of fuel consumption calculations performed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector-In-Charge revealed the aircraft would have experienced fuel exhaustion at the approximate location and time when the pilot declared an emergency with ATC following failure of the right engine. The NTSB did not receive the NTSB requested detailed, signed, dated statement from the pilot.
Probable cause:
The pilot's inadequate in-flight planning/decision, which resulted in fuel exhaustion and the loss of engine power in one engine. Contributing factors were the pilot's inadequate handling of the aircraft following failure of the right engine for his failure to extract maximum single engine performance, and his failure to properly refuel the aircraft.
Final Report:

Crash of a Canadair RegionalJet CRJ-200LR in Jefferson City: 2 killed

Date & Time: Oct 14, 2004 at 2215 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N8396A
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Little Rock – Minneapolis
MSN:
7396
YOM:
2000
Flight number:
NW3701
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Captain / Total flying hours:
6900
Captain / Total hours on type:
973.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
761
Copilot / Total hours on type:
222
Aircraft flight hours:
10168
Aircraft flight cycles:
9613
Circumstances:
On October 14, 2004, about 2215:06 central daylight time, Pinnacle Airlines flight 3701 (doing business as Northwest Airlink), a Bombardier CL-600-2B19, N8396A, crashed into a residential area about 2.5 miles south of Jefferson City Memorial Airport, Jefferson City, Missouri. The airplane was on a repositioning flight from Little Rock National Airport, Little Rock, Arkansas, to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, Minneapolis, Minnesota. During the flight, both engines flamed out after a pilot-induced aerodynamic stall and were unable to be restarted. The captain and the first officer were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. No one on the ground was injured.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable causes of this accident were:
1) the pilots' unprofessional behavior, deviation from standard operating procedures, and poor airmanship, which resulted in an in-flight emergency from which they were unable to recover, in part because of the pilots' inadequate training;
2) the pilots' failure to prepare for an emergency landing in a timely manner, including communicating with air traffic controllers immediately after the emergency about the loss of both engines and the availability of landing sites; and
3) the pilots' failure to achieve and maintain the target airspeed in the double engine failure checklist, which caused the engine cores to stop rotating and resulted in the core lock engine condition.
Contributing to this accident were:
1) the engine core lock condition, which prevented at least one engine from being restarted, and
2) the airplane flight manuals that did not communicate to pilots the importance of maintaining a minimum airspeed to keep the engine cores rotating.
Final Report:

Crash of an Embraer EMB-820C Navajo in Monsenhor Gil: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 23, 2004 at 1100 LT
Registration:
PT-EBU
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Picos – Teresina
MSN:
820-005
YOM:
1975
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
Following several flights during the last days, the crew departed Picos on the last leg to Teresina. While descending to Teresina-Senador Petrônio Portella Airport, the crew informed ATC about the failure of the left engine and reduced his altitude to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft struck a tree and crashed in an open field located about 800 metres from a road. The wreckage was found 51 km southeast of Teresina Airport. Both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Failure of the left engine due to fuel exhaustion. The following findings were identified:
- Poor flight preparation,
- Complacency, overconfidence,
- Contempt for published procedures and poor judgment,
- The copilot's licence and medical documents were expired.
Final Report:

Crash of a Rockwell Shrike Commander 500S near Hobart: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 19, 2004 at 1643 LT
Operator:
Registration:
VH-LST
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Hobart – Devonport
MSN:
500-3111
YOM:
1971
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
371
Captain / Total hours on type:
40.00
Circumstances:
The aircraft commenced taxying at Hobart for a Visual Flight Rules (VFR) ferry flight to Devonport. The pilot, who was the sole occupant, reported a departure time of 1643 to air traffic control, with an intention to climb to 8,500 ft and to fly a track of 319 degrees magnetic. Due to following traffic, the pilot was required to report leaving specific altitudes. At 1646, the pilot reported leaving 4,500 ft, and was advised that air traffic services were terminated. The acknowledgement of that call was the last communication heard from the pilot. At about 1800, the operator’s staff at Devonport advised the Hobart base that the aircraft had not arrived. The operator advised AusSAR and the Hobart air traffic control tower, and organised company search aircraft from both Hobart and Devonport. The non-flying occupant of the Hobart search aircraft sighted the wreckage at about 1930. Shortly after, a search and rescue helicopter arrived at the accident site. The pilot of the aircraft was found fatally injured in the wreckage. The wreckage was located 58 km from Hobart airport on a bearing of 320 degrees magnetic. Based on predictions of aircraft performance and the distance of the accident site from Hobart, the estimated time of the accident was 1656. There were no eyewitnesses to the accident. Aircraft flight profile The aircraft was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder, nor was it required to be. As such, and given that the aircraft was operating outside of radar coverage, there was no recorded flight profile information available. The pilot was not required to report cruising at 8,500 ft and there was no evidence to confirm that the aircraft had reached that altitude. However, based on the normal climb and cruise performance, forecast winds and the radio broadcasts made by the pilot, the aircraft should have reached an altitude of 8,500 ft approximately 35 km from Hobart at about 1651, which was 5 minutes prior to the estimated time of the accident at 1656.
Probable cause:
The trajectory analysis provided the ATSB with a high degree of confidence with respect to the aircraft altitude and speed at the time of the in-flight breakup. The aircraft’s speed could have readily accelerated to Vne during a rapid descent from the nominated cruise altitude of 8,500 ft to the break-up altitude of around 3,150 ft. At such a speed, a relatively small control input force or gusts encountered in the longitudinal (pitch) axis of the aircraft could have resulted in the symmetrical downward wing overloading and failure that occurred. There is no compelling evidence to support any one reason for the departure of the aircraft from the cruise altitude into a high speed dive type situation. However, there are a number of factors that provide some weight to the possibility of a flight upset related to operation of the autopilot. These factors include:
• The lack of any reference in the operations manual to the installation of a Bendix FCS-810 autopilot in LST and the lack of information in the operations manual on the operation of the FCS-810 autopilot
• The pilot’s relative inexperience in the operation of the particular autopilot system fitted to LST
• The operating characteristics of the autopilot system fitted to LST
• The illegible nature of the Aircraft Flight Manual supplement pertaining to the limitations and operating procedures for the autopilot system fitted to LST
• The autopilot controller pitch command wheel being found at the accident site in the maximum nose-down position
• Both elevator trim tabs being found at the accident site at or close to the maximum nose-down trim position. However, it is not possible to discount other explanations for the departure from cruise flight, including a runaway pitch-trim condition, pilot incapacitation, the effects of mountain waves and/or severe turbulence, or a combination of any of the above. On the evidence available to the investigation, it was not possible to conclusively determine the circumstances that led to the aircraft descending at speed to the altitude at which the in-flight breakup occurred.
Final Report:

Crash of a Piper PA-31-325 Navajo C/R in Kahului

Date & Time: Feb 18, 2004 at 1352 LT
Type of aircraft:
Registration:
C-GPTE
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Honolulu – Oakland – Brooks
MSN:
31-7712059
YOM:
1977
Location:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
7923
Circumstances:
The airplane collided with terrain 200 yards short of the runway during an emergency landing following a loss of engine power. The pilot was on an intermediate leg of a ferry trip. Approximately 300 miles from land, the fuel flow and boost pump lights illuminated. Then, the right engine failed. The pilot flew back to the nearest airport; however, approximately 200 yards from the runway, the airplane stalled and the right wing dropped and collided with the ground. The fuel system had been modified a few months prior to the accident to allow for a ferry fuel tank installation. Post accident examination of the airplane could not find a reason for the power loss.
Probable cause:
The pilot's failure to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering for landing on one engine, which resulted in an inadvertent stall. The loss of power in one engine for undetermined reasons was a factor.
Final Report:

Crash of a PZL-Mielec AN-2TP in Urimán: 1 killed

Date & Time: Oct 11, 2003 at 1600 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YV-1128C
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
MSN:
1G238-12
YOM:
1990
Country:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Circumstances:
Shortly after takeoff from Urimán Airport, while in initial climb, the single engine aircraft stalled and crashed in the Caroni River. The captain was killed and the copilot was injured. The aircraft was destroyed. Possible engine failure.

Crash of a Fletcher FU-24-950M near Matawai

Date & Time: Sep 20, 2003 at 1015 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
ZK-BDS
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Motu - Opotiki
MSN:
001
YOM:
1954
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
1
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
1
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
Crashed during bad weather. Andrew Wilde was flying and George Muir was a passenger. While enroute from Motu - Opotiki the gully became un-negotiable, so Andrew decided to return to Motu by flying a reciprocal course low level, depicted by arrows on his hand held marine GPS. During the return trip to Motahora up the Otara river valley, he found that the cloud base had lowered even further than when he entered the valley 6 minutes prior & he became fully reliant on that little GPS. The GPS became our enemy & lured Andrew into the cloud base, which ended our flight abruptly.
Testimony from George Muir, loader driver and passenger during this flight.