Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

The pilot was on approach for landing when the right main landing gear did not indicate that it was down. The pilot made a go-around and remained in left closed traffic performing emergency gear extension procedures with negative results. The pilot departed closed traffic and proceeded offshore to burn off fuel before attempting an emergency landing. A company airplane was dispatched to verify the landing gear position. The pilot started a straight in approach for landing five miles from the airport. The right engine started surging and quit. The left engine started surging one mile from the runway. He switched fuel tanks. The engine started and quit. He made a forced landing straight ahead and collided with runway approach lights about 1/4 mile from the end of the runway. The pilot stated he ran out of fuel.

Witnesses near the airport saw the flight approach on a left base to runway 4, touchdown on the runway, and takeoff again. One witness, a pilot, said the airplane turned onto final to the 'south' (right) of the runway centerline.' The airplane made a 'sharp' turn to the left to realign with the runway center, slightly overshot the runway to the left, turned to the right 'sharply,' and touched down on the runway. The witness further stated, '...by the time the pilot was on the runway he had wasted approximately 1,200 to 1,500 feet of runway 4, they hit reverse thrusters [sic] and were on full bore till they crossed runway 27 and 9.' The witness saw heat come out of both engine thrust reversers, the nose gear touched down and then came up again. He then saw the airplane come off the ground about 30 to 40 feet, wobble left and right at a 'slow airspeed,' crossover a highway at a low altitude, right wing low, strike some wires, go into a field, and catch fire. The pilot said, when he touched down on the runway, the airplane seemed to 'lurch' to the side. He said at this point his airspeed was 126 knots. He elected to abort the landing, and applied full power. He said the engines would not develop thrust and he elected to land in a field less than 1/4 mile in front of him. Examination of the left thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully open. Both the left and right pneumatic latches were found in the unlocked position. Examination of the right thrust reverser revealed that the translator was in the deployed position, with the blocker doors fully closed. The left pneumatic latch was found in the locked position. The right pneumatic latch was found in the unlocked position. The inboard sequence latches were found about 2 inches forward of full aft travel. The thrust reverser switch was found in the 'NORMAL' position. According to Gates Lear Jet Airworthiness Directive (AD) 79-08-01, '...to preclude inadvertent thrust reverser deployment and possible loss of aircraft control....,' the following limitations apply to all gates Lear Jet Model 35, 36, 35A, 36A, aircraft equipped with Aeronca Thrust reversers. According to the AD, Section I-LIMITATION; '....Thrust Reversers must not be operated prior to takeoff...Thrust Reversers must not be used for touch and go landings...After Thrust Reversers have been deployed, a visual check of proper door stowing must be made prior to takeoff...Operational Procedures in this Thrust Reverser Supplement are mandatory.' According to Lear Jet and FlightSafety International, the procedures that are taught to Lear Jet pilots in the use of thrust reverse and spoilers during landings are; '...pilots [are] to use thrust reverse only on full stop Lear Jet landings. Pilot are trained not to deploy spoilers or thrust reverse during touch and go's or during balked landings.' The pilot-in-command of N19LH at the time of the accident, told the NTSB investigator-in-charge (IIC) that he was 'aware' of the limitations on the Aeronca Thrust Reverser and he knew that once the Thrust Reverser was deployed that he was 'committed' to land. The pilot told the IIC that he knew of the limitations and that he was committed to land.

Following a wrong approach configuration, the twin engine aircraft landed too far down the runway at Walker's Cay Airfield. After touchdown, the pilot realized his mistake and initiated a go-around procedure. He asked the passenger seating on the right seat (a pilot rated passenger) to retract the flaps. Mistakenly, the passenger raised the landing gear instead. The aircraft sank on its belly, causing both propellers to struck the runway surface. The aircraft caught fire and the pilot elected to continue. During initial climb, he eventually ditched the airplane few dozen metres offshore. Both occupants were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

Leased from Winemiller Aviation, the aircraft was completing a charter flight from Fort Lauderdale to Cap Haïtien on behalf of the Metro Nord Travel Club. On approach to Cap Haïtien, flaps and undercarriage were selected down when the hydraulic pressure dropped. The crew continued the approach and the emergency air brake was armed. Upon touchdown, both tyres on the left main gear burst after the brakes locked. The aircraft veered off runway to the left and eventually collided with a parked UH-60 helicopter. All 31 occupants were evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot stated the left engine backfired and began to run rough shortly after takeoff. The engine was shut down and the propeller was feathered. He decided to return and land on the departure runway. Witnesses observed the aircraft on the downwind leg at 800 to 1,000 feet with the landing gear extended. As the aircraft turned to base leg it yawed sharply to the left and the left wing dropped. The aircraft descended rapidly. The pilot stated that as he turned from base to final leg at 75 to 100 feet the aircraft was buffeting and beginning to stall. He realized he would not make the runway and crash landed in a vacant lot. Examination of the left engine after the accident revealed no evidence to indicate precrash failure or malfunction of the engine.

The pilot was deviating around weather during descent when he noted the fuel flow and manifold pressure on the left engine oscillating. Because the propeller was still turning he elected not to feather the left propeller. The airplane would not maintain altitude so he lowered the landing gear and ditched the airplane in a swamp. Examination of the left fuel tank revealed the fuel float valve actuators and float arms excessively worn. This condition would allow unmetered air into the fuel lines. Also noted was the condition of one of the left fuel valves that could jam open allowing the fuel pickup to unport and induce excessive air into the fuel lines.

Crashed in unknown circumstances upon landing at South Bimini Airport. The pilot, sole on board, was uninjured.

The crew reported over radio that the #4 engine failed shortly after takeoff, and they were attempting to dump fuel when the #2 engine overheated. They then intentionally ditched the airplane. The wreckage was recovered about 2 weeks afterward, and the airplane was about 50% corroded away. Due to massive salt water corrosion, no preimpact failure/malfunction of the #4 engine could be identified. No record of airplane/operator being granted cfr part 129 certificate authority. No substantiation of the times in service for the airplane, engines, propellers, and time change components or airworthiness directives could be determined.

As the airplane was deviating around low intensity weather returns, and passing through 20,500 feet during climb out, it departed controlled flight and entered a right spiral. Descent rates exceeded 16,600 fpm during the descent from 18,300 feet to 3,900 feet and then slowed. Witnesses stated they saw the airplane descend from the clouds in a right flap spin. The empennage had separated from the airplane in pieces. Pieces of the wreckage were found up to 1.5 mile from the primary impact point. Both wings remained attached. The right engine was flamed out, and the propeller was feathered at impact. No mechanical reason for the flameout could be determined. At no time did the pilot indicate he was having difficulties. The NTSB weather study indicated that moderate turbulence was present in the area. The pilot's toxicology tests found 0.151 ug/ml of chlorpheniramine in the blood; normal therapeutic concentration is 0.01 to 0.04. Effects of overdosage include sedation, diminished mental alertness, and cardiovascular collapse to stimulation. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During cruise flight, the pilot reported that the right engine cowling partially separated and the left forward cylinder of that engine separated, followed by an engine compartment fire. He attempted to feather the propeller but was unable. He initiated a descent to extinguish the fire and was successful but after leveling off, was unable to maintain directional control. He ditched the airplane and both he and the passenger exited the aircraft. The pilot dragged the seriously injured passenger with him to a nearby island where they were rescued the following day. The aircraft was not recovered; therefore, no determination could be made as to the reason for the separation of the cylinder. Review of the aircraft logbook indicates that on 8/27/91, the n°5 cylinder of the right engine was removed and replaced. Also, the n°1 cylinder was removed and reinstalled following repair. There were no further entries in the aircraft logbook regarding cylinder removal or replacement to the right engine.