Training

The purpose of the flight was to familiarise a prospective purchaser with the handling of the aircraft. The captain who was the owner of the aircraft and held a Private Pilot's Licence with an Instructor's Rating, occupied the right-hand seat and the other pilot, who also held a Private Pilot's Licence, occupied the left-hand seat. The weather was fine with a light north-easterly wind. Before takeoff, some oil was noticed on the windscreen but neither the pilot considered that it warranted any action. Following an uneventful takeoff during which the engine and propeller functioned normally, some minutes were spent in the local area before it was decided to visit Barton. Liverpool ATC was informed and G-PU set course to Barton. On approaching Barton, some 20 minutes into the flight, an adjustment to the engine controls resulted in a significant increase in the amount of oil on the windscreen. The captain was unconcerned but the pilot kin the left-hand seat thought that he might have problems with visibility for landing. Shortly after this, Barton radio passed the airfield information which gave the landing runway as 09 with a left hand circuit. When crosswind at a height estimated by ground observers to be about 500 feet agl, the captain selected the propeller control to fully fine as part of his pre-landing checks. Coincident with this action, the windscreen and side windows became covered with a large quantity of oil which totally obscured both pilots view of the outside world. The operation manual recommends that under these circumstances the propeller be selected to coarse pitch to reduce the flow of oil. The captain did not execute this procedure because he considered that configuring the aircraft for an immediate landing in fine pitch was his priority in the prevailing circumstances. Both pilots opened their direct vision panels which enabled them to see the ground abeam the aircraft but not forward vision was possible because of the large amount of smoke that was ny now streaming back from the engine. The presence of smoke led the crew to believe that the aircraft might be on fire. Since the pilot in the left-hand seat could see towards the runway, it was decided that he should retain control and attempt to position the aircraft for a landing on runway 09. The captain made a radio call requesting priority in the circuit but the radio operator in the control tower received only carrier wave and assumed the call to be the captain's downwind report and replied accordingly. The aircraft's permanent radios not functioning and a hand held transceiver was being used by the pilot. Previous radio communications had been satisfactory. When it was judged that G-PU was at the end of the downwind leg, a turn onto base leg was initiated and a descent commenced. After turning towards the estimated position of the runway 09 threshold, the captain realised that he was high and selected full flap. It then became apparent to him that not only was the aircraft too high but that it had also flown through the runway centerline and he judged that, because of the presence of houses in the over-run are of runway 09, a safe landing could not be made. He therefore elected to go-around and increased power. The engine responded normally but the aircraft failed to either climb or accelerate. G-PU was now at a height estimated to be between 200 and 300 feet agl and the captain decided to retain full flap for a further circuit. During the subsequent left turn and downwind leg the aircraft as observed to be steadily losing height and the radio operator in the control tower alerted the emergency services in anticipation of a crash. G-PU continued its turn towards the airfield at a very low altitude but the crew did not have enough visual reference to determine their position. When it became apparent to the handling pilot that he was very close to the ground, he leveled the wings and waited for the inevitable impact. G-PU struck a stand of small trees and on the top of the M62 motorway embankment while on a heading of 180°, it then struck a motorway sign and several vehicles before coming to rest on the hard shoulder on a westerly heading. Neither pilot was aware that they had landed on the motorway until they vacated the aircraft. Neither pilot was injured but a car passenger sustained serious injuries.

Crashed in a hilly terrain in Tolcayuca while completing a training flight. All three pilots were injured.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Moscow-Chkalovky Airport consisting of touch-and-go maneuvers. During initial climb, while flying at a height of about 70 meters, the aircraft banked right then lost height and crashed in a lake located near Kudinovo, about 15 km southeast of the airport. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.

A company designated instructor and two f/o trainees were conducting a far 135 training flight. The third approach was terminated with a go-around initiated over the runway threshold at about 50 feet. After climbing to about 150 feet, the aircraft was observed to oscillate in yaw, followed by pitch, and then roll to the right. The aircraft impacted in a near-vertical descent attitude. The investigation revealed that the right engine was operating, but at reduced power. The left engine was at full power. There was no indication of aircraft system malfunction or failure. Company pilots indicated that the captain had a history of demeaning cockpit behavior and roughness with students. The f/o, was small in stature and had 100 hours of multi-engine time and no turboprop time. Company pilots reported the f/o trainee was consistently behind the aircraft in prior flights. Examination of the aircraft revealed the flaps in the retracted position contrary to aircraft handbook. Company pilots further indicated the captain had history of requiring low altitude 1-engine go arounds and delaying offers of assistance to students. All three crew members were killed.

Three pilots departed Taura Airbase for a local training flight. Shortly after takeoff, while climbing, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed. All three occupants were killed.

Aircraft was scheduled for an instructional flight. During the weather briefing, the CFI told the FSS specialist that the flight would include engine out practice. Witness statements indicate that the aircraft rolled sharply to the right and nosed down after attaining about 100 feet of altitude during the climb after takeoff. The aircraft struck the ground left prop and left wing tip first, in an inverted flight attitude. During the post accident investigation, the right engine power lever was subjected to lab exam and it was found that the lower aft part of the lift gate detent was worn. This created a ramping effect between the rounded edge of the lift gate and the flight idle stop. A worn lift gate detent would allow the power lever to inadvertently be moved into the beta range, causing asymmetrical drag and degraded airplane performance, particularly in critical phases of flight. All three occupants were killed.

The four engine airplane was engaged in a training exercise. While landing in ad hoc airfield, the nose gear collapsed and the aircraft came to rest. There were no casualties.

During the return flight to San Jose and subsequent descent and approach to the Long Beach Airport, the two pilots experienced, in succession, a failure of the turbocharger system, loss of an alternator, loss of engine oil pressure, an unsafe landing gear indication, and an in-flight fire followed by the loss of engine power during a night time circling approach to an unfamiliar airport in visual meteorological conditions. The aircraft crashed onto the southbound lanes of the San Diego freeway at Long Beach after making a flyby of the tower to confirm the landing gear position. The investigation revealed an improperly installed turbocharger, a cracked manifold exhaust, a burned main power lead, a separated cylinder, and a low fluid level in the hydraulic reservoir. Two years prior to this accident, the instructor pilot made an unintentional gear up landing in another aircraft. One year prior to this accident the FAA revoked the mechanic's inspection authorization.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Campo de Mayo AFB when the single engine airplane crashed upon landing. Both pilots were injured.

The crew departed Solenzara AFB on a training mission. The single engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances by the Asinao Pass, about 16 km southwest of the Solenzara Airbase. All three occupants were killed.