Executive/Corporate/Business

N2336X was on a business flight to Cody, WY. The pilot executed a missed approach on the first attempt of the VOR-A approach. A pilot who landed at Cody minutes before the accident said the visibility had decreased to 3/4 of a mile when N2336X made the first approach and approx 1/2 mile when N2336X crashed. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a mechanical malfunction or failure of the aircraft prior to accident. The sas servo arm was found in the full up position. The aircraft struck the terrain in a steep nose low attitude on a heading that was opposite to the direction of flight. Approach minimums at Cody are 5,800 feet and 1 mile visibility. All three occupants were killed.

On final approach to Rønne Airport, both engines failed simultaneously. The aircraft stalled and crashed in an open field located few km short of runway. All four occupants escaped with minor injuries while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot made a fairly long taxi from the ramp to the end of the runway and then started his takeoff roll with the parking brake still partially set. The brakes became very hot and the component parts expanded. After rolling almost 3,000 feet the brakes tightened up to the extent that both main gear tires started leaving black skid marks which continued until the aircraft ran off the end of the runway without obtaining flying speed, a distance of 3,168 feet. It was noted, through a design feature of the aircraft, that the parking brake handle could be placed in the released position without the brake being released. However, this would give the appearance that it had been released. The main gear tires were worn almost slick during this attempted takeoff. Both main gear brakes had been overheated during this time to the extent that they were destroyed. The aircraft was destroyed by collision with trees, rocks and a fire hydrant at the bottom of a hill off the end of the runway. The pilot escaped with serious injuries.

The two aircraft, a Beech U-21A and a Piper PA-31-350, collided nearly head on at 7,000 feet msl over Independence, MO. In daylight VMC conditions with a visibility of 20 miles. The U-21 was in level cruise and the PA-31 was climbing eastbound to an undisclosed altitude enroute to Saint Louis. Both aircraft were equipped with operating mode-c transponders but the controller in contact with the U-21 did not observe the conflict and traffic advisories were not provided. The PA-31 was operating in accordance with visual flight rules. The U-21 was operating in accordance with instrument flight rules. After the collision both aircraft crashed in uncontrolled descent. There was no indication that either aircraft took any evasive action. The conflict alert subprogram of the ARTS III tracking system was not programmed to alert the controllers to the impending collision and the two controllers did not observe any target in the vicinity of the data block representing the U-21. All six occupants in both aircraft were killed.

En route, the right engine failed. The pilot was unable to feather the propeller and the aircraft lost height until it crashed on the slope of a mountain located west of Wada, in the prefecture of Nagano. The aircraft was destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

The pilot stated that this was not a charter flight and, as such, he decided to attempt the loc 17 approach to Olathe even though the area was forecasting zero-zero conditions. According to the pilot, the last thing he remembers during the flight is bracketing the loc and reading 1,600 feet on the altimeter. Subsequently, the pilot further stated, he remembers being on the ground inside the wreckage, mitigating the injuries suffered and trying to stay warm. A post-accident invest revealed that the aircraft was to the left of the localizer course when it struck two trees 12 feet agl (1,062 feet msl), while in a 30° right bank. The aircraft made a flat 360 right pirouette over some small trees, tearing off the left wing before impacting the ground and sliding approximately 600 feet. A post-crash fire erupted from the right wing tank but it extinguished itself. A dot FAA operational flight test found the localizer to be within limits. A leak check of the aircraft static system and a bench check of both altimeters were satisfactory.

The pilot took off in fog and light rain and climbed into clouds at about 300-400 feet above the ground while both landing lights were extended and illuminated. Also the airport's rotating beacon (located about a mile from the accident site) was flashing on the clouds according to a ground witness. Just after entering the clouds the pilot was issued a left turn from his present heading of 350° to a heading of 270° and told to contact departure control. He did not make this contact and he continued the left turn (now descending) to a heading of 210° at which time the aircraft collided with trees and a large electrical transmission line and then the ground. The engines were operating at a high power setting at the time of impact. All broken flight control cables revealed evidence of overstress separation. No evidence of preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction was found. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

On approach to Casablanca-Nouasseur Airport, the crew failed to realize his altitude was insufficient when the aircraft crashed into houses located 2 km short of runway. All eight occupants were killed as well as two people on the ground.

During arrival for a LOC runway 26 approach, the pilot was advised the abyss fan marker was notamed out-of-service. With abyss inoperative, the minimum descent altitude (MDA) was 2200 feet. After N65TD was cleared for the approach, radar service was terminated and the flight was cleared to advisory frequency. The crew contacted unicom and obtained airport and weather advisory. The Unicom operator advised winds light and variable, estimated 800 feet overcast, visibility 5 miles, slush and ice reported on runway 1/2 hr earlier. After the crew reported 'procedure turn inbound,' no further transmissions were received from the aircraft. Subsequently, it hit trees on rising terrain at an elevation of approx 2200 feet, approx 7 miles before reaching the final approach fix (FAF, DALTON NDB). Minimum altitude for the approach in that area was 3000 feet. No preimpact part problems were found during the investigation. Airport elevation was 1194 feet. Radio transcripts indicated the crew were getting a weak signal from the DALTON NDB. Although not a required navaid, CHESTER VORTAC was depicted on the approach chart as an additional source to id the FAF, but was notamed as out-of-svc. The pilot did not obtain notams before flight.

While approaching Fort McMurray Airport, the twin engine airplane struck tree tops and crashed in a wooded area located 11 km southeast of the airfield. All four occupants were seriously injured.