Crash of a Lockheed L-382G-31C Hercules at Travis AFB: 5 killed

Date & Time: Apr 8, 1987 at 1732 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N517SJ
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Travis AFB - Travis AFB
MSN:
4558
YOM:
1974
Flight number:
SJ517
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
5
Captain / Total flying hours:
8600
Captain / Total hours on type:
8000.00
Aircraft flight hours:
17027
Circumstances:
The Hercules aircraft took off from Travis AFB at 14:45 for the second of a series of local training flights. Approaches and practice landings were carried out at McClellan AFB before returning to Travis. A runway 21L ILS approach and full stop landing were to be made by a 1st officer candidate. A balked landing forced the captain to take over the controls and initiate a go-around. The no. 1 and no. 2 engines both decelerated when throttles were advanced. The aircraft then banked left and struck the airport perimeter fence in a nose-low and steep left-wing low attitude.
Probable cause:
Inadequate Southern Air Transport engine maintenance which allowed the accumulation of oil residues in the engine compressor sections until two engines were incapable of responding to rapid demands for increased power. Contributing to the accident was the continuation of the go-around by the captain after power had been lost from two engines and the movement of the flap handle to the flaps retracted position during the go-around.
Final Report:

Crash of an Ilyushin II-76MD in Lake Sivash: 8 killed

Date & Time: Apr 2, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-76685
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dzhankoy - Dzhankoy
MSN:
0063468037
YOM:
1986
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Dzhankoy AFB on a combined night exercise with a second II-76 registered CCCP-76679 that was also carrying a crew of eight. Apparently following a pilot error, both aircraft collided in mid-air, entered a dive and crashed in Lake Sivash, Crimea. All 16 occupants in both aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
In-flight collision caused by a pilot error.

Crash of an Ilyushin II-76MD in Lake Sivash: 8 killed

Date & Time: Apr 2, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CCCP-76679
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Dzhankoy - Dzhankoy
MSN:
0063467014
YOM:
1986
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
8
Circumstances:
The four engine aircraft departed Dzhankoy AFB on a combined night exercise with a second II-76 registered CCCP-76685 that was also carrying a crew of eight. Apparently following a pilot error, both aircraft collided in mid-air, entered a dive and crashed in Lake Sivash, Crimea. All 16 occupants in both aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
In-flight collision caused by a pilot error.

Crash of a Canadair CL-215-1A10 near San Joan de Moró: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 13, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
UD.13-18
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
MSN:
1079
YOM:
1985
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a training flight and was completing a scooping mission on a small lake near San Joan de Moró when the airplane crashed while contacting water. Both pilots were killed.

Crash of a Boeing KC-135A-BN Stratotanker at Altus AFB

Date & Time: Feb 13, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
60-0330
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Altus AFB - Altus AFB
MSN:
18105
YOM:
1961
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
10305
Circumstances:
The crew was performing a local training mission at Altus AFB. After landing, smoke spread in the cockpit and a fire erupted. The crew immediately stopped the aircraft and the runway and evacuated the cabin safely. There were no injuries while the aircraft was totally destroyed by fire.
Probable cause:
It was determined that UHF cables which runs near the aft wing root in the fuselage were melted due to an electrical fault. Fuel vapors in the area of the aft body tank ignited.

Crash of a Dassault Falcon 20 at Omidiyeh AFB: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 8, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Omidiyeh AFB - Omidiyeh AFB
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
2
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The crew was engaged in a local training flight at Omidiyeh AFB. On approach, the twin engine aircraft was shot down by a surface-to-air missile and crashed few hundred meters short of runway threshold, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.
Probable cause:
Mistakenly shot down by a surface-to-air missile fired by Iranian soldiers performing an exercise at Omidiyeh AFB.

Crash of a Fokker F27 Friendship 200 in East Midlands

Date & Time: Jan 18, 1987 at 1415 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
G-BMAU
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
East Midlands - East Midlands
MSN:
10241
YOM:
1963
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
8345
Captain / Total hours on type:
2983.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5220
Copilot / Total hours on type:
572
Aircraft flight hours:
38487
Aircraft flight cycles:
44761
Circumstances:
The BMA Fokker F-27 aircraft was engaged on crew training at East Midlands Airport (EMA). The commander, who was an experienced training captain, occupied the right pilot's seat and a first officer undergoing training for conversion to captaincy occupied the left seat as handling pilot. Another captain refreshing on type sat on the jump seat behind the pilots' seats, the intention being that he should move into the left seat after the first officer's training period. The weather was: wind 150 degrees at 7 kts, visibility 4 km and cloud 7 oktas stratus, base 1000 feet. The surface temperature was 2 °C and the QNH 1030. The training session began with a practice abandoned takeoff after which the aircraft took off at 13:08 and flew three practice ILS approaches followed by touch-and-go landings on runway 09, climbing to 2000 feet above mean sea level (amsl) after each takeoff. The runway in use was then changed and the aircraft flew a simulated asymmetric ILS approach to runway 27 followed by a missed approach (go-around) with the left engine throttled back. The runway was then changed again and an ILS approach to runway 09 was flown with the left engine still throttled back. This approach was followed by a touch-and-go landing during which both engines were brought up to full power. Very soon after becoming airborne the training captain again simulated failure of the left engine and the aircraft was climbed to 2000 feet amsl. Soon after the aircraft levelled off, the handling pilot commented on the large amount of rudder required to counteract the simulated failure of the left engine after takeoff. The training captain then said that he was deliberately putting more drag on the left side than would have been the case if the propeller had auto-feathered so that the climb performance corresponded better with that of an aircraft with passengers on board. He went on to say that if the handling pilot could cope with that extra drag, he could expect to control the aircraft if the failed engine auto-feathered because the rudder pedal force would then not be quite so great. The crew then began a procedural NDB approach to runway 09, for which instrument screens were fitted in front of the handling pilot. It was intended that the aircraft should be landed after the NDB approach for the pilot in the jump seat to take over as handling pilot. Decision altitude for the approach was 740 feet and touchdown altitude was 305 feet. It was company practice for beacon passage to be identified by the movement of the radio compass needle and, as the aircraft passed about one third of a mile north of the marker beacon inbound, descending through approximately 1300 feet amsl, the handling pilot said "Over the beacon now". No audio signal from the marker beacon was heard on the cockpit voice recorder. The landing checklist was completed during the following 20 seconds, including confirmation that the undercarriage was down, fuel heaters were off, two blue propeller lights were illuminated and fuel was trimmed up. 48 seconds after passing the beacon the aircraft reached decision altitude, and the training captain asked the handling pilot "How long and where is it?", to which the handling pilot replied "Got about a minute and ten seconds to go - should be straight in front". 22 seconds later and some 36 seconds before impact the training captain said "Why are we at 650 feet?" and pointed out that the handling pilot had allowed the aircraft to descend below decision altitude when he was, for training purposes, still in IMC. The handling pilot responded by saying "Intend going around then", or words to that effect. The training captain then said "Yes, well I'll let you see it now. There it is". As the training captain was saying this, the sound of an engine power increase was heard on the CVR, and, about 25 seconds before impact, the rpm of one engine was increased to 14,800 rpm, a setting 200 rpm below maximum continuous power. 10 seconds later the training captain was heard to say "Hang on, that's the - that's the field there. See it?" The handling pilot then said "Hold tight", at which point, some 13 seconds before impact, the CVR recorded the sound of another engine increasing power to 14,800 rpm. A moment later the handling pilot said "Haven't got it", and the training captain said "I've got it". The F-27 yawed to the left before banking steeply to the right. The aircraft struck the ground on the northern side of the Castle Donington motor racing circuit in a nose-down attitude, banked to the left and with considerable left sideslip. After the accident an accumulation of mixed rime and glaze ice was found on the leading edges of the wings and tail surfaces which had formed rough-surfaced horns one inch high above and below the airflow stagnation point. No ice was found on the flaps or landing gear.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident was that the aircraft became uncontrollable at an airspeed well above both its stalling speed and minimum control speed because its flying and handling characteristics were degraded by an accumulation of ice. The decision by the training captain not to operate the airframe de-icing system was an underlying cause but he could not have been expected to foresee this at the time. A contributory factor was that the operating crew allowed the airspeed to fall below the normal approach speed during the latter stages of the approach.
Final Report:

Crash of a Learjet C-21A at Maxwell AFB: 2 killed

Date & Time: Jan 14, 1987
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
84-0121
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Maxwell AFB - Maxwell AFB
MSN:
35-567
YOM:
1985
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
2
Circumstances:
The aircraft was engaged in a local training flight at Maxwell AFB, carrying three pilots. At liftoff, it went out of control and crashed near the runway. Two occupants were killed and a third pilot was injured.

Crash of a NAMC YS-11A-213 in Remington

Date & Time: Jan 13, 1987 at 1354 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N906TC
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Indianapolis - West Lafayette
MSN:
2154
YOM:
1970
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
3913
Captain / Total hours on type:
1381.00
Circumstances:
The flight crew failed to adhere to appropriate procedures and directives when they failed to select the hp cock levers to the hswl (lock out) position while performing an approach to landing stall during a training/test flight. When stall recovery was initiated, both propellers 'hung up' when the high (cruise pitch) stops of each propeller failed to withdraw. As the power levers were advanced, turbine gas temperatures (tgt's) exceeded limitations; the left propeller auto-feathered, the right propeller was later feathered by the captain. Restart procedures were attempted without success, and a forced landing in a plowed cornfield ensued. Examination of the engines revealed that the turbines had been 'subjected to severe (and destructive) thermal degradation during operation' as a result of the propellers being constrained during low speed operations. Testing of the relays revealed that the high stop withdrawal relay for the right propeller functioned intermittently. All three crew members escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
Occurrence #1: airframe/component/system failure/malfunction
Phase of operation: maneuvering
Findings
1. (c) procedures/directives - not followed - pilot in command
2. (f) inattentive - pilot in command
3. (c) powerplant controls - improper use of - pilot in command
----------
Occurrence #2: loss of engine power (total) - mech failure/malf
Phase of operation: descent - emergency
Findings
4. Turbine assembly - overtemperature
5. Emergency procedure - attempted - pilot in command
6. Propeller system/accessories, feathering system - engaged
7. Propeller feathering - performed - pilot in command
----------
Occurrence #3: forced landing
Phase of operation: descent - emergency
----------
Occurrence #4: gear not extended
Phase of operation: landing - flare/touchdown
Findings
8. Terrain condition - open field
9. (c) wheels up landing - intentional - pilot in command
10. Terrain condition - rough/uneven
Final Report:

Crash of a Douglas DC-10-30 in Ilorin

Date & Time: Jan 10, 1987 at 1350 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
5N-ANR
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Lagos - Ilorin
MSN:
46968
YOM:
1977
Location:
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
9
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Aircraft flight hours:
29487
Aircraft flight cycles:
8748
Circumstances:
The flight originated from Lagos, Nigeria, at 1320LT hours local time as a training flight. The training flight commenced from Lagos with the trainee Captain on the left seat as the Pilot Flying while the Instructor Captain was on the right seat as Pilot-in-Command. The point of intended landing and subsequent trainings was Ilorin Airport. Flight preparation was completed by the crew and ground dispatchers with 60.3 metric tonnes of fuel up-lift giving an estimated endurance of 8 hours. The flight was normal up till the altitude of 3,000 feet when the aircraft was inside the control zone of Ilorin Control Tower which had cleared the aircraft for a touch and go on runway 05. At 1,000 feet agl the aircraft had its landing gears in the down position and landing flaps set at 35°. At 400 feet agl the autopilot was disconnected and later at 80 feet the autothrottles were also disconnected. The aircraft was fully established on the ILS. As the trainee captain was on his very first flight on the aircraft type, the Nigeria Airways DC-10 flight transition syllabus item 9 has it that the sequence of training at this point in time should be '3 engine or single land demonstration-Full stop'. As the aircraft had already requested and cleared for a touch and go and established on ILS, it was clear that item 9 had been skipped and item 10 '3 engine Flight Director ILS approach -Touch and Go' was in progress. The trainee captain crossed the 05 threshold rather high at about 60 feet or more and a long time, interspersed with instructions by the instructor captain, was spent before the aircraft had its main landing gears on the ground at about 2,913 feet (888 m) from the threshold. Runway 05 had a Landing Distance Available if 3,100 meters. It appeared that the trainee captain did not recede the throttles fully back for the touchdown and the Instructor had to assist in doing so. The trainee captain then appeared to be holding the nosewheel off the ground and again the Instructor had to push the control column down. On nosewheel touchdown, the trainee immediately requested for takeoff power. The Instructor went into the aircraft reconfiguration procedure after the landing and was still busy on the required settings when the trainee Pilot raised an alarm as the runway threshold was approaching. The Instructor looked out into the 900m of slight haze visibility, felt that the aircraft would not takeoff with the limited runway available and immediately reached out to deploy the spoilers at the same time stepped on the brakes. Abort takeoff was not announced. At this point in time the engine throttles had already been advanced for takeoff. The aircraft was on heavy braking from about 1,390 feet (424 meters) before runway end as it overran the runway. The aircraft made significant impacts with the ILS antenna bars, electrical switch posts and the approach light support structures of runway 23 all located on the runway 05 clearway before it came to a halt. The location of the accident site was 44 meters to the left of the centreline and 649 meters along the extended centreline. A fire erupted and consumed the fuselage. All nine crew members escaped uninjured.
Probable cause:
The probable cause of the accident is primarily the amount of runway consumed in effecting the landing coupled with the lack of knowledge, with certainty of the position of the throttle levers by both the instructor and the trainee pilot in a crucial moment of deciding either to continue the takeoff or abort. The breakdown of communication and coordination between the instructor, the trainee pilot and the trainee flight engineer led to the subsequent overrun.
The following contributing factors were reported:
- The absence of uniform flight standards especially on procedures, within the Nigeria Airways Ltd. in that simulator trainings are not a progressive and logical sequence to flying the live aircraft.
- The extent of the accident was aggravated by the repeated collisions with solidly constructed approach light supporting structures which caused the fire and the shoddy performance of the airport fire services.
- The visibility was too close to the minima for a training flight.