Executive/Corporate/Business

During arrival, the pilot was advised the destination weather was: estimated 500 feet overcast, visibility one mile with fog, airport below minimums. The pilot elected to make an NDB runway 23 approach, but said he would divert if a missed approach was made. He was provided radar vectors and was cleared for the approach. At the IAF (initial apch fix/tiney intersection), radar service was terminated and the pilot was told to contact tower. On tower frequency, the pilot was again reminded the airport was below minimums. Approximately two minutes later, he reported over the outer marker (OM) which was 4.2 miles past (southwest of) the NSB/final approach fix (FAF) and 3.9 miles northeast of the airport. Seconds later, the tower transmitted info (just recorded from ARTCC) that the aircraft was 2-1/2 mi east of course. Tower tried to notify the pilot, but radio and radar contact were lost. Investigations revealed the aircraft impacted a ridge nearly 4 miles past the NDB and two miles left of course at an elevation of approximately 1,900 feet, but before passing the OM. Minimum descent altitude (MDA) between the NDB and OM was 2,220 feet msl. MDA after passing the OM was 1,940 feet; airport elevation was 1,161 feet. No preimpact aircraft problems were found. The NDB facility operated satisfactorily during flight and ground checks. All five occupants were killed.

On final approach to Deauville-Saint-Gatien Airport, the twin engine airplane struck the ground and crashed in a field short of runway. Both wings were torn off and the aircraft was destroyed. There were no casualties.

Ten minutes prior to landing heavy rain fell on airport. Aircraft made normal touchdown, spoilers and lift dump activated. Pilot-in-command delayed brake application as usual and did not get thrust levers in idle. After aircraft passed mid-field taxiway pic reported brakes became ineffective. Aircraft hydroplaned on water-covered runway and overran departure end, down and embankment, and hit a ditch. Runway had an off center crown, grass was about two feet tall at runway edge, and a dam had formed from previously cut grass which prevented water drainage. Airport manager said he was not aware water would stand on runway.

In unknown circumstances, the twin engine airplane struck the slope of Mt Pakaraima. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During an ILS to runway 35, the approach was normal until the aircraft was approximately 100 feet above the decision height, except there was condensation on the windshield. Touchdown was hard. A witness said the aircraft landed approximately 1/3 of the way down the 5,200 feet runway. After landing, with the props in 'ground fine,' braking action was ineffective on the wet runway. The aircraft was not equipped with an anti-skid braking system. Subsequently, the aircraft continued off the runway and went down an embankment into a field. Scrub marks on the runway and reverted rubber on the tires indicated the aircraft was hydroplaning. According to the flight manual, 4,500 feet (plus a 10% factor for no anti-skid) would have been required to stop on a dry runway in the prevailing weather conditions, which included a slight tailwind. Two pax, acting as flight attendants (f/a's), assisted the other pax in evacuating. An investigation revealed the f/a's were not properly trained; the pax were not completely briefed before the flight; and the passenger briefing cards were inadequate. The aircraft was on a business flight to transport an entertainment troupe.

The aircraft was cleared for an NDB approach to Cadillac. The weather was 300 feet overcast, one mile visibility. Shortly after cancelling IFR the aircraft crashed on the opposite side of the airport from the approach end of the runway. The pilot activated runway lights were never turned on during the approach. It was a newly commissioned system not yet on approach plates. They were on a notam. An ntap revealed that the aircraft was following the rnav final approach course rather than the NDB final approach course. In addition, a lighted christmas tree farm was located adjacent to the airport. Lastly, no evidence of mechanical malfunction could be found in the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.

The pilot was forced to attempt an emergency landing for unknown reason. There were no casualties. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

A student pilot in a Cessna 152, N5522L, had departed Redbird Airport at Dallas. He was practicing solo maneuvers in a privately designated practice area that overlapped the extended inbound course to runway 31L and 31R at Love Field. At the same time, a Cessna 441, N400BG, was being vectored for a back course ILS to rwy 31R. DFW approach control cleared N400BG to continue descending to 3,000 feet and fly heading 290°. While N400BG was descending thru approximately 3,600 feet, about 14 miles southeast of Love Field, the two aircraft collided. The Cessna 152 pilot was maneuvering at or near the edge of the practice area when the collision occurred. An investigation revealed the Cessna 152 had just completed an approximately 180° turn toward an easterly heading. Both aircraft were demolished in a quartering head-on collision. Radar info from both aircraft was displayed on the controller's scope. The Cessna 152 was depicted as a 1200 beacon code; however, it was not equipped with a mode C (altitude reporting) transponder. The controller did not provide a traffic advisory for the Cessna 441 pilot; but, in this situation, an advisory was not mandatory. All five pilot on both aircraft were killed.

The Falcon 10 touched down long and fast on a wet runway, experienced hydroplaning and went off the end of the runway, struck a drainage ditch and collapsed the landing gear. The nose gear came back and bent the throttle quadrant bracket, pulled the fuel controls to 90% power. This pushed the aircraft on its belly another 1,000-1,600 feet until it came to a stop on a hillside. Both pilots were uninjured.

During arrival, the aircrew of a Gates Learjet 35A, N873LP, canceled their IFR clearance and contacted the Auburn unicom, then entered the traffic pattern to land on runway 18. The unicom operator reported that the Learjet crew had reported their position on each portion of the traffic pattern. At approximately the same time, the pilot of an unregistered, experimental, Challenger II was in the traffic pattern for runway 10. The two runways intersected at their approach ends. Just before landing, the two aircraft collided as they were crossing over the intersection and crashed on the airport. The challenger (a two place version of an ultralight vehicle) was not equipped with a radio and the unicom operator was unaware of its presence in the traffic pattern. The Learjet pilot stated that neither he nor his copilot had seen any other traffic at the airport. No indication was found that either crew had taken evasive action. An exam of the crash site revealed evidence that the collision had occurred approximately 50 feet above the intersection. A pilot on board the Learjet was killed while six other occupants were injured. The pilot of the Challenger II was also killed.