Crash of a Douglas DC-8-43 in Palermo: 115 killed

Date & Time: May 5, 1972 at 2224 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
I-DIWB
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Rome - Palermo
MSN:
45625/144
YOM:
1961
Flight number:
AZ112
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
108
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
115
Captain / Total flying hours:
8565
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3117
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Rome-Fiumicino Airport, the crew started the approach to Palermo-Punta Raisi by night. The four engine airplane was too low and struck the slope of Mt Longa (600 meters high) located 7 km south of the airport, west of the village of Carini. It was determined that the aircraft struck the mountain just few meters below its summit and disintegrated on impact. All 115 occupants have been killed. At the time of the accident, the visibility was limited to 5 km with clouds down to 1,500 feet.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the crew started the approach prematurely, causing the aircraft to descent below the minimum descent altitude. The lack of visibility caused by adverse weather conditions remains a contributing factor, as well as poor IFR operation on part of the crew. Also, it was reported that the crew failed to follow some of ATC instructions.

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-63CF in Anchorage: 47 killed

Date & Time: Nov 27, 1970 at 1705 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N4909C
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
McChord – Anchorage – Yokota – Cam Ranh Bay
MSN:
46060/472
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
CL3/26
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
219
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
47
Captain / Total flying hours:
14650
Captain / Total hours on type:
5740.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
13500
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2057
Aircraft flight hours:
4944
Circumstances:
The airplane was completing a charter flight from McChord AFB to Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, with intermediate stops in Anchorage and Yokota, carrying 219 military personnels and 10 crew members. During the takeoff roll on runway 06R at Anchorage-Intl Airport, the airplane failed to gain sufficient speed and to get airborne. After V1 speed, the crew decided to abort the takeoff procedure but the airplane overran, struck a wooden barrier, an ILS structure, a 12-foot deep drainage ditch and came to rest in flames. A crew member and 46 passengers were killed while 182 other occupants were evacuated, 163 of them were wounded. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
The failure of the aircraft to attain the necessary airspeed to effect lift-off during the attempted takeoff. The lack of acceleration, undetected by the crew until after the aircraft reached V1 speed, was the result of a high frictional drag which was caused by a failure of all main landing gear wheels to rotate. Although it was determined that a braking pressure sufficient to lock all of the wheels was imparted to the brake system, the source of this pressure could not be determined. Possible sources of the unwanted braking pressure were either a hydraulic/brake system malfunction or an inadvertently engaged parking brake.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-62 in New York

Date & Time: Sep 15, 1970 at 1321 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
I-DIWZ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Rome - New York
MSN:
46026/452
YOM:
1969
Flight number:
AZ618
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
146
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13310
Captain / Total hours on type:
1362.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
8114
Copilot / Total hours on type:
247
Circumstances:
Alitalia Flight 618 departed Rome at 10:22 local time for a non-stop flight to New York. The en route and descent were normal. After having descended to 6000 feet, the crew listed to the ATIS: "The seventeen hundred zulu weather Kennedy six hundred scattered measured ceiling eight hundred overcast four miles fog the winds are two one zero degrees at three and the altimeter three zero one five temperature seventy three expect ILS four right approach landing runway four right. Notice to Airmen glide slope out of service.". About this point in the flight, the first officer, at the request of the captain, took over the flight controls. He disengaged the autopilot and proceeded to comply with the various vectors provided by the approach controller. At 13:07 the controller instructed the flight to increase airspeed from 210 knots to 250 knots. Five minutes later the flight was instructed to reduce the speed to 200 knots. At 13:18:05, the flight was advised, "Alitalia six eighteen you’re three and a half from the marker, turn right zero two zero, cleared ILS four right approach." The DC-8 broke through the clouds at about 600 feet. The runway was in sight, but the plane appeared to be high and slightly on the right. The captain decided to perform a steep approach and took over the controls. He put the four engines at idle-reverse, then selected reverse thrust on Nos. 2 and 3 engines, deciding to select forward thrust when on the proper slope. too busy in rotating the aircraft, the captain could not leave the controls to regain forward thrust. The plane touched down very hard started to yaw to the left. It ground looped and came to rest with the fuselage split open aft of the wing and three out of four engines separated.
Probable cause:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the use of reverse thrust in flight, contrary to published procedures, with a resultant uncorrectable high sink rate. The captain's decision to use reverse thrust and not to execute a missed approach was a reaction under stress occasioned at least in part, by Air Traffic Control (ATC) instructions which led to positioning the aircraft too high and too close to the runway. ATC vectored the aircraft to the final approach path under IFR conditions and in the absence of an operating ILS glide slope.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-63CF in New York: 11 killed

Date & Time: Sep 8, 1970 at 1606 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N4863T
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
New York – Washington DC – London
MSN:
45951/414
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
TV863
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
11
Captain / Total flying hours:
22300
Captain / Total hours on type:
7100.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
15775
Copilot / Total hours on type:
4750
Aircraft flight hours:
7878
Circumstances:
Approximately 1,500 feet from the initiation of the takeoff roll, the aircraft was observed rotating to an excessively nose-high attitude. The aircraft became airborne about 2,800 feet down the runway after which it continued to rotate slowly upward to an attitude estimated to be between 60° and 90° above the horizontal, at an altitude estimated to be between 300 and 500 feet above the ground. The aircraft rolled about 20° to the right, rolled back to the left until it reached approximately a vertical angle of bank, and then fell to the ground in that attitude. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire. All 11 crew members, the only occupants of the aircraft, died in the accident.
Probable cause:
The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was a loss of pitch control caused by the entrapment of a pointed, asphalt-covered object between the leading edge of the right elevator and the right horizontal spar web access door in the aft part of the stabilizer. The restriction to elevator movement, caused by a highly unusual and unknown condition, was not detected by the crew in time to reject the takeoff successfully. However, an apparent lack of crew responsiveness to a highly unusual emergency situation, coupled with the captain's failure to monitor adequately the takeoff, contributed to the failure to reject the takeoff.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-63AF off Naha: 4 killed

Date & Time: Jul 27, 1970 at 1136 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N785FT
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Los Angeles – San Francisco – Seattle – Cold Bay – Naha – Cam Ranh Bay – Đà Nẵng
MSN:
45005/412
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
FT045
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
4
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
4
Captain / Total flying hours:
12488
Captain / Total hours on type:
1381.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
12206
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1157
Aircraft flight hours:
6047
Circumstances:
The airplane departed Los Angeles for a flight to Da Nang AFB, Vietnam with intermediate stops at San Francisco, CA, Seattle, WA, Cold Bay, AK, Tokyo, Okinawa and Cam Ranh Bay. Flight 45 departed Tokyo 09:29 for the IFR flight to Okinawa. The flight proceeded without difficulty to Okinawa, and was cleared for an en route descent to an altitude of 1,000 feet msl to make a precision radar approach to runway 18 at Naha AFB. At 11:31 the flight was advised "... have reduced visibility on final ... tower just advised approach lights and strobe lights are on ....". At 11:32:46, a new altimeter setting of 25.84 inches was given to the crew and acknowledged. The landing checklist, including full flaps. setting of radio altimeters, gear down and locked, and spoilers armed, was completed at 11:33:49. At slightly less than 5 miles from touchdown, the crew was instructed to begin the descent onto glidepath and was cleared to land. The approach continued, with various heading changes and, at 11:34:53, the crew was advised that they were slightly below the glidepath 3 miles from touchdown. Additional vectors were provided and at 11:35:14, 2 miles from touchdown, the crew was again advised "...dropping slightly below glidepath ... you have a 10 knot tailwind." At 11:35:34, the controller advised the crew that they were on glidepath. The DC-8 continued to descend and broke out of heavy rain and low clouds at an estimated altitude of 75 to 100 feet. The aircraft struck the water approximately 2,200 feet short of the runway at a speed of 144 kts.
Probable cause:
An unarrested rate of descent due to inattention of the crew to instrument altitude references while the pilot was attempting to establish outside visual contact in meteorological conditions which precluded such contact during that segment of a precision radar approach inbound from the Decision Height.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-63 in Toronto: 109 killed

Date & Time: Jul 5, 1970 at 0809 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CF-TIW
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Montreal - Toronto - Los Angeles
MSN:
46114/526
YOM:
1970
Flight number:
AC621
Location:
Country:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
100
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
109
Captain / Total flying hours:
20990
Captain / Total hours on type:
2899.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
9323
Copilot / Total hours on type:
5626
Aircraft flight hours:
453
Circumstances:
Flight number 621 of Air Canada DC-8-63 CF-TIW with 100 passengers, six cabin air crew and three flight crew aboard on July 5, 1970 from departure at Montreal International Airport until its final crash at Toronto International Airport lasted slightly more than 52 minutes. This aircraft took off at Montreal at 07 hours and 17 minutes EDT, initially touched down on runway 32 at Toronto International Airport at 08 hours 06 minutes and 36 seconds EDT and finally crashed at 08 hours 09 minutes 34 seconds EDT. The flight from Montreal to Toronto was routine. The flight during this interval was also routine. The "In-Range Check" was made when the aircraft was about 10 miles from Toronto International Airport on a southerly heading. The "Before-Landing Check" was made when the aircraft was about 8 miles from this Airport, and just commencing its turn onto final approach. On this Before-Landing cockpit check, which includes the lowering of the undercarriage, the item "spoilers armed" was intentionally omitted. During this period there occurred a conversation between the Captain and the First Officer as to whether the ground spoilers would be armed 'on the flare' or 'on the ground' and an agreement between them as to this was reached. The agreement was that the First Officer would arm them 'on the flare', that is, immediately before the aircraft touched down on the runway. Power was reduced then on the aircraft for the purpose of the flare and the Captain gave the order to the First Officer by saying 'OK'; and immediately thereafter the ground spoilers were deployed. The spoilers were deployed when the aircraft was about 60 feet above the runway. As a result, the aircraft sank rapidly. Practically immediately thereafter the Captain, with an exclamation, applied full throttle to all four engines and pulled back the control panel causing the nose of the aircraft to rotate upwards. During this sequence the First Officer apologized to the Captain for what he had done. Notwithstanding the action taken by the Captain, he did not succeed in preventing the aircraft from touching down on the runway. Instead, the aircraft struck the runway very heavily. It remained on the runway only about half a second and then rose back into the air at which time the ground spoilers commenced to retract and then did retract. When the aircraft struck the runway, number 4 engine and pylon separated from the aircraft and fell on the runway along with a piece of the lower wing plating (which allowed fuel to escape and subsequently ignite). Damage was also done at this time to the attachments relating to number 3 engine, but that engine after touchdown continued to function. After this touchdown, the aircraft climbed to an altitude of 3,100 feet above the ground. During this climb, there were conversations between the First Officer and the aircraft airport control tower from which it is patent, that the air crew considered that they would be able to cause their aircraft to circle for another landing attempt on runway 32. In fact, the air crew did not know, until only about 40 seconds prior to the final crash, that the happening of such final crash was irreversible. During this climb, fire and smoke were seen trailing behind the aircraft intermittently. About 2 and one half minutes after the initial touch down of this aircraft on the runway, the first explosion occurred in the right wing outboard of number 4 engine location causing parts of the outer wing structure to fall free to the ground. Six seconds later, a second explosion occurred in the vicinity of number 3 engine and the engine with its pylon ripped free of the wing and fell to the ground in flames, trailing heavy black smoke. Six and one half seconds later, a third explosion occurred which caused the loss of a large section of the right wing, including the wing tip. The aircraft then went into a violent manoeuvre, and with the right wing still ablaze, lost height rapidly and at the same time more wing plating tore free following which the aircraft struck the ground at a high velocity, about 220 knots in the attitude with the left wing high and the nose low. At final crash, all persons aboard this aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
Within the meaning of the word "circumstances" ("of any accident") in section 5A of the Aeronautics Act, Revised Statutes of Canada 1952, chapter 2 as amended, there were several contributing circumstances to this accident. Without attempting to weight each or to list them in order of priority, they are set out hereunder:
- The failure of the Captain to follow the procedures laid down in the 'Before-Landing Check' in the Air Canada operating manual, in respect to arming the ground spoilers in this aircraft on this day,
- The action taken by the First Officer, contrary to the order of the Captain on this day, in pulling the ground spoiler actuating lever aft manually to the "Extend", position when the aircraft was about 60 feet above runway 32 at Toronto International Airport,
- The failure of the manufacturer of this aircraft to provide a gate or equivalent means to guard against such inappropriate manual operation of the ground spoiler lever in flight,
- The acceptance and approval by the Ministry of Transport, of the design of the ground spoiler system in this aircraft,
- The acceptance and use by Air Canada of this aircraft with this defective design feature in its ground spoiler system,
- The failure of the manufacturer and Air Canada in their respective manuals unequivocally to inform that the ground spoilers of this aircraft could be deployed when it was in flight by doing what the First Officer did in this case; and, also, to warn of the hazard of extending the ground spoilers when the aircraft is in flight and especially when it is close to the ground,
- The failure of Air Canada to cause its Ground Training School personnel to instruct student pilots that the ground spoilers of this aircraft could be deployed in the way the First Officer did in this case or to warn that the ground spoilers could be deployed when this type of aircraft is in flight and especially when it is close to the ground,
- The failure of the Ministry of Transport to detect the deficiencies and misinformation in the manufacturer's aircraft flight manual as to the operation of the ground spoiler systems on this type of aircraft; and the failure to require the manufacturer in such manual to warn of the danger of inappropriate deployment of the ground spoilers on this type of aircraft when in flight and especially when it is close to the ground,
- The failure of the Ministry of Transport:
1) to have noted the differences in the manuals of Air Canada and other Canadian aircraft operators in relation to the hazards of operating this ground spoiler in this aircraft,
2) to have alerted Air Canada of this, and
3) to have taken appropriate remedial action so that Air Canada's manual in respect thereto was not deficient in respect thereto,
- Under the subject overload conditions, the failure of the manufacturer to design attachments of the engine pod to wing structure to provide for safe sequential separation, or failing which to otherwise ensure the integrity of the fuel and the electrical systems.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-62 in Rome

Date & Time: Apr 19, 1970 at 0545 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
SE-DBE
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Tokyo - Tehran - Rome - Zurich - Copenhagen - Stockholm
MSN:
45823/279
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
SK986
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
54
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Circumstances:
During the takeoff roll, the engine n°1 exploded. Some debris fall on the ground, bounced and struck the wing, causing the rupture of the n°2 fuel tank. The crew started an emergency braking procedure and the airplane came to a stop in flames. All 65 occupants were quickly disembarked, 23 of them were injured. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.
Probable cause:
It was determined that the explosion of the engine n°1 was caused by the disintegration of the 1st stage of the compressor. Debris bounced on the runway and on the wing, causing the rupture of the n°2 fuel tank. A fire ensuing, causing serious damages.

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-63CF in Stockton

Date & Time: Oct 16, 1969 at 1545 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N8634
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Oakland - Stockton - Oakland
MSN:
46021/424
YOM:
1968
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
19308
Captain / Total hours on type:
1747.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
4210
Copilot / Total hours on type:
725
Aircraft flight hours:
3441
Circumstances:
The aircraft overran the departure end of runway 29R at Stockton Metropolitan Airport, California, during the performance of a crew training flight. The aircraft struck a roadway thereby collapsing the left main and nose landing gears. The aircraft came to rest 792 feet beyond the end of the runway. The aircraft was destroyed by fire. The five crewmembers aboard were uninjured. The flight was scheduled for use for recurrent training and annual proficiency checks of first officers in DC-8 equipment. The flight originated at the Oakland International Airport (OAK) and was to terminate at OAK. Training maneuvers were to be conducted in the Stockton area, with landing and takeoff practice to be performed at the Stockton Metropolitan Airport. During a touch-and-go landing on Runway 29R at the Stockton Metropolitan Airport, the captain rejected the takeoff because of the sounding of a takeoff warning hob and the activation of a ground spoiler extend light. The crew was not able to stop the aircraft on the remaining runway.
Probable cause:
A false ground spoiler position indication during the takeoff portion of a touch and go landing that induced the captain to discontinue the takeoff at a point too far down the runway to permit him to stop the aircraft on the runway.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-62 off Los Angeles: 15 killed

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1969 at 1921 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
LN-MOO
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Copenhagen – Seattle – Los Angeles
MSN:
45822/272
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
SK933
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
36
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
15
Captain / Total flying hours:
11135
Captain / Total hours on type:
900.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5814
Copilot / Total hours on type:
973
Aircraft flight hours:
6948
Circumstances:
The aircraft crashed in Santa Monica Bay, approximately 6 nautical miles west at 1921LT. The aircraft was operating as flight SK933 from Seattle, Washington, to Los Angeles, following a flight from Copenhagen, Denmark. A scheduled crew change occurred at Seattle for the flight to Los Angeles. The accident occurred in the waters of Santa Monica Bay while the crew attempting an instrument approach to runway O7R at Los Angeles International Airport. Of the 45 persons aboard the aircraft, 3 passengers and one cabin attendant drowned, 9 passengers and 2 cabin attendants are missing and presumed dead; 11 passengers and 6 crew members including the captain, the second pilot, and the systems operator, were injured in varying degrees; and 13 passengers escaped without reported injury. The aircraft was destroyed by impact. The fuselage broke into three pieces, two of which sank approximately 350 feet of water. The third section including the wings, the forward cabin and the cockpit, floated for about 20 hours before being towed into shallow water where it sank. This section was later recovered and removed from the water. The weather at Los Angeles International Airport was generally: 1,700 feet broken, 3,500 feet overcast; visibility 4 miles in light rain and fog, wind 060° at 10 knots; and the altimeter setting was 29.87 inches of mercury. The weather in the accident area was reported to be similar.
Probable cause:
The lack of crew coordination and the inadequate monitoring of the aircraft position in space during a critical phase of an instrument approach which resulted in an unplanned descent into the water. Contributing to this unplanned descent was an apparent unsafe landing gear condition induced by the design of the landing gear indicator lights, and the omission of the minimum crossing altitude at an approach fix depicted on the approach chart.
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-8-43 in Milan: 13 killed

Date & Time: Aug 2, 1968 at 1406 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
I-DIWF
Survivors:
Yes
Site:
Schedule:
Rome - Milan - Montreal
MSN:
45630
YOM:
1962
Flight number:
AZ660
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
10
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
85
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
13
Circumstances:
Flight AZ660 to Montreal, Canada departed Rome-Fiumicino Airport, Italy at 13:15. An intermediate stop was planned at Milan-Malpensa Airport. The airplane climbed in VMC to the en route altitude of FL220. The en route part of the flight was uneventful. While descending to the south of the airport, preparing for an approach to runway 35, the aircraft entered IMC with heavy turbulence due to the presence of a thunderstorm in the area. About 13:59 the flight was cleared from 9,000 feet down to 4,000 feet for a straight-in approach. Three minutes later the pilot advised that he would make a 360° turn over the beacon as the aircraft was at 6,000 feet. On completion of the turn, at an altitude of 1,500 feet, the flight continued on runway heading and descending. At 14:06 the flight crew became unsure of their position and almost immediately the airplane struck a wooded hillside 11,5 km north of Milan runway 35. 13 passengers were killed while 22 others were injured. 60 people were uninjured. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
Insufficient checking of flight times during the final portion of the approach; Positioning for final approach by means of a non standard procedure; Delayed detection of the VOR radial or wrong selection of such radial; Broken view of terrain north of the airport similar to that south of the airport.