Ferry

The crew departed Punia on a ferry flight to Goma. About 10 minutes into the flight, while cruising at a relative low altitude, the aircraft collided with power lines. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crashed in the Lowa River located about 30 km northeast of Punia, coming to rest upside down. Both pilots escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was ferrying the aircraft under the visual flight rules (VFR) from the operator’s base at Tully, Qld to Ingham and return. The flights, conducted in the private category without passengers, were to allow aircraft maintenance to be conducted at Ingham. The flight from Tully to Ingham was conducted in the morning, with no reported difficulties. At 1454 Eastern Standard Time, the pilot departed Ingham on the return flight to Tully. The aircraft did not arrive at Tully. It was not until the next day that the pilot and aircraft were reported missing. Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR) was notified and a search, based on the last air traffic control radar observed position of an unidentified aircraft from a replay of recorded radar data together with witness reports from the area, was initiated. Searchers located the aircraft wreckage on the morning of 18 August. The aircraft had impacted mountainous terrain in a state forest 24 km south of Tully. The pilot was fatally injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The aircraft was departing Mogadishu on a ferry flight to Minsk with an intermediate stop in Djibouti City, carrying 4 technicians of the operator and 7 crew members who were returning to Belarus after they recovered materials and instruments from another II-76 (EW-78826) that was damaged beyond repair at Mogadishu Airport last March 9. Shortly after takeoff, while in initial climb, the aircraft was hit by a missile that struck the left wing between both engines n°1 and 2. An explosion occurred and the aircraft caught fire. The crew initiated a turn when the left wing detached and crashed in the sea. Out of control, the aircraft crashed on a beach near the airport, killing all 11 occupants.

The airplane impacted a fence and terrain on short final during a visual approach to runway 27. The airplane was operated as a cargo airplane with two flight crewmembers by a commercial operator certificated under 14 CFR Part 135. The flightcrew worked approximately 18.75 hours within a 24-hour period leading up to the accident performing flights listed by the operator as either 14 CFR Part 91 or 14 CFR Part 135, all of which were in the conduct of company business. Of this total, 5.9 hours involved flying conducted under 14 CFR Part 135. The flight to the accident airport was for the purposes of picking up repair parts for another company airplane that received minor damage in which the flight crew was previously piloting in the 24- hour period. They were then going to fly back to the operator's home base on the same day, which would have had an estimated flying time of 2:45 hours. The captain said he was tired and that he and the first officer had not slept at any of the stops made during the period. The captain said that the company likes for the airplanes to return to their home base. The captain said that the company prefers an option for pilots to stay overnight if tired and he has stayed overnight on previous trips but only due to maintenance related reasons. The Aeronautical Information Manual states that acute fatigue affects timing and perceptional field performance.

The airport's instrument approach procedures included a very high frequency, omnidirectional range (VOR) approach, and a global positioning system (GPS) approach that was not an overlay. The VOR approach procedure included an inbound course to the VOR, and after passage, a descent along the same course to a missed approach point. The missed approach point was defined as 6 nautical miles beyond the VOR, as well as by timing. The pilot twice attempted the VOR approach in instrument meteorological conditions. He flew the first approach to the missed approach point, initiated a missed approach, contacted the controller, and requested a second VOR approach. He then received vectors to rejoin the approach course inbound to the VOR. The airplane subsequently passed over the VOR, on course, about 100 feet above the minimum altitude. However, instead of descending as described in the procedure, the airplane maintained that altitude until reaching the airport, then began a descent. The airplane continued to travel outbound along the same approach course until it impacted rising terrain about 6.5 miles beyond the airport. There was no dedicated distance measuring equipment (DME) onboard the airplane. Instead, distance was determined by the use of an instrument flight rules (IFR)-approved GPS unit. Due to the non-storage capability of the unit, historical waypoint selection could not be determined. The pilot could have selected the airport as a "direct to" waypoint, or, if he had entered flight plan waypoints, the unit would have sequenced from the VOR to the airport during the first approach. In either case, unless the pilot reprogrammed the unit, the last waypoint entered would have remained at the airport, rather than the VOR. The pilot then most likely mistook the airport position for the VOR position, and displaced the beginning of the descent by 6 nautical miles. Also noted, was that once the airplane passed over the VOR en route to the airport, the HSI would have indicated a change of "to" to "from". There were no medical anomalies noted with the pilot and no mechanical anomalies noted with the airplane.

Witnesses stated that they observed the twin-engine airplane roll into a steep right bank and enter a spin at a low altitude (less than 700 feet) during the initial climb. The airplane then descended and impacted terrain about 1.5 miles from the end of the departure runway. Some witnesses reported hearing an unusual engine noise just before the airplane began to roll and spin. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed. Examination of the right engine revealed that the ring gear support of the engine/propeller gearbox had fractured in flight due to high cycle fatigue originating from the corner radii of the high-speed pinion cutout. The reason for the fatigue could not be determined. The ring gear support disengaged from the ring gear due to this failure, resulting in a disconnection in power being transferred from the engine power section to the propeller. In addition to the ability for a pilot to manually feather the propellers, and an automatic feathering feature, the engine (Honeywell TPE-331) design also includes a “Negative Torque Sensing” (NTS) system that would automatically respond to a typical failed engine condition involving a propeller that is driving the coupled engine. Feathering the propeller reduces drag and asymmetric yawing due to the failed engine. All Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) certification evaluations for one-engine inoperative handling qualities for the airplane type were conducted with the NTS system operational. According to the airplane manufacturer, the NTS system was designed to automatically reduce the drag on the affected engine to provide a margin of safety until the pilot is able to shut down the engine with the condition lever. However, if a drive train disconnect occurs at the ring gear support, the NTS system is inoperable, and the propeller can come out of feather on its own, if the disconnect is followed by a pilot action to retard the power lever on the affected engine. In this scenario, once the fuel flow setting is reduced below the point required to run the power section at 100% (takeoff) rpm, the propeller governor would sense an “underspeed” condition and would attempt to increase engine rpm by unloading the propeller, subsequently driving the propeller out of feather toward the low pitch stop. This flat pitch condition would cause an increase in aerodynamic drag on one side of the airplane, and unanticipated airplane control difficulty could result due to the asymmetry.

After the crew dropped off passengers at Karlsruhe-Baden-Baden Airport, he was returning to his base in Freiburg im Breisgau. On final approach to runway 16 in marginal weather conditions (poor visibility due to night and fog), the crew descended too low when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area located 450 metres short of runway, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and both pilots were killed.

Shortly after takeoff from Zalingei Airport, en route to Al Fashir on behalf of the African Union, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circonstances. Both pilots, Ukrainian and Moldavian citizens, were killed.

On 21 November 2005, the day before the accident, the pilot had completed a day of aerial topdressing in ZK-DZG, a New Zealand Aerospace Industries Fletcher FU24-950, then flown the aircraft with his loader-driver as a passenger to Whangarei Aerodrome. That evening the pilot contacted his operator’s (the company’s) chief engineer in Hamilton and said that the airspeed indicator in ZK-DZG was stuck on 80 knots. The chief engineer told him the pitot-static line for the indicator was probably blocked and to have a local aircraft engineer blow out the line. Early the next morning, the day of the accident, the pilot flew ZK-DZG with his loader-driver on board to an airstrip 50 km north-west of Whangarei to spread fertiliser on a farm property. As the morning progressed, the weather conditions became unsuitable for aerial topdressing. At about 1020, the pilot used his mobile telephone to talk to another company pilot at Kerikeri, and told him that the wind was too strong for further work. The conversation included general work-related issues and ended about 1045, with the pilot saying that he was shortly going to return to Whangarei and go to his motel. Before leaving for Whangarei, the pilot spoke with a truck driver who had delivered fertiliser to the airstrip about 1100. The driver commented later that the pilot said the wind had picked up enough to preclude further topdressing. After they had covered the fertiliser, the pilot told the driver that he and the loader-driver would fly to Whangarei. The driver did not recall anything untoward, except that the pilot had casually mentioned there was some electrical fault causing an amber light in the cockpit to flicker and that it would only be a problem if a second light came on. He said the pilot did not appear to be concerned about the light. The driver then left and did not see the aircraft depart. The pilot used his mobile telephone to tell an aircraft engineer at Whangarei Aerodrome about the airspeed indicator problem and asked him if he could have a look at it and blow out the pitot-static system. The engineer believed the call was made from the ground at about 1130, but he could not be certain of the time. The engineer agreed to rectify the problem and the pilot said he would arrive at the Aerodrome about noon. The engineer said he did not know that the pilot had spent the previous night in Whangarei or that the aircraft had been parked at the Aerodrome overnight. ZK-DZG was equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) and its navigation data was downloaded for analysis. From the data it was established that the aircraft departed from the airstrip at 1131 and flew for about 39 km on a track slightly right of the direct track to Whangarei Aerodrome, before altering heading direct to the aerodrome and Pukenui Forest located 5 km west of Whangarei city. A witness who had some aeroplane pilot flying experience, and was on a property close to the track of ZK-DZG, said he saw the aircraft fly past shortly after about 1130 at an estimated height of 500 feet. He watched it fly in the direction of Pukenui Forest for about 40 seconds before turning his head away. A short time later he turned again to look at the aircraft, which by then was just above the horizon about 2 ridges away. He said there was a strong, constant wind blowing from the right (south) of the aircraft, which appeared to be drifting sideways and rocking its wings. He then saw the aircraft enter a steep descending turn that seemed to tighten before it disappeared from view. He estimated it to have turned about 270 degrees. Another witness near the aircraft track and accident site reported seeing the aircraft at about 1140 flying just above the tree line and thought it might have been “dusting” the forest. The aircraft then turned and disappeared behind some trees. Other witnesses who heard or saw the aircraft described the weather as squally throughout the morning with strong winds from the south, and said that near the time of the accident there was no rain. The witnesses noticed nothing untoward with the aircraft itself, and at the time none was concerned that the aircraft may have been involved in an accident. The local aircraft engineer said he was not concerned when ZK-DZG did not arrive at Whangarei, because from his experience it was not unusual for agricultural pilots to change their plans at the last minute and to not inform the engineers. He described his conversation with the pilot as being casual and said the pilot did not mention that he was finishing topdressing for the day because of the weather. He thought the pilot was just trying to fit in the maintenance work and that his plans had changed. The pilot had not asked him to provide any search and rescue watch, nor did the engineer expect him to because he could not recall any pilot having asked him to do so. There was no evidence that the pilot made any radio calls during the flight. The frequency to which the radio was selected and its serviceability could not be determined because of the accident damage. At about 2200 a member of the pilot’s family contacted the emergency services when she became concerned that there had been no contact from the pilot. An extensive aerial search began at first light the next morning, and at about 1120 the wreckage of ZK-DZG was located about 50 metres (m) below a ridge in a heavily wooded area of Pukenui Forest, at an elevation of 920 feet above sea level. Both occupants were fatally injured.

The float-equipped de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (registration C-FODG, serial number 205) departed the outfitter base camp at Squaw Lake, Quebec, at 0925 eastern daylight time, with a passenger and a few supplies on board, for a round-trip visual flight rules (VFR) flight to two wilderness camps, Camp 2 and Camp Pons. The weather in Squaw Lake was suitable for visual flight at the time of take-off but was forecast to deteriorate later in the day. The pilot completed the flights to the two camps and on the way back to Squaw Lake, the weather forced the pilot to make a precautionary landing on Elross Lake, 15 nautical miles (nm) northwest of Squaw Lake. At 1630, he reported to the company via high frequency (HF) radio that he intended to take off from Elross Lake, as there seemed to be a break in the weather. Rescue efforts were initiated in the evening when the aircraft did not arrive at the base camp. The aircraft was located at 1230 the following day, 4 nm from Elross Lake. The aircraft was destroyed by a post-impact fire. The pilot sustained fatal injuries.