Piper PA-46 (Malibu/Meridian/Mirage/Matrix/M-Class)

Shortly after a night takeoff from Jacarepaguá Airport, the single engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent and crashed in the sea. Few debris were found several days later. The pilot's body was found on September 4 on a beach in Barra de Tijuca. The wreckage and the copilot's body were never found. It was reported that the crew did not activate the transponder after takeoff and did not contact ATC for unknown reasons.

A witness reported that the airplane veered left during the takeoff roll and headed toward a large ditch that surrounded the runway. It appeared that the pilot did not attempt to stop the airplane or abort the takeoff. The airplane continued toward the ditch, and, upon reaching the ditch's edge, the airplane rotated and reached an altitude of about 50 feet. The airplane's left wing collided with trees. The airplane rolled left and then right before stalling and crashing. The pilot stated that the airplane seemed to pull left on takeoff, possibly due to a right quartering tailwind, and that he did not realize where he was positioned on the runway. Examination of the airplane and engine did not reveal any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

While delivering the single-engine, turbine-powered airplane to Brazil during a multiple leg trip, the pilot decided to fly direct from his departure airport in Puerto Rico to his destination airport in Grenada instead of following the island chain and staying within power-off gliding distance of the shore. During the cruise portion of the flight, a total loss of engine power occurred over open water in visual meteorological conditions at 27,000 feet, about 119 miles west of a suitable landing area. During the loss of power, the engine torque indication dropped from the cruise power setting to 0 foot-pounds (ft-lbs) of torque, the engine then began to vibrate, and smoke began emanating from the engine. The pilot ditched the airplane, it sank, and it was not recovered. The pilot and the pilot-rated passenger were rescued by a French Navy helicopter. The pilot said that he had decided to take a direct route instead of staying closer to the island chain between the two airports because he had ferried 3 airplanes down to Brazil in the last year and that it was a judgment call and a calculated risk because the engine was reliable. At the airplane’s planned operating altitude of 27,000 feet, the airplane could have glided about 54 miles; if the route had been planned to take advantage of this glide distance, the pilot could have remained off shore island chain and taken a shorter, although not direct, route. Review of fueling documentation, the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH), and statements made by the pilot and pilot-rated passenger also revealed that on the accident flight, good operating practices were disregarded. For instance, during fueling, the airplane which was not equipped with fuel heaters, had been topped off with fuel, but no fuel icing additive had been added, even though the pilot was planning to operate the airplane at 27,000 feet. The airplane was also operated in excess of the manufacturer's published weight limitations, and no power setting or performance information was available for climb and cruise operations in excess of these limitations. Furthermore, according to the pilot, before the loss of engine power, the torque was about 937 ft-lbs. According to the pilot-rated passenger, before the failure, the torque gauge was indicating about 980 ft-lbs. Review of the maximum cruise performance chart in the POH and Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) revealed that both of the stated torque settings exceeded the maximum torque setting listed on the chart. Operating the engine beyond the recommended power settings specified in the POH/AFM for a prolonged period will result in accelerated deterioration due to hot section component distress and will affect engine reliability and durability.

On July 24, 2011, about 0920 central daylight time, a Piper PA-46-350P, N46TW, owned and operated by a private pilot, sustained substantial damage when it impacted powerlines and terrain during takeoff from runway 27 at the Rantoul National Aviation Center Airport-Frank Elliott Field (TIP), near Rantoul, Illinois. A post impact ground fire occurred. The personal flight was operating under 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. An instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was on file. The pilot and two passengers sustained fatal injuries. The flight was originating from TIP at the time of the accident and was destined for Sarasota/Bradenton International Airport (SRQ), near Sarasota, Florida. A witness, who worked at the fixed base operator, stated that the pilot performed the preflight inspection of the airplane in a hangar. An estimated 80 pounds. of luggage was loaded behind the airplane's rear seat. The witness said that the pilot's wife told the pilot that she had to use the restroom. The pilot reportedly replied to her to "hurry because a storm front was coming." The witness said that the engine start was normal and that both passengers were sitting in the rear forward-facing seats when the airplane taxied out. A witness at the airport, who was a commercial pilot, reported that he observed the airplane takeoff from runway 27 and then it started to turn to the south. He indicated that the landing gear was up when the airplane was about 500 feet above the ground. The witness stated that a weather front was arriving at the airport and that the strong winds from the northwest appeared to "push the tail of the plane up and the nose down." The airplane descended and impacted powerlines and terrain where the airplane subsequently caught on fire. The witness indicated that the airplane's engine was producing power until impact.

A witness reported and radar data showed the airplane approaching the runway at a higher‐than‐normal speed. As the airplane leveled low over the runway, the propeller began striking the runway surface. The damage from repetitive propeller strikes resulted in a loss of the thrust and airspeed necessary for flight. The airplane impacted the ground and subsequently caught fire. The postaccident examination of the wreckage confirmed that the airplane was configured with the landing gear and flaps retracted. No mechanical anomalies were observed that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane. Weight and balance estimates of the airplane indicated that the pilot was operating the airplane outside of its certified weight and center of gravity limits. Forensic toxicology performed on the pilot showed the presence of Hydrocodone and Dihydrocodeine, indicative of the pilot using disqualifying sedating cough or pain medications. These medications can impair performance in high workload environments. The level of medication found in the pilot’s blood at the time of the accident could not be determined. Additionally, Nortriptyline was detected in the pilot’s tissues. While the medications could have had degrading effects on the pilot’s performance, the investigation was not able to determine what role they may have played in the accident sequence.

While en route to the destination airport, the pilot was issued a clearance to descend. As the airplane descended to the assigned altitude, radar plots depicted the airplane entering a right turn, climbing rapidly, and then descending rapidly in a spiral-like pattern. The airplane wreckage was found the following day in mountainous terrain. Several tall trees surrounded the perimeter of the wreckage. Many of the trees showed scuff marks down the trunks consistent with the airplane impacting the terrain in a near-vertical descent. All airplane components were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airplane showed no preimpact failures of the airframe or the engine. A weather analysis revealed that the airplane was descending in the immediate vicinity of a stationary front. The weather conditions in the area were conducive to the production of moderate to severe turbulence, mountain wave activity with updraft/downdrafts in excess of 750 feet per minute, and moderate icing. The radar data confirmed that the airplane began its rapid descent shortly after entering cumuliform clouds. The radar information along with the wreckage at the accident site was consistent with the pilot losing control while trying to maneuver the airplane in an area of turbulent weather.

The single engine aircraft departed Kumamoto Airport runway 07 at 1711LT on a private flight to Kitakyūshū, with two persons on board: a PIC in the left seat and a passenger in the right seat. At 17:12:11, the radar of the Kumamoto aerodrome station C captured the aircraft. The pilot made a position report at 6 nm north of the airport at 2,300 feet. While climbing to the altitude of 6,500 feet, the pilot was instructed to change the frequency. About three minutes after takeoff, the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a wooded area located on the southeast slope of Mt Yago, about 14 km northeast of Kumamoto Airport. The wreckage was found in the afternoon of the following day at an altitude of 850 metres. The aircraft was destroyed and both occupants were killed, Mr. & Mrs. Hiroshi and Hiromi Kanda.

About 20 minutes after departing on a cross-country flight, the pilot acknowledged the air traffic controller’s clearance to climb to 17,000 feet mean sea level (msl). Radar data indicated that the airplane reached a maximum altitude of 16,800 feet msl. The airplane then entered a right descending turn followed by a left descending turn. While in the left turn, the pilot informed the controller, “I lost my autopilot; I’m in an unusual attitude.” The pilot stated this same information two more times in response to transmissions by the controller. The pilot’s last transmission was that he was busy trying to recover the airplane. Witnesses heard the airplane flying overhead for several minutes, but they could not see it due to the low ceiling. A postaccident examination of the airplane did not reveal any pre accident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the engine that would have precluded normal operation. Examination of the autopilot system revealed a loose screw inside the pitch servo housing. The screw was one of two that secured the high wattage resistor to the solenoid housing. Observed corrosion within the screw threads was consistent with the threads not being engaged in a nut or other internally threaded feature. No mechanical damage or arcing was visible on the screw. The operational impact of the loose screw is unknown. The pilot’s instrument flying proficiency could not be determined. According to log records, the pilot last flew 4.5 months before the accident. The airplane was in instrument meteorological conditions when the pilot stated that he was trying to recover from the unusual attitude. The pilot did not follow prescribed procedures for an autopilot malfunction. Weather data indicates that the airplane most likely encountered turbulence and icing conditions during the flight; however, the airplane was equipped with an ice protection system. Although ethanol was found during the toxicology tests, the levels varied greatly among the tissue/fluid samples. The investigation was unable to determine if the presence of ethanol was from ingestion or from postmortem production or contamination. The detected level of diphenhydramine, an over-the-counter sedating antihistamine used to treat allergies, was above therapeutic levels and likely contributed to the pilot’s inability to recover from the unusual attitude.

About 2 hours into a cross-country flight over water, the pilot heard a noticeable change in engine noise and observed erratic engine torque readings. Moments later the airplane experienced a complete loss of engine power. After declaring an emergency, the pilot attempted to diagnose the problem and restart the engine to no avail. The airplane ditched 175 miles from land, in water over 5,000 feet deep. The airplane was not recovered and the reason for the loss of engine power could not be determined.

The instrument-rated pilot was executing a night instrument approach when the airplane impacted the water. The published approach minimums for the area navigation/global positioning system approach were 460-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility. Recorded air traffic control voice and radar data indicated that prior to the approach the pilot had turned to an approximately 180-degree heading and appeared to be heading in the direction of another airport. The controller reassigned the pilot a heading in order to intercept the final approach. The airplane was located in the water approximately 5,000 feet from the runway threshold. A postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left main landing gear was in the retracted position and the right main and nose landing gear were in the extended position. Examination of the left main landing gear actuator revealed no mechanical anomalies. The pilot had likely just commanded the landing gear to the down position and the landing gear was in transit. It is further possible that, as the gear was in transit, the airplane impacted the water in a left-wing and nose-down attitude and the left gear was forced to a gear-up position.