Ferry

The aircraft departed Grand Manan, New Brunswick, at 1938 Atlantic daylight time (ADT) on a charter flight to Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, with the pilot and five passengers on board. After dropping off the passengers at Yarmouth, the aircraft departed at 2106 ADT for a night visual flight to return to Grand Manan. The pilot was unable to land at Grand Manan off the first visual approach because of low weather conditions and conducted a second visual approach. During the second approach, he noticed that he required increasing right rudder to maintain direction, and that the left engine manifold pressure was low. The pilot feathered the left propeller and, despite the application of full power on the right engine, the aircraft would not accelerate or climb. The aircraft began a shallow descent into a fog layer, and the aircraft collided with some trees, pitched nose-down, and struck the ground. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and a post-impact fire. The pilot suffered serious injuries, but managed to get out of the aircraft and make his way to a nearby cabin where he was found by a ground search team about three hours later.

On a flight from Porto Alegre to Rio de Janeiro, while cruising at an altitude of 33,000 feet, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent. The crew did not send any distress call. The aircraft descended with a rate of 20,000 feet per minute. At an altitude of 1,500 feet, it disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed. Both pilots were killed.

The departure from Langgur was delayed for few hours due to technical problems with the right engine, so it was decided to ferry the airplane to Ambon for repairs. On final approach to Ambon-Pattimura Airport in light rain and mist, the aircraft stalled and crashed 270 metres short of runway. The aircraft was destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

The crew was completing a flight from Colmar to Zurich with an intermediate stop in Basel. While on a night approach to runway 28 at Zurich-Kloten Airport, both engines lost power simultaneously. The aircraft lost height, struck a three-floor building and crashed on a second one located few dozen metres further. The captain was seriously injured while the copilot was killed.

The pilot had made a refueling stop at Vandalia, Illinois. She did not observe the refueling process, but the FBO also operated a King Air and she felt he knew the proper procedure to follow. The airplane was reportedly serviced with 235 gallons of Jet-A fuel (total capacity is 384 gallons). The pilot flew between 7,500 and 10,500 feet. When the airplane was 45 minutes from its destination, the fuel transfer pump lights illuminated, indicating the wing tanks were empty. The nacelle tank gauges registered 3/4 full and the pilot determined she had sufficient fuel to complete the flight. When the airplane was three minutes from its destination, both engines flamed out and the pilot made a wheels up forced landing. When the salvage company recovered the airplane, they reported finding no evidence of fuel aboard. The pilot was provided and used performance charts for the Beech 65-A90 instead of the Beech B90.

Before the ferry flight, the pilot (PIC) & inexperienced copilot noted the left & right, float-type, underwing, fuel gauges indicated about 3,900 & 4,050 lbs of fuel, respectively. After takeoff, they noted that the cockpit gauges showed an opposite fuel imbalance of 4,100 & 3,600 lbs in the left & right tanks. Due to this indication, the PIC crossfed fuel from the left tank to both engines for about 30 min to rectify the perceived fuel imbalance. Later as they approached the destination, the left tank was exhausted of fuel, & the left engine lost power, although the left gauge indicated about 500 lbs of fuel remaining in that tank. The PIC then crossfed fuel from the right tank to both engines, & left engine power was restored. ATC vectored the flight for an emergency ILS runway 3 approach. The PIC was distracted during the approach & maneuvered the airplane to re-intercept the localizer. About 500' agl in IMC, both engines lost power. During a forced landing at night, the airplane struck a raised berm & was damaged. No evidence of fuel was found in the left tank; 125 gal of fuel was found in the right tank. Unusable fuel was published as 3 gal. During an exam of the engines & fuel system components, no preimpact failure was found. Historical data from the manufacturer indicated that when the airplane had a low fuel state, unporting of fuel tank outlets could occur during certain maneuvers. This information was not in the Convair 340 flight manual, although unporting of the outlets on this flight was not verified.

The flight was cleared for the VOR/DME approach to runway 17 at the Marco Island Airport. The CVR recorded conversation between the pilot and co-pilot reference to the approach, specifically the MDA both in mean sea level and absolute altitude for a straight-in-approach to runway 17. The flight crew announced that the flight was landing on runway 35. The flight crew did not discuss the missed approach procedure nor the circling minimums. The flight continued and the co-pilot announced that the flight was 5 miles from the airport to descend to the MDA to visually acquire the airport. While descending about 8.5 feet of the left wing of the airplane was severed by a guy wire about 587 feet above ground level from an antenna that was 3.36 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 17. The tower is listed on the approach chart that was provided to the flight crew. The airplane then rolled left wing low, recovered to wings level, then was observed to roll to the left, pitch nose down, and impacted the ground. A fireball was then observed by witnesses. The altimeters, air data computer, and pilot's airspeed indicator were last calibrated about 8 months before the accident. The co-pilots altimeter was found set .01 high from the last known altimeter setting provided to the flight crew. The CVR did not record any conversation pertaining to failure or malfunction of either the pilot or copilot's HSI, the DME or Altimeters. There were no alarms from the VOR/DME monitoring equipment the day of the accident. The flight crew of another airplane executed the same approach about 30 minutes before the accident and they reported no discrepancies with the approach. The MDA for the segment of the approach between where the tower is located is no lower than 974 feet above ground level.

The aircraft was ferried from Kiev to Bamako with an intermediate stop in Tunis following a complete revision at the Antonov factory in Kiev. En route from Kiev to Tunis, while flying over the north part of Greece, the crew informed ATC about technical problems and was cleared to divert to Thessaloniki-Makedonia Airport. As a radar (instrument) approach was not possible, the crew attempted to land under VFR mode in IMC conditions. On final, in limited visibility due to rain falls and fog, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the slope of a mountain located 4 km short of runway. All six crew members were killed. It is possible that the crew encountered technical problems with fuel.

On approach to Posadas-Libertador General José de San Martín Airport, the crew encountered low visibility due to foggy conditions. Despite the fact he was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway, the crew decided to continue the approach when the aircraft landed on the taxiway parallel to the runway. After a course of 800 metres, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was written off.

The new owner/co-pilot of the 50-year-old airplane and another pilot, who was typed rated in the airplane, departed on a 1,700 mile ferry flight. After the first 250 mile leg, the airplane was landed at another airport with a right engine problem. The owner replaced the right engine and continued the ferry flight. Twenty minutes into the second flight, the replacement right engine lost power. The owner stated that they applied maximum power to the left engine, were unable to feather the right propeller, and performed a forced landing to a field. However, the airplane collided with trees before reaching the field, then burned after impact. Investigation revealed that during the past 5 years, the airplane had neither flown nor had an annual inspection, except for 3 recent maintenance flights, totaling 1.5 Hours. The right propeller blades had chordwise scratches. The left propeller blades had no chordwise scratches. Examination of the wreckage revealed three propeller strikes in the ground, near the right engine ground scar, and no propeller strikes in the ground, near the left engine ground scar. The right engine mixture was locked in the auto-cruise position, while the left was locked in the emergency position. Airplane charts listed the single-engine rate of climb with a feathered propeller to be 350 feet per minute, and 10 feet per minute with a windmilling propeller.