Executive/Corporate/Business

Witnesses reported hearing an airplane engine at night, at high power for about 5 seconds followed by impact. They went to the scene and found the airplane on the left side of the approach end of runway 03, on fire. The pilot was removed and the fire was extinguished. The airplane had struck a runway threshold light located about 25 feet to the left side of the runway, and slid about 100 feet into trees, angling away from the runway on a heading of 360 degrees. The outboard 5 feet of the left wing was bent up about 20 degrees. Ground scars were found corresponding to the positions of the left, right, and nose landing gears, all of which had collapsed. The inboard section of the left wing came to rest on the nose of the airplane. The propeller blades were deformed with "S" bending and leading edge gouges. Flight control continuity was verified to the rudder and elevator. The aileron control cables had separated with puffed ends. All separations occurred at other than attach points. The pilot had received head injuries and has no memory of the accident.

About 20 minutes before the accident, the pilot reported to the air traffic controller that he had a problem with an engine and needed to shut the engine down. The flight had just leveled at 23,000 feet. The controller told the pilot that he was near Jackson, Tennessee, and that he could descend to 7,000 feet. About 10 minutes later, the pilot reported he was at 8,000 feet and requested radar vectors for the instrument landing system approach to runway 2 at the McKellar-Sipes Regional Airport, at Jackson. The pilot told the controller he had the left engine shut down. About 5 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a propeller runaway. About 1 minute later, the pilot reported he was in visual conditions and requested radar vectors direct to the airport. About 2 minutes later, the pilot reported he had a cloud layer under him and that he had the localizer frequency for runway 2 set. About 1 minute later, the pilot was told to contact the McKellar Airport control tower. The pilot acknowledged this instruction. No further transmissions were received from the flight. Examination of the left engine at the accident site showed the left propeller control was found disconnected at the point the propeller control extension bracket attaches to the propeller governor. The propeller control cable had also pulled loose from a swaged point at the control rod and was also separated further aft due to overstress. The housing for the propeller control rod was found securely attached to the engine and the control rod was securely attached to the extension bracket. The propeller governor control arm, which was disconnected from the propeller control cable and rod, was found spring loaded into the high RPM position. Examination of the fractured left propeller bracket assembly was performed by the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The bracket assembly was fractured in the area of the outermost eyehole, at the point a bolt passes through the bracket assembly and the propeller governor arm. The fracture surface contained small amounts of dirt, grease, and minor corrosion. The fracture surface features include flat areas that lie on multiple planes separated by ratchet marks, features typically left behind by the propagation of a fatigue crack. The fatigue crack emanated from multiple origins on opposite sides of the bracket. The total area of the fatigue crack occupied approximately 85 percent of the fracture surfaces. The fatigue fractures initiated on the outer edges of the surface and propagated inward toward the center. The remaining 15% of the fracture surface had features consistent with overstress separation. Near the middle of each fatigue region were microfissures suggesting that the crack propagated under high-stress conditions. The NTSB Materials Laboratory also examined the separation point between the left propeller control flexible cable and the rigid rod that connects to the bracket assembly. The cable and the swaged part of the rigid rod were in good condition with no fractures or damage. The Piper PA-31-T2 Pilot Operating Handbook, Section 3, Emergency Procedures, does not contain a procedure for loss of propeller control. Section 3 did contain a procedure for "Over speeding Propeller", which stated that if a propellers speed should exceed 1,976 rpm, to place the power lever of the engine with the over speeding propeller to idle, feather the propeller, place the engine condition lever in the stop position, and complete the engine shutdown procedures. Pilot logbook records show the pilot completed a simulator training course for the accident model airplane about 9 days before the accident and had about 13 flight hours in the Piper PA-31-T2.

The airplane was fueled to capacity and placed in a heated hangar about one hour before departure. The instrument rated pilot obtained a weather briefing, filed an IFR flight plan, and obtained an IFR clearance. Low ceiling, reduced visibility, and ice fog prevented control tower personnel from observing the takeoff. Radar (NTAP) and on-board GPS data indicated the airplane began drifting to the left of runway centerline almost immediately after takeoff. The airplane made a climbing left turn, achieving a maximum altitude of 7,072 feet and completing 217 degrees of turn, before beginning a descending left turn. The airplane impacted terrain on airport property. Autopsy/toxicology protocols were unremarkable. There was no evidence of preimpact failure/malfunction of the airframe, powerplant, propeller, or flight controls. The autopilot and servos, pitot-static system, and flight instruments were tested and all functioned satisfactorily. The pilot's shoulder harness was found attached to the seatbelt, but the male end of the seatbelt buckle was broken.

The pilot and passengers were on a instrument flight returning home. When they were within range of the destination airport, the controller cleared the flight for an instrument approach. Moment later the pilot canceled his instrument flight plan and told the controller that he was below the weather. Low clouds, reduced visibility and fog existed at the destination airport at the time of the accident. The airplane collided with a river bank as the pilot maneuvered for the visual approach. The post-crash examination of the airplane failed to disclose a mechanical problem.

Shortly after takeoff at less than 200 feet above ground level the pilot reported an engine failure, and requested to return to the airport. The controller saw the airplane in a right turn, descending, and observed the airplane level its wings just prior to impact with the tips of trees. The airplane collided with terrain approximately 2,000 feet east of the approach end of runway 20L. A post crash fire ensued and consumed a majority of the airplane. Examination of both engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components characteristic of the engines being powered, with the propellers out of feather at the time of impact, and a low power range. Examination of the propellers found the left propeller blades showed more damage then the blades from the right propeller. Both propellers were rotating with considerable rotational energy. However, examination showed that the left propeller had more power then the right.

The pilot and passenger departed on a night IFR flight. Weather en route was a mixture of instrument and visual meteorological conditions. When the airplane was 17 miles southwest of its destination, the pilot was cleared for an instrument approach. At 9 miles, the pilot reported the airport in sight, and canceled his IFR clearance. The airplane continued to descend towards the airport on a modified left base until radar contact was lost at 3,300 feet msl. The pilot was in radio contact with his wife just prior to the accident. He advised her that he was on base for runway 32. Neither the pilot's wife, nor ATC received a distress call from the pilot. The airplane was located the next morning about 100 feet below the top of a mountain. The accident site was 7.9 miles from the airport, and approximately 1,200 feet above the airport elevation. Ground based weather radar recorded light snow showers, in the general vicinity of the accident site about the time of the accident, and satellite imagery showed that the airplane was operating under a solid overcast. A level path was cut through the trees that preceded the main wreckage. Examination of both engines and the airframe revealed no pre impact failures or malfunctions.

During en route cruise flight at an assigned altitude of 11,000 feet (msl) in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane impacted mountainous terrain at 5,300 feet, in wings level, descending flight. During the final 12 minutes of the flight (from 1046 to 1058 Pacific daylight time), recorded military search radar height values (primary radar returns) show the aircraft in a steady descent from 11,000 feet to 5,600 feet, where radar contact was lost. During the same time interval, recorded Mode C altitudes received at Los Angeles Air Traffic Control Center (Center) and SoCal Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) indicated the aircraft was level at 11,000 feet. At 1055:49, when the pilot was handed off from SoCal TRACON to Los Angeles Center, the pilot checked in with the Center ". . . level at one one thousand." At 1057:28, the pilot asked the Center controller "what altitude you showing us at" to which the controller responded "not receiving your mode C right now sir." At 1057:37, the pilot transmitted "o k we'd like to climb to vfr on top, our uh altimeter just went down to uh fifty three hundred." The controller approved the pilot's request to climb to VFR conditions on-top and, at 1057:54, the pilot responded "roger we're out." No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The airplane was equipped with a single instrument static pressure system with two heated static ports. The static system and static system instruments were damaged or destroyed by impact and post-crash fire sufficiently to preclude post-accident testing.

During the takeoff roll on runway 33 at Toulouse-Blagnac Airport, at a speed of 50 knots, it is believed that the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft skidded on runway, lost its nose gear and came to rest. All eight occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot said that he 'landed properly' on the runway, touching down at about 700 feet from the approach end. He said that he 'applied brakes, which had no effect, ran out of runway, and turned to the right to avoid trees. [The] Grassy field should have worked out, except for the drainage ditch.' The pilot said that later he was told that there was a tail wind estimated at 45 knots, when he landed. Examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. Approximately 34 minutes before the accident, the weather observation at Louisville, Kentucky, 11 miles south of the accident site, reported winds of 320 degrees at 16 knots, with gusts to 20 knots.

The twin engine aircraft departed Douala on a flight to Abong Mbang with an intermediate stop in Djoum, carrying five passengers and one pilot. On final approach to Abong Mbang, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with limited visibility due to heavy rain falls. On short final, the aircraft struck the ground about 60 metres short of runway threshold. Upon impact, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft came to rest on its belly. All six occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.