Training

The aircraft impacted mountainous terrain in controlled flight during hours of darkness and marginal VFR conditions. The flight was being vectored for an instrument approach during the pilot's 14 CFR Part 135 instrument competency check flight. The flight was instructed by approach control to maintain VFR conditions, and was assigned a heading and altitude to fly which caused the aircraft to fly into another airspace sector below the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA). FAA Order 7110.65, Section 5-6-1, requires that if a VFR aircraft is assigned both a heading and altitude simultaneously, the altitude must be at or above the MVA. The controller did not issue a safety alert, and in an interview, said he was not concerned when the flight approached an area of higher minimum vectoring altitudes (MVA's) because the flight was VFR and 'pilots fly VFR below the MVA every day.' At the time of the accident, the controller was working six arrival sectors and experienced a surge of arriving aircraft. The approach control facility supervisor was monitoring the controller and did not detect and correct the vector below the MVA.

At approximately 0910 EST, the aircraft took off from runway 32 at Horn Island and commenced a normal climb. Shortly after, it adopted a nose-high attitude and commenced a wingover type manoeuvre to the right. Witnesses described the aircraft as being in a nose-low attitude, and at a height of approximately 600 ft to 700 ft above ground level after the completion of this manoeuvre. It then abruptly adopted a level attitude and rapidly entered a spin to the left. Witnesses on the ground reported that at approximately the same time as the aircraft entered the spin, engine power became asymmetric, with the right engine continuing to deliver considerable power. The aircraft continued to descend in a fully developed flat spin, with no observed signs of an attempt to recover. The impact was heard shortly after the aircraft descended behind vegetation to the north-west of the aerodrome. The accident was reported to Flight Service by radio at 0918. The wreckage was located on a beach approximately 2 km to the north-west of the aerodrome. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and the pilot sustained fatal injuries.

The pilot-owner/operator, who was seated in the right seat, said the left seat pilot made the approach to runway 15. The wind was reported as being from the southwest at 20 knots with no reference to gusts. He said the pilot aligned the airplane 40 feet left of runway centerline and failed to flare. The airplane contacted the runway, bounced back into the air with the right wing high, and began drifting to the left. The right seat pilot took control, first trying to lower the wing then attempting to abort the landing. The airplane struck the ground and cartwheeled. The left seat pilot said he was 'receiving training' from the pilot-owner and was 'not at the controls' at the time of the accident.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Shymkent Airport. On approach, at an altitude of about 300 metres, the instructor shut down one engine to simulate a failure. The pilot-in-command requested full power on the remaining engine but the flight engineer misinterpreted the instruction and shut down the second engine. The aircraft lost speed and height and struck the ground with a positive acceleration of 2,6 g before coming to rest in a field 1,100 metres short of runway threshold. All four occupants were injured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While in a training flight, the aircraft went out of control and crashed in a field located in Uzech, about 15 km north of Cahors, Lot. The aircraft was destroyed and all four occupants were killed.
Crew:
Cpt Jean-Marie Bachelot,
Cpt Henri-Claude Johary.
Passengers:
Michel Magnier,
Jacqueline Spirkovitch.

Two company pilots were undergoing first officer Metro III type-conversion flying training. Both had completed Metro III ground school training during the week before the accident. A company check-and-training pilot was to conduct the type conversions. This was his first duty period after 2 weeks leave. Before commencing leave, he had discussed the training with the chief pilot. This discussion concerned the general requirements for a co-pilot conversion course compared to a command pilot course but did not address specific sequences or techniques. The three pilots met at the airport at about 1530 EST on 16 September 1995. During the next 2 hours and 30 minutes approximately, the check-and-training pilot instructed the trainees in daily and pre-flight inspections, emergency equipment and procedures, and cockpit procedures and drills (including the actions to be completed in the event of an engine failure), as they related to the aircraft type. The briefing did not include detailed discussion of aircraft handling following engine failure on takeoff. The group began a meal break at 1800 and returned to the aircraft at about 1830 to begin the flying exercise. The check-and-training pilot was pilot in command for the flight and occupied the left cockpit seat. One trainee occupied the right (co-pilot) cockpit seat while the other probably occupied the front row passenger seat on the left side. This person had the use of a set of head-phones to listen to cockpit talk and radio calls. The aircraft departed Tamworth at 1852, some 40 minutes after last light. Witnesses described the night as very dark, with no moon. Under these conditions, the Tamworth city lighting, which extended to the east from about 2 km beyond the end of runway 12, was the only significant visual feature in the area. The co-pilot performed the takeoff, his first in the Metro III. For about the next 30 minutes, he completed various aircraft handling exercises including climbing, descending, turning (including steep turns), and engine handling. No asymmetric flight exercises were conducted. The check-and-training pilot then talked the co-pilot through an ILS approach to runway 30R with an overshoot and landing on runway 12L. The landing time was 1940. The aircraft had functioned normally throughout the flight. After clearing the runway, the aircraft held on a taxiway for 6 minutes, with engines running. During this period, the crew discussed the next flight which was to be flown by the same co-pilot. The check-and-training pilot stated that he was going to give the co-pilot a V1 cut. The co-pilot objected and then questioned the legality of night V1 cuts. The check-and-training pilot replied that the procedure was now legal because the company operations manual had been changed. The co-pilot made a further objection. The check-and-training pilot then said that they would continue for a Tamworth runway 30R VOR/DME approach and asked the co-pilot to brief him on this approach. The crew discussed the approach and the check-and-training pilot then requested taxi clearance. The aircraft was subsequently cleared to operate within a 15-NM radius of Tamworth below 5,000 ft. The crew then briefed for the runway 12L VOR/DME approach. The plan was to reconfigure the aircraft for normal two-engine operations after the V1 cut and then complete the approach. The crew completed the after-start checks, the taxi checks, and then the pre-take-off checks. The checks included the co-pilot calling for one-quarter flap and the check-and-training pilot responding that one-quarter flap had been selected. The crew briefed the take-off speeds as V1 = 100 kts, VR = 102 kts, V2 = 109 kts, and Vyse = 125 kts for the aircraft weight of 5,600 kg. Take-off torque was calculated as 88% and watermethanol injection was not required. The aircraft commenced the take-off roll at 1957.05. About 25 seconds after brakes release, the check-and-training pilot called 'V1', and less than 1 second later, 'rotate'. The aircraft became airborne at 1957.32. One second later, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot that the aircraft attitude should be 'just 10 degrees nose up'. After a further 3 seconds, the check-and-training pilot retarded the left engine power lever to the flight-idle position. Over the next 4 seconds, the recorded magnetic heading of the aircraft changed from 119 degrees to 129 degrees. The co-pilot and then the check-and-training pilot called that a positive rate of climb was indicated and the landing gear was selected up 15 seconds after the aircraft became airborne. The landing gear warning horn began to sound at approximately the same time. After 19 seconds airborne, and again after 30 seconds, the check-and-training pilot reminded the co-pilot to hold V2. Three seconds later, the check-and-training pilot said that the aircraft was descending. The landing gear warning horn ceased about 1 second later. By this time, the aircraft had gradually yawed left from heading 129 degrees, through the runway heading of 121 degrees, to 107 degrees. After being airborne for 35 seconds, the aircraft struck a tree approximately 350 m beyond, and 210 m left of, the upwind end of runway 12L. It then rolled rapidly left, severed power lines and struck other trees before colliding with the ground in an inverted attitude and sliding about 70 m. From the control tower, the aerodrome controller saw the aircraft become airborne. As it passed abeam the tower, the controller directed his attention away from the runway. A short time later, all lighting in the tower and on the airport failed and the controller noticed flames from an area to the north-east of the runway 30 threshold. Within about 30 seconds, when the emergency power supply had come on line, the controller attempted to establish radio contact with the aircraft. When no response was received, he initiated call-out of the emergency services.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Labuan Airport. Following several touch-and-go manoeuvres, the crew initiated a new approach when one of the engine failed. The aircraft stalled and crashed in the sea few hundred metres offshore. Three crew members were killed and three others were seriously injured.

The aircraft was engaged in a training flight at Baroda airport. It was under the command of an examiner pilot with the trainee pilot on right hand seat. The first touch and go exercise was uneventful. During the second exercise, immediately on touchdown the left main landing gear failed at its shock strut outer cylinder and the inner cylinder with the main wheel assembly attached to it got liberated. The aircraft continued moving forward with the remaining portion of left shock strut contacting the runway followed by the left engine propellers and fuselage bottom and finally came to rest on the runway left side strip. There was no fire and no injury to persons on board the aircraft.

This was the first flight of the Grumman G-21 in two years. Also, the pilot had not flown the G-21 for two years. Before taking off, the pilot reported that three takeoffs and landings would be needed for purposes of becoming current. After takeoff, he flew the airplane approximately one hour and made two full stop landings. During the third takeoff, the airplane was described as lifting off in a short distance and going into a nose high attitude below an altitude of 100 feet. The airplane then rolled left, struck the ground in a steep descent, and burned. Witnesses reported that the engines were providing power until impact; the engines and propellers had evidence of rotational damage. The flap actuators were found extended to a position that equated with 30° of flaps (half flaps). Four G-21 pilots were interviewed. According to them, flaps were not normally used for takeoff in this airplane. They reported that the turboprop engines had substantial power for the weight of the airplane, especially when the plane was not loaded, and that the G-21 would tend to become airborne quickly with flaps extended. No pre impact mechanical problem was noted during the investigation.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Riga-Lielvārdes AFB. While passing over runway 36 at a height of 150-200 metres, the pilot-in-command elected to make a barrel when control was lost. The aircraft crashed on runway and was destroyed, killing both occupants.