Asia

The cause of the accident with the An-2 RA-40851 aircraft was the collision of the aircraft with a reinforced concrete support and power transmission lines in a controlled flight while performing the aerial application at an extremely low altitude.
The contributing factors most likely were:
- Field processing when the sun is less than 15° above the horizon and the sun's heading angle is less than 30°,
- Insufficient prudence of the PIC when performing a VFR flight for aerial application,
- Failure of the pilot to take into account the presence of artificial obstacles in the flight area,
- Lack of marking of power lines.

The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of the evidence that the causes of the mishap were the MA’s excess airspeed above recommended landing velocity, which caused the MA to maintain lift (flight) and did not provide sufficient weight on wheels (WOW) to allow braking action to occur. Additionally, the AIB President found, by a preponderance of the evidence, the MC’s failure to adequately assess risk, failure to follow proper procedures, and their poor communication were all substantially contributing factors to the mishap.

The accident was the caused by the combination of the decision of the PF to abort the take-off after VR that resulted to runway excursion and incorrect pilot techniques or procedures in the high-speed rejected take-off.
The following contributing factors were identified:
- Operational pressures related to the delay of schedule due to late filing of the flight plan compelling the crew to rush and meet the schedule demand.
- The crew's complacency by skipping required briefing item in the before take-off checklist, in this case, the considerations in the event of a malfunction before/after V1.

The aircraft stalled during initial climb because its total weight was above the MTOW and the CofG was well beyond the aft limit. The crew failed to prepare the flight according to procedure and, failed to proceed with a mass and balance calculation and the passengers and lugages were incorrectly placed in the cabin according to the CofG.

The accident with the Boeing 737-500 VQ-BPS aircraft occurred during the landing as a result of a collision of the aircraft with a snow parapet 1.1 m high at a distance of 32 m to the runway threshold (within the paved section of the runway), which resulted in damage to the main landing gear and their subsequent "folding" in the process of moving along the runway.
The accident was caused by a combination of the following factors:
- the presence of contradictions in the Federal Aviation Rules for flights in the airspace of the Russian Federation, the airline's radio control system and the aircraft operational documentation regarding the need and procedure for introducing temperature corrections to the readings of barometric altimeters at low ambient temperatures;
- Failure by the operator of the Usinsk aerodrome to comply with the FAP-262 requirements for the maintenance of the aerodrome, which resulted in the presence of snow parapets on the paved section of the landing strip;
- the operator of the Usinsk aerodrome did not eliminate the shortcomings in the winter maintenance of the aerodrome, noted based on the results of the inspection by the Rosaviatsia commission on January 22, 2020;
- lack of risk assessment in the airline associated with the execution of approaches in the baro-VNAV mode in the presence of factors that impede such approaches (low ambient temperatures, snow-covered underlying surface, drifting snow (snowstorm), significant changes in the relief in front of the runway end, lack of PAPI-type lights), as well as appropriate recommendations to the crews on the specifics of such approaches, including after the transition to visual flight, and crew training;
- insufficient assessment by the crew during the preparation of the existing threats (hazard factors) and making an insufficiently substantiated decision to perform an RNAV (GNSS) approach (under the control of the autopilot in LNAV/VNAV mode) without introducing a correction for low outside air temperature in altitude overflying waypoints, which led to a flight below the established glide path;
- performing a flight along the "extended glide path" after turning off the autopilot and switching to manual piloting without attempting to enter the set glide path;
- the PIC may have had a visual illusion of a "high glide path" due to a snow-covered underlying surface, a snowstorm and the presence of a ravine directly in front of the runway end in the absence of PAPI type lights, which led to an incorrect assessment of the aircraft's flight altitude after switching to manual piloting, lack of reaction to timely and correct warnings of the co-pilot and exit to the runway end at a height significantly less than the established one.