Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

The instructor pilot reported that while practicing an engine-out landing in the traffic pattern, the pilot-rated student overshot the turn from base leg to final rolling out to the right of the runway centerline. The student pilot attempted to turn back toward the runway and then saw that the airplane’s airspeed was rapidly decreasing. The instructor reported that when he realized the severity of the situation it was too late to do anything. The student attempted to add power for a go-around but was unable to recover. The airplane stalled about 10 ft above the ground, impacted the ground right of the runway, and skidded onto the runway where it came to rest. Both wings and the forward fuselage were substantially damaged. Both pilots stated there were no preaccident mechanical failures or malfunctions with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.

The pilot departed on an instrument flight rules cross-country flight with three passengers. While enroute at a cruise altitude about 6,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot discussed routing and weather avoidance with the controller. The controller advised the pilot there was a gap in the line of weather showing light precipitation, and that the pilot could pass through it and then proceed on course. The controller assigned the pilot a heading, which the pilot initially acknowledged, but shortly thereafter, he advised the controller that the airplane was pointed directly at a convective cell. The controller explained that the heading would keep the pilot out of the heavy precipitation and that he would then turn the airplane through an area of light precipitation. The pilot responded, saying that the area seemed to be closing in fast, the controller acknowledged and advised the pilot if he did not want to accept that routing, he could be rerouted. The pilot elected to turn toward a gap that he saw and felt he could fly straight through it. The controller acknowledged and advised the pilot that course would take him through moderate precipitation starting in about one mile extending for about four miles; the pilot acknowledged. Radar information indicated that the airplane entered an area of heavy to very heavy precipitation, likely a rain shower updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a preaccident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The airplane was equipped with the capability to display weather radar "mosaic" imagery created from Next Generation Radar (NEXRAD) data and it is likely that the pilot was using this information to navigate around precipitation when the airplane encountered a rain shower updraft with likely severe turbulence. Due to latencies inherent in processes used to detect and deliver the NEXRAD data from the ground site, as well as the frequency of the mosaic-creation process used by the service provider, NEXRAD data can age significantly by the time the mosaic image is created. The pilot elected to navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight based on the data displayed to him instead of the routing suggested by the controller, which resulted in the penetration of a rain shower updraft, a loss of airplane control, and a subsequent inflight breakup.

On September 15, 2019, at 1146 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N218MW, lost engine power while maneuvering over the Gulf of Mexico, and the pilot was forced to ditch. The private pilot was not injured. The airplane was registered to and operated by Mailworks, Inc., Spring Valley, California, under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Visual meteorological conditions existed near the accident site at the time of the accident, and the flight was operated on a visual flight rules flight plan. The flight originated at 0830 eastern daylight time from Space Coast Regional Airport (TIX), Titusville, Florida, and was en route to Ozona Municipal Airport (OZA), Ozona, Texas. His final destination was Gillespie Field Airport (SEE), El Cajon, California. According to the pilot's accident report, he departed TIX with 140 gallons of fuel. After crossing Gulfport (GPT), Mississippi's Terminal Radar Service Area (TRSA) at 10,500 ft, he initiated a slow descent over Boothville, Louisiana, and proceeded southbound towards the mouth of the Mississippi River, descending to 1,500 ft. He then configured the airplane for climb. The engine did not respond to the application of power and the airplane began losing altitude. After going through the emergency checklist, he was unable to restore engine power, and declared an emergency to Houston air route traffic control center (ARTCC) and on frequency 121.5 mHz. He also activated the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) prior to ditching. After ditching, the pilot put on his life jacket, exited the airplane, and remained on its wing until it sank. About an hour later, a U.S. Coast Guard helicopter rescued the pilot and transported him to a hospital in New Orleans, Louisiana. He was discharged a few hours later. The airplane has not been recovered.

The pilot was in cruise flight at an altitude of 19,000 feet mean sea level (msl) for about 1 hour and 10 minutes on an easterly heading when he requested a diversion from his filed destination to an airport along his route of flight to utilize a restroom. Two miles west of his amended destination at 12,000 ft msl, the pilot advised the controller that he had a “fuel emergency light" and wanted to expedite the approach. The controller acknowledged the low fuel warning and cleared the airplane to descend from its assigned altitude. Instead of conducting the descent over the airport, the airplane continued its easterly heading past the airport for nearly 8 miles before reversing course. After reversing course, instead of assuming a direct heading back to the airport, the pilot assumed a parallel reciprocal track and didn’t turn for the airport until the airplane intercepted the extended centerline of the landing runway. The pilot informed the controller that he was unable to make it to the airport and performed a forced landing less than 1 mile from the landing runway. Both fuel tanks were breached during the accident sequence, and detailed postaccident inspections of the airplane’s fuel system revealed no leaks in either the supply or return sides of the system. A computer tomography scan and flow-testing of the engine-driven fuel pump revealed no leaks or evidence of fuel leakage. The engine ran successfully in a test cell. Data recovered from an engine and fuel monitoring system revealed that, during the two flights before the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the fuel consumption rates depicted at the respective power settings (climb, cruise, etc). During the accident flight, the reduction in fuel quantity was consistent with the indicated fuel flow throughout the climb; however, the fuel quantity continued to reduce at a rate consistent with a climb power setting even after engine power was reduced, and the fuel flow indicated a rate consistent with a cruise engine power setting. The data also showed that the indicated fuel quantity in the left and right tanks reached 0 gallons within about 10 minutes of each other, and shortly before the accident. Given this information, it is likely that the engine lost power due to an exhaustion of the available fuel supply; however, based on available data and findings of the fuel system and component examinations, the disparate rates of indicated fuel flow and fuel quantity reduction could not be explained.

The pilot departed on the cross-country flight with the airplane about 730 lbs over its maximum gross weight. While in cruise altitude at 27,000 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot reported to air traffic control that he observed weather on his radar along his route and ahead of his position. The areas of weather included thunderstorms with cloud tops up to 43,000 ft msl. The controller acknowledged the weather; however, she did not provide specifics to the pilot, including the size and strength of the area of precipitation or cloud tops information, nor did she solicit or disseminate any pilot reports related to the conditions, as required. The airplane entered an area of heavy to extreme precipitation, likely a thunderstorm updraft, while in instrument meteorological conditions. Tracking information indicated that the airplane climbed about 300 ft, then entered a right, descending spiral and broke up in flight at high altitude. The recovered wreckage was found scattered along a path about 2.6 miles in length. Both wings separated, and most of the empennage was not located. The airplane was likely about 148 lbs over the maximum allowable gross weight at the time of the accident. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of a pre accident malfunction or failure that would have prevented normal operation. The pilot, who owned the airplane, did not possess an instrument rating. The pilot-rated passenger in the right seat was instrument-rated but did not meet resency of experience requirements to act as pilot-in-command. Toxicology testing detected a small amount of ethanol in the pilot’s liver but not in muscle. After absorption, ethanol is uniformly distributed throughout all tissues and body fluids; therefore, the finding in one tissue but not another is most consistent with post-mortem production. Hazardous weather avoidance is ultimately the pilot’s responsibility, and, in this case, the airplane was sufficiently equipped to provide a qualified pilot with the information necessary to navigate hazardous weather; however, the controller’s failure to provide the pilot with adequate and timely weather information as required by Federal Aviation Administration Order JO 7110.65X contributed to the pilot’s inability to safely navigate the hazardous weather along his route of flight, resulting in the penetration of a thunderstorm and the resulting loss of airplane control and inflight breakup.