Executive/Corporate/Business

The twin engine aircraft departed Münster-Osnabrück Airport on a flight to Dresden, carrying four passengers and one pilot. On approach to Dresden-Klotzsche Airport by night, the pilot failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck the chimney of a bungalow and crashed in a field located in Grossnaundorf, 13 km northeast of runway 22 threshold, bursting into flames. All five occupants were killed, among them Dietman Richert.

The flight was executing the non-precision NDB runway 04 approach, had reported procedure turn inbound, and was cleared to change to advisory frequency. Witnesses observed the airplane descend out of the base of the overcast clouds in a 10° nose down, 45° left wing down attitude. The airplane impacted terrain about 3/4 mile south-southeast of the airport. Witnesses in the area reported that the weather was ceilings of about 100 feet and visibility of about 500 feet in light rain and fog. The minimum descent altitude for the approach is 465 feet agl. Both pilots were killed.

The Mitsubishi MU-300 Diamond business jet was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight from Williams Lake, British Columbia, to Hinton, Alberta. There were two pilots and two passengers on board. Prior to issuing the descent clearance from flight level 270 (FL270), the Edmonton Area Control Centre (ACC) advised the crew of the Jasper townsite, Alberta, weather. The winds were reported as calm. The crew cancelled the IFR during the descent and continued for a visual approach and landing to runway 02 at the Jasper-Hinton Airport. During the approach, the crew encountered moderate turbulence on short final. The captain increased the reference airspeed (Vref) from 105 to 115 knots to allow for subsiding air and airspeed fluctuations. The crew noted that the wind sock for runway 02 was fully extended and was varying in direction frequently. They elected to continue the approach and landing on runway 02. Power was reduced to idle at 50 feet. The aircraft touched down at about 1,000 feet down the runway. During the landing roll, the captain first applied maximum braking and then, when he determined that the aircraft would not come to a stop in the remaining runway distance available, he initiated commanded swerving to assist in stopping the aircraft; the aircraft skidded to a position 255 feet off the end of the runway. The aircraft sustained substantial damage; however, the occupants were uninjured. The accident occurred at latitude 53°19'N, longitude 117°45'W, at an elevation of 4,016 feet above sea level (asl), at 0920 mountain standard time (MST), during the hours of daylight.

The single engine airplane departed with two pilots, two passengers, baggage and equipment. At takeoff, the airplane was 955 pounds over the maximum allowable gross weight, and 2 inches beyond the aft c.g. Limit. After 4 hours of flying, the pilot elected to divert to another airport, due to icing conditions. During the descending left turn from base leg to final approach to runway 22, the airplane dropped, struck the ground, and slid 250 feet. The wings were separated from the airplane during the ground slide by two trees. A satisfactory postaccident engine run was completed. The airplane was calculated to be about 600 pounds over the maximum landing weight, and 2 inches beyond the aft c.g. Limit. The air induction lever was in the primary position, and not the required alternate position for icing conditions. The propeller and stall warning heat switches were off. The airplane had been flying in light freezing rain, which the poh stated should be avoided. Severe mixed icing was reported 25 miles northwest of the airport. Winds at the airport were from 150 degrees at 10 knots, gusting to 16 knots. Both pilots were killed and both passengers were seriously injured.

While climbing through 6,300 feet, the pilot reported the complete loss of power on the right engine. Approx 4 min later, and after the pilot had established an emergency descent for a landing, he reported that the left engine had also lost power. The airplane impacted a driveway and skidded into a building. Examination revealed that the right engine failed due to shifting of the engine case halves. Review of the engine maintenance records indicated that several cylinders had been replaced in recent months; the cylinder through bolts are used to torque the engine case. A reason for the loss of power on the left engine was not determined.

During climb to cruise the pilot reported a power loss on one engine and received vectors for a return to the departure airport. The pilot was subsequently cleared for the VOR-A approach and reported intercepting the inbound radial. The impact site was right of the inbound radial and short of the extended runway centerline. Weather at the airport was VFR. Post impact fire damaged the airplane. The left engine propeller was in the feather position. Visual and metallurgical examination confirmed the turbocharger shaft separated due to fatigue. The shaft contained chromium. The aircraft overhaul manual states that 'chrome plating...restoration of the shaft...are not permitted.' Metallographics revealed a microstructure of grey iron (automotive application) in the center housing. The turbocharger was overhauled and installed on the left engine in october 1989. All three occupants were killed.

The airplane was level at FL220 at night when vertical fluctuations in altitude up to 500 feet above altitude were noted by the Salt Lake Center controller. Immediately thereafter, the aircraft began a descent and transponder targets were lost. A trajectory study showed the aircraft descending in a tight right turn. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the right elevator separated in negative overload with both wings separating negatively. Wreckage distribution established separation of the empennage and its associated control surfaces before the separation of the wings. A preimpact fire was witnessed and the main fuselage was destroyed by an intense post crash fire. The initiating event which resulted in the altitude divergence and descending turn could not be determined.

The twin engine aircraft was approaching Mannheim Airport following an uneventful flight from Vienna-Schwechat. The pilot encountered poor visibility due to fog and failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft struck a tall tree, stalled and crashed in a wooded area, bursting into flames. The wreckage was found on the slope of Mt Königstuhl, east of Heidelberg, about 17 km southeast of Mannheim Airport. A passenger was seriously injured while three other occupants were killed. Two weeks later, on December 7, the only survivor died from his injuries. On board were two pilots aged 34 and 29, and two passengers, Otto Rüdiger and Klaus O. Fleck, both head corporate of the Südzucker Group.

On final approach to Huambo-Albano Machado Airport, the crew realized that a vehicle was on the runway. Instead of initiating a go-around procedure, the crew landed after the vehicle, too far down a wet runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran and collided with a concrete wall. All 10 occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The pilot was completing the first leg of an IFR flight in a multi-engine airplane. As the airplane was established on final approach, about 5 miles from the airport, the pilot encountered visual meteorological conditions and canceled his IFR flight plan. Moments later, the right engine began to sputter and then lost power. The pilot said that he switched the fuel selector valves to various positions and positioned the fuel boost pump to high-flow; however, during this time, the left engine also lost power. The pilot attempted to start both engines, but without success. During a forced landing, the airplane struck a pole, then crashed into a condominium. A fire erupted, but all 4 occupants survived the accident. Two occupants in the condominium received minor injuries. The pilot believed that he had moved the fuel selector valves to the auxiliary position for about 1 hour during flight; however, the passengers did not see him move the fuel selectors until after the engine(s) lost power. The right fuel selector handle was found between the right main tank and off positions. The left fuel selector was destroyed by post-impact fire.