Training

The copilot inadvertently induced a lateral oscillation and lost control of the airplane while practicing touch-and-go landings. The pilot made the first touch-and-go. The copilot successfully made the second touch-and-go. The copilot attempted the third touch-and-go. At 50 feet, he disengaged the yaw damper and entered a pilot induced lateral oscillation. The airplane rapidly decelerated and developed a high sink rate. The airplane dragged the right tip fuel tank, which separated from the airplane, and the airplane bounced back into the air. The airplane landed hard, the main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane skidded to a stop off the right side of the runway. Both pilots and the passenger deplaned through the main entry door. The pilot-in-command had not demonstrated the handling characteristics of the airplane with the yaw damper off, and he felt he did not react quickly enough to prevent the accident.

After takeoff from Mendoza-El Plumerillo Airport, while climbing to a height of about 50 metres, the right engine lost power. The crew declared an emergency and initiated a left turn to return to the airport when control was lost. The aircraft stalled and crashed 300 metres past the runway end, bursting into flames. All five crew members were killed. They were completing a training flight to Paraná.

The flight crew stated that while making a missed approach after a practice instrument landing system approach, the right engine failed. The captain took control of the airplane from the copilot. The captain stated that while he performed the emergency procedures for engine failure, he noticed the left engine was not producing power. He then made a forced landing in water east of the airport. He stated that just before impact, he feathered the left propeller. The copilot stated he observed the captain activate the propeller feathering button for the left engine as he performed the emergency procedures for the right engine failure. The reason for failure of the right engine was not determined.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Surabaya-Juanda Airport, consisting of touch-and-go manoeuvres. While approaching the airport to complete the eighth landing, at an altitude of 500 feet, the aircraft rolled to the left then stalled and crashed in a pond located 3 km short of runway, bursting into flames. All three pilots were killed. Both captains were operating on Casa-Nurtanio CN-235 (IPTN) and making a transition to Fokker F27.

The instructor was accompanied by a trainee pilot and two passengers (also pilots) on a local training flight and was in the process of doing type conversion training when the accident happened. On the third circuit after a touch and go landing on runway 06L, the right-hand engine failed soon after take-off. The aircraft was flown at low altitude in a left-hand circuit in an attempt to land onto runway 17. During this circuit the left-hand engine also failed. The aircraft collided with, and severed, three 11kV electrical conductors and executed a forced landing with the gear retracted to the North of FALA approximately 1 km from threshold of runway 17. The pilot only sustained minor injuries with no one else injured. The initial on-site inspection revealed that both front tanks, which were selected at the fuel tank selector, were empty. The pilot who was undergoing conversion training refueled the aircraft prior to the accident and stated that 70 litres of fuel was uplifted into each "inboard auxiliary" tank and that what he presumed to be the "main" tanks were filled to capacity. The instructor stated that upon his arrival, the pilot who refueled the aircraft told him that he had filled the "mains" and that the "centre aux. tanks" were partially filled. The instructor further stated that the "main" tanks were selected for the duration of the flight. The aircraft is equipped with three fuel tanks in each wing. These tanks are: Front, Rear Auxiliary and Auxiliary tanks. Only one fuel quantity gauge is installed in the aircraft. A seven position selector knob above the fuel quantity gauge determines the tank to which the gauge is connected which then indicates the amount of fuel in that respective tank. The left and right front tanks were selected on the fuel gauge selector knob.

The crew was completing a local training flight at Morón AFB. In unknown circumstances, the aircraft crashed in the swimming pool of a private residence located in the district of Moreno, west of the airbase. Both pilots (Cpt Reyna and Lt Pesci) were killed while there were no injuries on the ground.

The crew (two pilots and one technician) departed Kayseri-Erkilet AFB on a local training flight. While flying at a relative low altitude, the twin engine aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent, dove into the ground and crashed near the Sarimsakli Dam, about 22 km northeast of Kayseri Airbase. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three occupants were killed.

The twin engine aircraft departed Paris-Le Bourget Airport at 1309LT on a flight to Reims-Champagne with two pilots on board, one instructor and one pilot that should complete a transition program. While descending at an altitude of 2,000 to Reims-Prunay Airport, the crew informed ATC that he would perform an exercise consisting of a go-around procedure with the simulation of an engine failure. On a left downwind approach to runway 25, the crew started the exercise when the aircraft rolled to the left, lost height and crashed in an open field, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found 425 metres short of runway 25 and both pilots were killed.

The accident aircraft had recently had maintenance work performed on its autofeather system pressure sensing switches, due to reports of the left engine not autofeathering properly in flight. The purpose of the accident flight was to verify proper inflight operation of the autofeather system following the maintenance work on the autofeather pressure sensing switches and a successful ground check of the autofeather system. Air traffic control (ATC) communications recordings disclosed that the pilot called ready for takeoff from runway 2 approximately 1207, and requested to orbit above the airport at 8,000 feet (note: the airport elevation is 4,740 feet.) The pilot subsequently reported established in a hold above the airport at 8,000 feet approximately 1213, and was instructed by ATC to report leaving the hold. Approximately 1215, an abbreviated radio transmission, "zero five four," was recorded. The Idaho Falls tower controller responded to this call but never got a response in return from the accident aircraft, despite repeated efforts to contact the aircraft. Witnesses reported that the aircraft banked to the left, or to the west, and that it entered a spiral from this bank and crashed (one witness reported the aircraft was flying at 200 to 300 feet above ground level when it entered this bank, and that it performed a "skidding" or "sliding" motion part way through the bank, about 1 second before entering the spiral.) The aircraft crashed about 2 miles north of the airport. On-site examination disclosed wreckage and impact signatures consistent with an uncontrolled, relatively low-speed, moderate to steep (i.e. greater than 22 degrees) angle, left-wing-low impact on an easterly flight path. No evidence of flight control system malfunction was found, and a large quantity of jet fuel was noted to be aboard the aircraft. Post-accident examination of the aircraft's engines indicated that the left engine was most likely operating in a low power range and the right engine was most likely operating in a mid to high power range at impact, but no indications of any anomalies or distress that would have precluded normal operation of the engines prior to impact was found. Post-accident examination of the aircraft's propellers disclosed indications that 1) both propellers were rotating at impact, 2) neither propeller was at or near the feather position at impact, 3) both propellers were being operated with power at impact (exact amount unknown), 4) both propellers were operating at approximately 14º to 20º blade angle at impact, and 5) there were no propeller failures prior to impact. Post-accident examination of the autofeather pressure sensing switches disclosed evidence of alterations, tampering, or modifications made in the field on all but one switch (a replacement switch, which had been installed just before the accident flight during maintenance) installed on the aircraft at the time of the accident. All switches except for the replacement switch operated outside their design pressure specifications; the replacement switch operated within design pressure specifications. Examination of the switches indicated that all switches were installed in the correct positions relative to high- or low-pressure switch installations. Engineering analyses of expected autofeather system performance with the switches operating at their "as-found" pressure settings (vice at design pressure specifications) did not indicate a likelihood of any anomalous or abnormal autofeather system operation with the autofeather switches at their "as-found" pressure settings. Also, cockpit light and switch evidence indicated that the autofeather system was not activated at the time of impact. The combination of probable engine power and propeller pitch on the left engine (as per the post-accident engine and propeller teardown results) was noted to be generally consistent with the "zero-thrust" engine torque and propeller RPM settings specified for simulated single-engine practice in the aircraft Information Manual.

The four engine aircraft was dispatched at King Hussein AFB for a local training mission on behalf of the Jordan Special Forces. While flying at an altitude of 1,000 feet in the vicinity of the airbase, the crew encountered an unexpected situation when the aircraft that entered an uncontrolled descent. At low height, the crew attempted a last correction manoeuvre to avoid power cables when the aircraft crashed in a huge explosion. All 13 occupants were killed. It was reported that the crew encountered unknown technical problems.