Positioning

While approaching La Paragua on a positioning flight from Canaima, the single engine aircraft crashed in a wooded and hilly terrain located 13 km from the destination. Both pilots were killed.

On final approach to Charallave-Óscar Machado Zuloaga Airport runway 28, the crew was unable to establish a visual contact with the runway and initiated a go-around procedure. Few minutes later, while on a second attempt to land, the aircraft broke through the cloud base at 800 feet but was not properly lined up with the runway. To avoid a collision with the tower, the crew made a turn to the right when the aircraft crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed.

Following an uneventful positioning flight from Porlamar, the aircraft landed at Oranjestad-Reina Beatrix Airport with its undercarriage retracted. The aircraft slid on ity belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The Learjet 35A received substantial damage on impact with airport property and terrain during a landing overrun on runway 19 (7,002 feet by 150 feet, grooved asphalt) at Charles B. Wheeler Downtown Airport (MKC), Kansas City, Missouri. The airplane was operated by a commercial operator as a positioning flight to Kansas City International Airport (MCI), Kansas City, Missouri, with a filed alternate destination of Lincoln Airport (LNK), Lincoln, Nebraska. Night instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. LNK was a certificated airport with a snow removal plan and was served by runway 17R (12,901 feet by 200 feet, grooved asphalt and concrete). The flight was en route to MCI to pick up passengers and continue on as an on-demand charter but diverted to MKC following the closure of MCI. MCI was closed due to a McDonnell Douglas MD83 sliding off a taxiway during an after landing taxi on contaminated runway/taxiway conditions. MKC held a limited airport certificate that did not have a snow removal plan and was served by runway 19. Following a precision approach and landing on runway 19 at MKC, the Learjet 35A slid off the departure end of the runway and impacted airport property and terrain. The Learjet 35A was operated with inoperative thrust reversers as per the airplane's minimum equipment list at the time of the accident. About 1:05 hours before the accident, runway 19 Tapley values were recorded as 21-22-22 with 1/2 inch of wet snow. About 17 minutes before the accident, MKC began snow removal operations. About 7 minutes before the accident, the MKC air traffic control tower (TWR) instructed the snow removal vehicles to clear the runway for inbound traffic. TWR was advised by airport personnel that runway 19 was plowed and surface conditions were 1/4 inch of snow of snow; friction values were not taken or reported. While inbound, the Learjet 35A requested any braking action reports from TWR. The first airplane to land was a Cessna 210 Centurion, and the pilot reported braking action to the TWR as "moderate", which was then transmitted by TWR as "fair" from a Centurion in response to the Learjet 35A's query. The Cessna 210 Centurion pilot did not use brakes during landing and did not indicate this to TWR during his braking action report. The Aeronautical Information Manual states that no correlation has been established between MU values and the descriptive terms "good," fair," and "nil" used in braking action reports. The Airport Winter Safety and Operations advisory circular (AC) states that "pilot braking action reports oftentimes have been found to vary significantly, even when reported on the same frozen contaminant surface conditions." The AC also states, "It is generally accepted that friction surveys will be reliable as long as the depth of snow does not exceed 1 inch (2.5 cm) and/or depth of wet snow/slush does not exceed 1/8 inch (3mm). The Learjet 35A flightcrew calculated a landing distance 5,400 feet. Two of the cockpit voice recording channels, which normally contain the pilot and copilot audio panel information, were blank.

The Hansa 320, a corporate turbojet airplane departed runway 26L at night on a maintenance ferry flight at 1954 central standard time, and was destroyed when it impacted a river two miles west of the departure airport. Radar track data indicated that the airplane climbed to about 900 feet msl at about 180 knots before it began losing altitude and impacted the river. The current weather was: winds 270 degrees at 13 knots gusting to 19 knots, visibility 7 miles, light rain, 1,000 feet scattered ceiling, 1,800 feet broken, 2,400 feet overcast, temperature 2 degrees Celsius (C), dew point 2 degrees C, altimeter 29.90. The FAA had issued the pilot a Special Flight Permit for the flight. The limitations listed in the flight permit included the following limitations: Limitation number 6 stipulated, "IFR in VMC conditions approved, provided all equipment required for IFR flight is operational and certified iaw 14 CFR Part 91.413. If this equipment is NOT certified and operational, then VFR in VMC conditions ONLY." The ferry permit listed, "Additional Limitations: Engine power assurance runs, compass swing, and functional check of avionics equipment must be performed, and appropriate maintenance entries in the aircraft log prior to departure." The pilot was informed that none of the additional limitations had been performed prior to takeoff. The pilot had aborted a previous takeoff at about 1830 due to no airspeed indications. At the request of the pilot, maintenance personnel disconnected the lines to the pitot tubes and blew out the tubes, but no leak check, as required by FAR 91.411, was performed prior to the accident flight. The pilot performed a high-speed taxi to test the airspeed indicators prior to takeoff. The copilot did not have any ground school or flight time in a Hansa 320. The second-in-command requirements stated in FAR 61.55 9 (f) (1), required that the flight be conducted under day VFR or day IFR. The Toxicology report for the pilot indicated that 0.106 (ug/ml, ug/g) Diphenhydramine was detected in the blood. Diphenhydramine is an antihistamine commonly used in over-the-counter cold/allergy preparations. In therapeutic doses, the medication commonly results in drowsiness, and has measurable effects on performance of complex cognitive and motor tasks (e.g. flying an aircraft). The pilot's currency in the Hansa 320 expired on November 30, 2004, the day of the accident. He would be required to have an FAA checkride in a Hansa 320 to be a pilot-in-command (PIC) after November 30th. Engine teardown inspections revealed that both engines were developing power at the time of impact. The inspection of the elevator trim system revealed that the elevator trim cables were improperly installed when they were replaced to comply with an Airworthiness Directive (AD) 224-01-11. The maintenance manager who inspected the installation of the elevator trim cables did not perform an operational check of the elevator trim tabs. The maintenance manager signed the aircraft log stating the "Aircraft is approved for one time ferry flight from SUS to TOL," although all stipulations of the ferry permit had not been met, and that a leak check of the pitot-static system had not been performed after the pitot tubes had been blown out.

On November 22, 2004, about 0615 central standard time, a Gulfstream G-1159A, N85VT, operated by Business Jet Services Ltd., struck a light pole and crashed about 3 miles southwest of William P. Hobby Airport, Houston, Texas, while on an instrument landing system approach to runway 4. The two pilots and the flight attendant were killed, an individual in a vehicle near the airport received minor injuries, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.

The crew departed Chicano, Angola, on a positioning flight to Kigali. While overflying DRC, the crew encountered severe turbulences. It seems that a fuel tank was broken following a structural failure, forcing the crew to attempt an emergency landing. The aircraft crash landed somewhere in DRC and was damaged beyond repair. Both occupants escaped uninjured.

The airplane departed from a maintenance facility, after installation of the right engine, with an unknown quantity of fuel. Shortly after takeoff, the pilot reported that he had "lost" an engine. He requested vectors for the departure airport, then amended his request to an alternate destination. From the original distress call to the last recorded radar target, approximately 2 ½ minutes, the airplane descended from 2,500 feet to 700 feet and slowed from 190 knots to about 87 knots. Several witnesses described the engine sound as "rough", and "cutting in and out" before the airplane descended out of view and sounds of impact were heard. The left wing was consumed by post-crash fire. Forty gallons of fuel were drained from the right inboard and nacelle tanks. Only trace amounts of fuel were visible in the right outboard tank. Both fuel selectors were found in the outboard tank position. Examination of flight times and ground-maintenance run times revealed that the engines were run for approximately 3 hours with the outboard tanks selected. The outboard tanks each held 40 gallons, for a total of 80 gallons. According to the pilot's operating manual, the fuel consumption rate at the maximum endurance power setting was 28 gallons per hour.

The flight was a VFR positioning flight from FLL to FXE. Transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) showed that while waiting for takeoff from FLL the flightcrew heard the local controller reported to a Delta Airlines flight that was on a seven mile final approach to land on runway 27R that the winds were 250 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 50 knots. The Delta Airlines flight crew then informed the controller they were making a missed approach. At 1130:05 the captain asks the first officer if "can you see the end of the weather? If we make a hard right turn, can we stay clear of it?" The first officer responded "I believe so." At 1130:06 the local controller reported "wind shear alert. The centerfield wind 230 at 22. Runway 27R departure 25 knot loss one mile departure." The captain stated to the first officer "sweet." At 1132:11 the captain transmitted to the local controller "tower, any chance of Hop-a-Jet 55 getting out of here?" The local controller responded wind 230 at 17, right turn direct FXE approved, runway 27R cleared for takeoff. The captain responded "cleared to go, right turn out." At 1133:10 the captain asks for gear up. At 1133:15 the local controller responded to a Southwest Airlines Flight waiting for takeoff "no, don't look like anyone's gonna go." "The uh, weather is due west moving rapidly to the north. It looks like a few minutes, and you all be in the clear straight out." At 1133:17, the captain stated to the first officer "oh #. Think this was a bad idea." The first officer responded "no airport in sight." At 1133:43 the sound similar to precipitation hitting the windshield is recorded. At 1133:46 the FLL local controller instructs the flight crew to contact FXE Tower. At 1133:54 the CVR records the FXE local controller transmitting "wind 200, variable 250 at 15, altimeter 29.99. Heavy cell of weather to the west moving eastbound. Low level wind shear possible. At 1134:16, the FXE local controller transmits "attention all aircraft, low level wind shear advisories are in effect. Use caution. Wind 240 at 10." At 1134:51, the first officer transmitted to the FXE local controller that the flight was over the shoreline inbound full stop. At 1135:02, the FXE local controller transmitted "Hop-a-Jet 55, Executive tower, wind 210 variable 250 at 35, 35 knots and gusting. Winds are uh, heavy on the field. Low level wind shear advisories are in effect. Heavy rains from the west, eastbound and would you like to proceed inbound and land Executive? Say intentions." The first officer responded "that's affirmative." The local controller responded, "Hop-a-Jet 55 straight in runway three one if able. The winds 230 gusts, correction, winds 230 variable 210 at 25." At 1135:48, the local controller transmitted, "Hop-a-Jet 55, wind 230 variable 300 at 25 gusts 35. Altimeter 30.00. Runways are wet. Traffic is exiting the runway prior to your arrival, a Dutchess. Caution standing water on runways. Low level wind shear advisories in effect, Runway 31. Cleared to land." The first officer responded "cleared to land, Hop-a-Jet 55." At 1136:35, the local controller transmitted "wind 230 at 25, gusts 35." At 1136:58, the CVR records the sound similar to precipitation on the windshield. At 1137:17, the CVR records a sound similar to the aircraft touching down on the runway. At 1137:19, the sound of a repetitive tone similar to the thrust reverser warning starts and continues to the end of the recording. At 1137:23 a loud unidentified roaring sound starts and lasts 8 seconds. At 1137:30, loud rumbling noises similar to the aircraft departing the runway start. At 1137:36, a continuous tone similar to landing gear warning signal sounds and continues to the end of the recording. The rumbling noises stop. At 1137:39 the captain states the thrust reversers didn't stow and at 1138:36, the captain states "I went around and the # TRs stayed. The CVR recording ended. The 1132, Goes-12 infrared image depicts a rapidly developing cumulonimbus cloud between and over the FLL and FXE airports. The top of the cloud over FXE was in the range of 22,000 feet. The top of the cloud southwest of FXE was in the 39,000 feet range. The 1145, Goes-12 infrared image depicts a developing cumulonimbus cloud over FXE with the cloud top in the 42,000 feet range. Data was obtained from the Melbourne, Florida Doppler Weather Radar System, located 118 miles north-northwest of the accident site. The data showed that at FXE, between 1130 and 1145, a VIP Level 1 to 2 echo evolved into a VIP Level 5 "intense" echo at 1135 and a VIP Level 6 "extreme" echo by 1145.

The aircraft was refuelled to capacity at Polokwane Airport, South Africa on 28 June 2004 with 1750 litres of Jet A1 fuel where after it flew to São Sebastião, near Vilanculos, Mozambique. Later the day on 28 June 2004 the crew attempted to take off on a non-scheduled flight from Sao Sebastiao (near Vilanculos) to Vilanculos Airport (VNX). The purpose of the fight was to airlift an injured man to a hospital at an unknown destination. The crew did not use the full runway length available but attempted the takeoff run with only 870ft (265 m) of runway available. The aircraft failed to become airborne and overran the runway, colliding with a sandbank, the perimeter fence and trees and erupted in fire. Calculations, using the takeoff performance graphs in the POH (Pilot Operating Handbook), showed that the aircraft would have required a ground roll distance of 2000 ft (610 m) with 40° flap and 2100 ft (640 m) with no flap selected.