Executive/Corporate/Business

The pilot had received clearance for the ILS Runway 6 approach and was advised that the previous landing traffic reported '...breaking out at minimums.' Radar data revealed that the airplane descended in instrument meteorological conditions to the decision height altitude of 294 feet, approximately 3 miles from the missed approach point. The pilot did not perform the missed approach procedure. The airplane leveled off and continued at or below decision height altitude for approximately 28 seconds, traveling a distance of approximately 1 mile. Four low altitude alerts appeared on the tower controller's display. The controller stated he withheld the alert because '...it was a critical phase of flight and the aircraft appeared to be climbing...' The airplane collided with trees and terrain approximately 1.5 miles from the approach end of the landing runway.

The flightcrew of a Gulfstream G-IV began taking off on Runway 34 with a crosswind from 280° at 24 knots. About 1,340 feet after the takeoff roll began, the airplane veered left 5.14° to a heading of 335°. It departed the runway, and tire marks indicated no braking action was applied. One of the pilots said, "Reverse," then one said, "No, no, no, go, go, go, go, go." The airplane traversed a shallow ditch that paralleled the runway, which resulted in separation of both main landing gear, the left and right flaps, and a piece of left aileron control cable from the airplane. The airplane became airborne after it encountered a small berm at the departure end of the runway. Reportedly, the left wing fuel tank exploded. The main wreckage was located about 6,650 feet from the start of the takeoff roll. Examination of the airplane indicated no preexisting anomalies of the engines, flight controls, or aircraft systems. The Nose Wheel Steering Select Control Switch was found in the "Handwheel Only" position, and not in the "Normal" position. The pilot-in-command (PIC) routinely flew with the switch in the "Normal" position. The PIC and copilot (pilot-not-flying) comprised a mix crew in accordance with an Interchange Agreement between two companies which operated G-IV's. The companies' operation manuals and the Interchange Agreement did not address mixed crews, procedural differences, or aircraft difference training.

On approach to Offenburg Airport runway 02, the crew encountered limited visibility due to low clouds. Under VFR mode in IMC conditions, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the aircraft collided with trees and crashed in a hilly terrain located about 7,2 km southeast of runway 02 threshold, near Friesenheim. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all four occupants were killed.

The crew was completing an executive flight from Kaduna to Jos, carrying four crew members and eight passengers, among them Colonel Mohammed Wase. On approach to Jos Airport, the crew encountered limited visibility due to marginal weather conditions when the aircraft collided with a telecommunication antenna and crashed, bursting into flames. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 12 occupants were killed.

The pilot took off on runway 07 and was cleared direct to the Wiscasset NDB, east of the airport. Shortly after takeoff, the airplane began turning to the left. The pilot then asked the controller, '. . . can you tell if I'm in a turn? I have a problem here.' Soon thereafter, the airplane collided with terrain in an uncontrolled descent, about 1.6 miles north of the airport. Investigation revealed that three days before the accident, a refueler had fueled the airplane's left wing with 840 pounds of fuel, then the fuel farm ran out of fuel. No further fueling was accomplished, and the pilot was not advised of the uneven fuel load. Procedures in the Beech E90 Pilot's Operating Manual (POM) included a check of the fuel tanks during preflight. The Beech C90 POM specified a maximum fuel imbalance of 200 pounds, but the E90 POM did not specify a maximum fuel imbalance. During examination of the wreckage, no preimpact malfunction or failure was found.

The pilot encountered poor visibility on approach to Kushiro Airport due to foggy conditions. Too low on final, the single engine aircraft collided with elements of the ILS systems and crashed 200 metres short of runway 17, bursting into flames. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all six occupants were killed.

The pilot reported getting an unsafe indication on the right main landing gear when the landing gear was lowered. The crew recycled the landing gear and got the same unsafe indication. The crew retracted the gear and diverted to Detroit. On arrival, the crew performed the 'landing gear abnormal extension checklist,' but the unsafe indication remained. The air traffic control tower reported that the gear appeared normal. During the landing, the right main landing gear retracted. The airplane slid sideways, striking a runway marker as it departed the runway, and came to rest in a field. Examination revealed that the right landing gear downlock mechanism could be overcome with physical force. Examination of the right landing gear actuator revealed that one of the six shims which separate the spacers and help guide the safety lock switch was out of position and lying on top of the lock assembly.

During flight, the airplane was cruising at flight level 210 in IFR conditions with turbulence and with the wind from about 255 degrees at 70 knots. The airplane drifted off course at about 1600 cst. At 1610:09, after about ten minutes of unrecognized heading changes, the pilot stated '. . . I've lost my gyro.' At 1610:15, the controller issued a no-gyro vector. At 1611:29, as the airplane was still turning (to a heading that would intercept the original course), the pilot stated 'we've lost aLL our instruments . . . please direct me towards VFR.' He was cleared to descend to 14,000 feet. At about that same time, he stated 'we're in trouble' and 'we've lost all vacuum,' then there was no further radio transmission from the airplane. The airplane entered a steep, downward spiraling, right turn. The left outer wing panel separated up and aft (in flight) from overload and impacted the left stabilizer. The airplane crashed, and parts that separated from the airplane were found over a four mile area. Investigation revealed evidence that the HSI heading card can fail without the HDG flag appearing. Although the pilot had reported the loss of instruments and vacuum, examination of the airplane revealed that the engine, flight controls, electrical system, pitot/static system and vacuum systems exhibited continuity. No malfunction was found that would have led to loss of pressurization or hypoxia.

The flight was on the ILS approach to runway 6, broke out of the clouds at 500 feet, and then re-entered the clouds. The airplane had not yet touched down when it drifted to right of the runway centerline and struck a snow bank located in the grass to the right of the runway, between the runway and the taxiway. The pilot stated he was just starting the missed approach when the accident occurred, and '...that there was no indication of a malfunction of the aircraft.' The reported ceiling was, 100 sky obscured, and the visibility was 1/4 mile, wind 040 degrees, 6 knots.

During the preflight briefing, the pilot was informed of reduced visibility and low ceiling in the vicinity of the destination airport, at the approximate time of the planned arrival. Upon arriving in the Atlanta area, the pilot was issued radar vectors to a final for the localizer runway 31 approach. The pilot was also given the current Atlanta altimeter setting, and was cleared for the localizer runway 31 approach. The airplane collided with a 60-foot tall light pole at a nearby baseball complex 2 miles short of the runway. The weather observation from the Hartsfield International Airport indicated that visual weather conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. However, according to a witness at the accident site, the weather conditions were foggy with reduced visibility. The wreckage distribution path was 2,467 feet right of the localizer course. The minimum descent altitude for this approach, using Atlanta's altimeter setting, was 1260 feet. The ground check of the localizer and DME facility was within normal operating range. Examination of the aircraft navigational radios also tested within normal ranges. The average field elevation in the vicinity of the accident site is 800 feet. The pilot's toxicological examinations detected pseudoephedrine (decongestant), phenylpropanolamine (decongestant), and chlorpheniramine (antihistamine). No samples were available to quantify the blood levels of these medications.