Training

A pilot proficiency examiner (PPE) was using the airplane to conduct a pilot-in-command (PIC) proficiency check for two company pilots. Before the accident flight, one of the two company pilots on board received a PIC proficiency check, which terminated with a full-stop landing and reverse thrust application; no discrepancies with either thrust reverser were discussed by either flight crewmember. The pilot being examined then left the cockpit, and the accident pilot positioned himself in the left front seat while the PPE remained in the right front seat. The flight crew then taxied to the approach end of the runway to begin another flight. Data from the enhanced ground proximity system (EGPWS) revealed that, the flight began the takeoff roll with the flaps retracted, the thrust reversers armed, and both engines stabilized at 96 percent N2. About 2 seconds later, the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the "V1" call while on the airplane was on the runway; acoustic analysis indicated that the N2 speed of one engine, likely the right, decreased; the N2 speed of the other engine remained constant. This decrease in N2 speed was consistent with the PPE retarding right engine thrust to flight idle with the intent of simulating an engine failure. The takeoff continued, and, while the airplane was in a wings-level climb at an airspeed of 148 knots about 18 ft radar altitude, the CVR recorded the pilot command that the landing gear be retracted. The landing gear remained extended, and, about 1 second after the command to retract the landing gear, or about 3 seconds after becoming airborne, while about 33 ft above the runway and at the highest recorded airspeed of 149 knots, the CVR recorded the beginning of a rattling sound, which was consistent with the deployment of the right thrust reverser, and it continued to the end of the recording. About 1.5 seconds after the rattling sound began, the CVR recorded the PPE asking, "…what happened," which indicates that the deployment was likely not annunciated in the cockpit. The right engine N2 speed continued to gradually decrease, and the airplane rolled slightly left, back to a wings-level position. The airplane continued climbing with the landing gear extended as pitch changes continued to occur. During this time, the flight crew exchanged comments about their lack of understanding about what was occurring. While flying 10 knots above V2 speed with the left engine N2 speed remaining steady and the right engine N2 speed decreasing at a slightly greater rate than previously, the airplane began a right roll with a corresponding steady decrease in airspeed from about 144 knots. About 9 seconds after the original call to retract the landing gear, the CVR recorded the PPE requesting that the landing gear be retracted, which occurred 1 second later. The airplane then continued in the right turn with the airspeed steadily decreasing, and about 11 seconds after the PPE asked "…what happened", the EGPWS sounded a bank angle alert. At that time, the airplane was in a right roll of about 30 degrees, and the airspeed was about 132 knots. The right roll continued to a maximum value of about 39 degrees, which was the last valid bank angle value recorded. The airplane impacted the ground off the right side of the runway in a nose- and right-winglow attitude. The landing gear and flaps were retracted, and there was no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the flight controls for roll, pitch, and yaw; nor was there any evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction of either engine. A definitive reason for the deployment of the right thrust reverser could not be determined. No previous instances of inadvertent in-flight thrust reverser deployment were documented by the operator of the accident airplane or by the airframe manufacturer for the accident airplane make and model. Certification flight testing of an airplane with the same thrust reverser system determined that the airplane remained controllable with the right thrust reverser deployed and throttle retarder system functioning. The flight testing also included application of a momentary, peak burst of right engine thrust, again with no controllability issues noted. It was also noted that with the installed throttle retarder system, in the event of inadvertent thrust reverser deployment, that the engine's thrust should have been reduced to idle within 4 to 8 seconds. Acoustic analysis of the accident flight indicated that the lowest recorded N2 rpm value was about 84 percent and that the reduction in rpm occurred over a period of about 8.5 seconds, after the right thrust reverser deployed. No determination could be made as to why the throttle retarder system did not reduce the right engine thrust to flight idle as designed. Additionally, no determination could be made as to why the flight crew was not able to maintain directional control of the airplane following deployment of the right thrust reverser. Although the PPE had severe coronary artery disease, which placed him at risk for an acute coronary event that would cause symptoms like chest pain, shortness of breath, or sudden unconsciousness, the CVR recorded no evidence of impairment. Neither the heart disease nor the medications he was taking to treat it would have impaired his judgement or physical functioning. Therefore, it is unlikely any medical condition or substance contributed to the PPE's actions. Additionally, there was no evidence that any medical condition would have impaired judgement or physical functioning of the pilot being examined.

The single engine aircraft was completing a training flight from Sabi Sabi to Lydenburg on behalf of the 41st Squadron. While descending to Lydenburg, the aircraft crashed in a mountainous area near the Long Tom Pass. Two passengers were seriously injured while three other occupants were killed.

The commercial pilot reported that the purpose of the flight was to perform a check/orientation flight with the airline transport pilot (ATP), who was new to the area; the ATP was the pilot flying. The airplane was started, and an engine run-up completed. The commercial pilot reported that, during the takeoff roll, all of the gauges were in the “green.” After reaching an airspeed of 80 knots, the airplane lifted off the ground. About 350 ft above ground level (agl), the pilots felt the airplane “jolt.” The commercial pilot stated that it felt like a loss of power had occurred and that the airplane was not responding. He immediately shut off the boost pumps, and the ATP initiated a slow left turn in an attempt to return to the airport to land. The airplane descended rapidly in a nose-low, right-wing-low attitude and impacted the ground. A witness reported that he watched the airplane take off and that it sounded normal until it reached the departure end of the runway, at which point he heard a distinct “pop pop,” followed by silence. The airplane then entered an approximate 45-degree left turn with no engine sound and descended at a high rate with the wings rolling level before the airplane went out of sight. Another witness made a similar statement. Based on the witnesses’ statements and photographs of the twisted airplane at the accident site, it is likely that a total loss of engine power occurred and that, during the subsequent turn back to the airport, the ATP did not maintain sufficient airspeed and exceeded the airplane’s critical angle-of-attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with terrain. Although a postaccident examination of the airframe and engines did reveal an inconsistency between the cockpit control positions and the positions of the fuel shutoff valves on the sump tank, this would not have precluded normal operation. No other anomalies were found that would have precluded normal operation.

The check airman was conducting the first company training flight for the newly hired second-in-command (SIC). Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data showed that, after departure, the airplane began a series of training maneuvers, consistent with normal operations. About 21 minutes into the flight, when the airplane was about 3,400 ft mean sea level, it began a steep descent and subsequently impacted terrain. An airplane performance study showed that the airplane reached a nose-down pitch of about -40 degrees and that the descent rate reached about 16,000 ft per minute. Numerous previous training flights conducted by the check airman were reviewed using archived ADS-B data and interviews with other pilots. The review revealed that the initial upset occurred during a point in the training when the check airman typically simulated an in-flight emergency and descent. Postaccident examination for the airframe and control surfaces showed that the airplane was configured for cruise flight at the time of the initial upset. Examination of the primary and secondary flight control cables indicated that the cables were all intact at the time of impact. Trim actuator measurements showed an abnormal trailing-edge-up, nose-down configuration on both trim tabs. The two elevator trim actuator measurements were inconsistent with each other, indicating that one of the actuators was likely moved during the wreckage recovery. Based on the supporting data, it is likely that one of the actuators indicated the correct trim tab position at the time of impact. Simulated airplane performance calculations showed that, during a pitch trim excursion, the control forces required to counter an anomaly increases to unmanageable levels unless the appropriate remedial procedures are quickly applied. Given the simulated airplane performance calculations, the trim actuator measurements, and the check airman's known training routine, it is likely that the check airman simulated a pitch trim excursion and that the SIC, who lacked experience in the airplane type, did not appropriately respond to the excursion. The check airman did not take remedial action and initiate the recovery procedure in time to prevent the control forces from becoming unmanageable and to ensure that recovery from the associated dive was possible.

The four engine aircraft departed Agra-Kheria Airport at 1000LT on a combined exercice with a second C-130, carrying five crew members. The goal of the mission was to simulate drops at low altitude. At a height of about 300 feet, the aircraft encountered wake turbulences from the preceding airplane. It is believed that the crew attempted to gain height when control was lost. The aircraft crashed in the rocky bed of a river near Karauli. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed. Built in 2010 and delivered to IAF in April 2011, the aircraft was one of the six examples ordered by IAF.

On behalf of Morningstar Air Express, the pilot departed Sault Sainte Marie Airport, south Ontario, in the morning, for a local training flight. For unknown reasons, the pilot did not maintain any radio contact with his base or ATC and continued to the north for about 1,200 km when the aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in the Hudson Bay, some 500 km east of Churchill, Manitoba. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.

The crew was completing a training mission. In unknown circumstances, the single engine aircraft crashed in a prairie located near Mount Nicholas, between Queenstown and Te Anau, coming to rest upside down. Both pilots were seriously injured and the aircraft was destroyed.

The purpose of the flight was for the pilot to accomplish a flight review with a flight instructor. According to air traffic control records, after takeoff, the pilot handling radio communications requested maneuvering airspace for airwork in an altitude block of 13,000 to 15,000 feet mean sea level (msl). About 8 minutes later, the air traffic controller asked the pilot to state his heading, but he did not respond. A review of recorded radar data revealed that, about 14,000 msl and 3 miles southeast of the accident site, the airplane made two constant-altitude 360-degree turns and then proceeded on a north-northeasterly heading for about 2.5 miles. The airplane then abruptly turned right and lost altitude, which is consistent with a loss of airplane control. The airplane continued to rapidly descend until it impacted trees and terrain on a southerly heading. No discernible distress calls were noted. The wreckage was found generally fragmented, and all of the airplane’s structural components and flight control surfaces were accounted for within the wreckage debris path. Subsequent examination of the engines revealed evidence of rotation and operation at impact and no mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The four engine aircraft Harbin SH-5 (Shuishang Hongzha 5) was engaged in a training mission off Qingdao with a crew of five on board. In unknown circumstances, the seaplane crashed in the Jiaozhou Bay few km offshore, killing all five occupants.

The pilot and two passengers departed Sarlat-Domme Airport for a training mission over the region of Bordeaux. A precision approach was completed at Bordeaux-Mérignac Airport followed by a go-around procedure. The IFR flight plan was closed and the pilot continued under VFR mode to Bordeaux-Léognan-Saucats Aerodrome where he landed. A passenger deplaned, the engine remained running and the aircraft took off few minutes later to Bergerac where a refueling was planned. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 2,000 feet, both engines failed. The pilot reduced his altitude, selected gear down and attempted and emergency landing in a vineyard. Upon landing, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.