Operator Image

Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 100 in New York

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1984 at 1442 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N148PM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New York - Ottawa
MSN:
10108
YOM:
1958
Flight number:
PM035
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
21
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7012
Captain / Total hours on type:
799.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3151
Copilot / Total hours on type:
197
Aircraft flight hours:
42040
Aircraft flight cycles:
39945
Circumstances:
At 1442 on January 13, 1984, Pilgrim Airline Flight 35, a scheduled 14 CFR Part 121 flight with 21 passengers and a crew of three took off from runway 04L at John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York, en route to Ottawa, Canada. The weather was, in part, ceiling 2,700 feet overcast, visibility 7 miles; wind, 050° at I4 knots; and temperature 26°. As the captain raised the landing gear, the propeller on the left engine autofeathered. The captain initiated emergency procedures and told the first officer that he was retarding the power lever for the left engine. Concurrently, according to the cockpit voice recorder, the right engine experienced a power loss, and the airplane began to descend. The first officer, who was flying the airplane, maintained directional control, and the captain immediately put the landing gear lever down. however, the airplane struck the runway before the landing gear extended fully, and slid about 1,200 feet before stopping near the intersection of taxiway "G" and runway 04L. The captain and 13 passengers incurred minor injuries, and the flight attendant incurred a fracture of the spine. The airplane was damaged substantially; there was no postcrash fire.
Probable cause:
The flight crew's failure to use engine anti-ice on the inbound flight to JFK, the captain's failure to conduct a thorough pre-flight inspection, and the flight crew's decision to use engine anti-ice on take-off from JFK which led to power losses on both engines.
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 300 near Providence: 1 killed

Date & Time: Feb 21, 1982 at 1533 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N127PM
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Groton - Boston
MSN:
105
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
PM458
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
10
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
1
Captain / Total flying hours:
6500
Captain / Total hours on type:
2700.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
2100
Copilot / Total hours on type:
400
Aircraft flight hours:
27015
Circumstances:
At 4,000 feet light icing on the windshield was noted, and the deicing system was activated. After two cycles of deicing, alcohol was smelled in the cockpit, and smoke was coming up from the control yoke. An emergency landing was attempted at Providence, RI, but smoke and flames forced the crew to land on 10-12 inch thick ice on a reservoir. By then, heavy black smoke poured in the cockpit and fire was seen. Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed and the right wing was sheared off. Eleven occupants escaped and were injured while a passenger was killed.
Probable cause:
The deficient design of the isopropyl alcohol windshield washer/deicer system and the inadequate maintenance of the system which resulted in an in-flight fire. The ignition source of the fire was not determined.
Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft 99 Airliner in Groton

Date & Time: Feb 1, 1982 at 0045 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N451C
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
New Haven - Groton
MSN:
U-66
YOM:
1969
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
5
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
7108
Captain / Total hours on type:
400.00
Aircraft flight hours:
19188
Circumstances:
After crossing the mondi intersection inbound for an ILS runway 05 approach, the captain felt that a proper descent was not possible due to a strong tailwind and their present altitude. They turned and proceeded outbound to lose altitude. The crew then established themselves again on the inbound course at an airspeed of approximately 120 knots. The copilot reported that around 300 feet "the bottom dropped out." the aircraft crashed onto the surface of a frozen cove and slid onto marshy terrain and stopped about 500 feet short of the runway. An NTSB weather summary shows that the following wind regimes existed when the aircraft made its approach: 5,000 to 24,000 ft asl, wind 220/50; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, wind 180/30; 450 feet asl to surface, wind 100/5. Using the above wind regimes and assuming an approach airspeed of 123 knots, the following ground speeds were computed: 5,000 to 2,400 ft asl, 155 knots; 2,400 to 450 feet asl, 147 knots; 450 feet asl to surface, 118 knots.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: in flight encounter with weather
Phase of operation: approach - faf/outer marker to threshold (ifr)
Findings
1. Light condition - dark night
2. (f) weather condition - low ceiling
3. (f) weather condition - fog
4. (f) weather condition - turbulence in clouds
5. (f) weather condition - downdraft
6. (c) weather condition - windshear
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Occurrence #2: loss of control - in flight
Phase of operation: approach - faf/outer marker to threshold (ifr)
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Occurrence #3: undershoot
Phase of operation: descent - uncontrolled
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Occurrence #4: in flight collision with terrain/water
Phase of operation: descent - uncontrolled
Findings
7. Terrain condition - icy
Final Report:

Crash of a De Havilland DHC-6 Twin Otter 100 off Groton: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 10, 1970 at 1837 LT
Operator:
Registration:
N124PM
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Groton - New York
MSN:
41
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
PM203
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
3
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
6335
Captain / Total hours on type:
2180.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
991
Copilot / Total hours on type:
669
Aircraft flight hours:
5817
Circumstances:
Pilgrim Flight 203 departed from Groton about 16:21, approximately 15 minutes behind schedule primarily because of ground delays encountered on previous flights which used the aircraft. Shortly after takeoff, Flight 203 reported on course and was instructed to contact the New York Center. Communications were established at 16:27 and the Center cleared the flight to Deer Park via its flight plan route to cross Saybrook at 4,000 feet, and then to climb and maintain 6,000 feet. At 16:33, the New York Center controller recleared the flight to Deer Park, to climb to 9,000 feet, and issued it holding instructions at Deer Park. About 2 minutes later, the controller advised that 7,000 feet was open for the flight, with the possibility of no holding, and he cleared it back to 7,000 feet. The flight reported at 7,000 immediately thereafter. About 16:36, the controller told Pilgrim 203 that if holding were necessary, its expected approach clearance time was 17.06. At 16:47 the crew contacted Kennedy Approach Control and they reported holding at Deer Park at 7,000 feet. About this time, the weather conditions at the Kennedy Airport deteriorated, and some flights which were then making instrument approaches to runway 13L began missing their approaches. Because of this, instrument approaches were changed to runway 22R, which had a better RVR. At 16:55, in connection with the runway change, Pilgrim 203 was recleared to hold in the Medford holding pattern. At 1709, Pilgrim 203 was given an expected approach clearance time of 17:46, which the flight acknowledged. At 17:39, the Kennedy approach controller cleared Pilgrim Flight 203 to descend to 6,000 feet. At 17:42, the crew of Pilgrim 203 radioed: "Pilgrim 203 request New Haven if we can get there, expedite." At 17:48, the flight was cleared to descend to 4,000 feet, and at 1750, it was cleared to Pond Point, which is the final approach fix from which VOR instrument approaches are made to New Haven-Tweed Airport. During the next minute, Pilgrim Flight 203 contacted Westchester Approach Control and asked for the latest Tweed weather. It was advised that the weather was: Scattered clouds 200 feet, estimated ceiling 500 feet broken, 700 feet overcast; visibility 2 miles, rain and fog; altimeter 29.46: wind variable 120° to 040° at 15 knots with gusts to 25 knots. At 17:53, the Westchester approach controller instructed Flight 203, "Upon reaching Pond Point hold southwest on the 205 radial, right turns, EAC 1815." Two minutes later the controller checked the position of the flight and, finding it was suitable for descent, cleared the flight to descend to 3,000 feet. At 17:57, the flight reported at Pond Point and asked if holding were still necessary. The controller advised that it was and repeated the holding instruction. At 18:12, the Westchester approach controller called Flight 203 and advised that, based on a report from the Cessna pilot who just landed, the airport was below minimums. He advised the weather was: Aircraft ceiling 200 feet broken, 500 feet, overcast: visibility 2 miles. He then asked the pilot his intentions. About 18:13, after asking for and being given the Bridgeport weather, which was lower than New Haven, the flight advised it would make the approach. The flight was cleared for the approach and instructed to contact New Haven Tower. This was done, and, at 1814, the flight advised New Haven it was inbound from Pond Point. The controller acknowledged, cleared the flight to land, and repeated the surface wind as variable 120° to 060°, 15 knots with gusts to 25 knots. Shortly before 18:17, Flight 203 reported to New Haven it had missed its approach. The tower controller immediately cleared the flight to the Madison VOR at 2,000 feet and instructed it to contact Westchester Approach Control. At 18:17, the flight asked for the Groton weather. The controller then gave the flight the Groton weather as: Measured ceiling 300 feet overcast; visibility 1-1/2 miles, moderate rain and fog; wind 100° at 15 knots, with gusts to 25 knots; altimeter 29.50. At 18:19, the crew told the controller, "Westchester, we’d like to ah get direct Groton right now." Within the same minute, the controller advised he was getting the clearance. The flight repeated that it had to get direct to Groton and the controller replied he had to coordinate (with New York Center). At 18:20, Flight 203 advised the Westchester controller, "Ah Westchester, 203 ah we got minimum fuel now, we gotta get to Groton." About 18:21, the controller cleared the flight to the Groton VOR via Victor Airway 126 and climb and maintain 3,000 feet. The flight reported it was level at 3,000 feet and asked to be cleared for an approach to Groton direct from Saybrook. The controller advised the flight to contact Quonset Approach Control. At 18:22, Flight 203 called Bradley FSS and advised it could not contact Quonset Approach Control, it was low on fuel, and wanted clearance for an instrument approach direct to Groton from Saybrook. On request, Quonset Approach Control gave this clearance to Bradley FSS and, at 18:23, the latter delivered it to the flight. About 18:24, the captain of Flight 203 called his company radio and said, "We’re coming home with this... pile of junk. We ain’t got any equipment working." He then asked to talk to the chief pilot. The captain asked initially for the Groton weather which was ceiling 300 feet, overcast; visibility 1-1/2 miles, rain and fog Later, he was advised that the ceiling had lowered to 200 feet. The captain said that Kennedy would not accept him because the aircraft transponder was not working. He said he was inbound to Groton on the 270 degree radial of the Groton VOR, flying about 100 feet above the water, and he could see the shoreline. Asked how much fuel he had remaining, the captain answered "none," and added, in essence, that fuel exhaustion could occur at anytime. Shortly thereafter, he radioed that he had lost one engine and was going to try to reach the shore. He then said he had just lost the other engine, could not make the shore, and was going into the water off Harkness Point. This was the last transmission from the aircraft.
Probable cause:
Fuel exhaustion resulting from inadequate flight preparation and erroneous in-flight decisions by the pilot-in-command.
Final Report: