Executive/Corporate/Business

The airplane touched down about 1/3 beyond the approach end of Runway 28, a 5,000 footlong, asphalt runway. The PIC stated, 'as usual,' he applied 'light' braking and attempted to actuated the airplane's thrust reverser (TR) system; however, the TR handles could not be moved beyond the 'Deploy-Reverse-Idle' position. After the PIC cycled the levers two or three times, he began to apply maximum braking. A passenger in the airplane stated he looked out of the cockpit window, saw the end of the runway, and the airplane seemed like it was still moving 'pretty fast.' As the airplane approached the end of the runway, he could see smoke, which he believed was coming from the airplane's tires. He then sensed the airplane was falling. The co-pilot stated he had no memory at all of the accident flight. Review of the CVR revealed the co-pilot said that the airplane was 'Vref plus about twenty,' when the airplane was 100 feet over the runway threshold. The PIC could not recall the airplane's touchdown speed, however, he stated that it seemed like the airplane was still traveling 50 to 60 knots when it departed the end of the runway. A pair of parallel tire marks were observed 3,200 feet beyond the approach end of the runway. The tire marks extended past the end of the runway and onto a 106 foot-long grass area. The airplane came to rest on a plateau about 90 feet below the runway elevation. Examination of the airplane, including the optional TR system did not reveal any pre-impact malfunctions. The airplane's estimated landing distance was calculated to be about 3,100 feet. The PIC reported about 4,700 hours of total flight experience, of which, 107 hours were in make and model. The PIC stated he had never performed a landing in the accident airplane without using the TR system. Winds reported at the time of the accident were from 290 degrees at 15 knots, with 21 knot gusts.

While in cruise flight at 24,000 feet msl, the pilot of the Piper Malibu Mirage advised Memphis Center that he had encountered icing conditions and was experiencing a fuel imbalance. The pilot requested and was cleared to deviate to the north. Subsequently, radio and radar contact were lost. A witness reported hearing the sound of the airplane's engine stop running and observed the airplane descending from the dark clouds in a nose down attitude and rotating clockwise. Residents of the area reported that the weather at the time of the accident was high ceilings with heavy rain just before and after the accident. There were thunderstorms with lightning in the area at the time of the accident. The wreckage of the airplane was scattered along an area of about four miles. The airplane was equipped with an autopilot, weather radar, and an ice protection system. The pilot had recently purchased the 1999 model airplane and had completed a Mirage initial training course. At the time of the accident the pilot had accumulated a total of 21.4 hours in the make and model of the accident aircraft. No anomalies were found with the airframe or engine that would have prevented normal operation.

The airplane took off from Port Huron, Michigan, on April 1, 1999, at 1130 est. The airplane was scheduled to arrive in Freemont, Ohio. An employee of the pilot's company said that the pilot was going to meet a customer there. At 1230 est, the customer called the company inquiring about the pilot. The employee said that the pilot 'would have taken the shortest route, over [Lake] St. Clair, Ontario [Province], and [Lake] Erie,' to get to Freemont, Ohio. An ALNOT was issued at 1803 est. Search and rescue operations were conducted by the U. S. Coast Guard, Civil Air Patrol, and the Canadian Search and Rescue Center. The search was suspended on April 10, 1999, at 2125 est. The passenger's body was discovered on May 1, 1999, in the Lake St. Clair shipping channel, approximately 6.9 miles east of St. Clair Shores, Michigan. On July 2, 1999, the pilot's body was found in Lake St. Clair. Parts of the airplane identified from the make and model of aircraft were recovered with the bodies.

The airplane descended to 2,600 feet to the NDB, and initiated the approach upon crossing the NDB. As the airplane descended below 1,500 feet MSL, Huntsville lost radar contact. The next communication with the airplane was when the pilot radioed that he was initiating the missed approach. The published missed approach procedure is, 'Climbing lift turn to 2,700 direct CPP NDB and hold.' The airplane made a series of turns within the next one minute and 24 seconds. Additionally, the airplane's altitude varied but it never climbed above the altitude of 1,700 feet. The airplane wreckage was located approximately 3.5 miles north of the airport on a 345 degree heading on the opposite side of the outbound course to the NDB. Witnesses in the immediate area stated that they could hear the airplane flying low over their homes but could not see it due to the foggy conditions. A review of pilot records did not show the pilot having any fixed wing airplane experience.

According to the pilot, during pre-flight examination of the airplane performed the evening prior to the flight, the fuel gauges read 'around' 3/4 full. Visual examination of the tanks by the pilot revealed the tanks were not full but he believed the quantity was more than adequate to conduct his flight. While at 17000 feet MSL and approximately 60 miles from his destination, both the left engine and right engine suffered fuel exhaustion. After declaring an emergency, the pilot ditched the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean about ten miles off the coast of Isle De La Tortue, Haiti. The pilot received minor injuries and was rescued by the United States Coast Guard at 1730 the same day. Based on data obtained from the Raytheon Aircraft Company and 3/4 full fuel tanks, the total available flight time for this flight was approximately 4.00 hours. The actual flight time for this flight was 3.25 hours.

During the landing roll, the nose gear settled onto the runway, and the aircraft veered hard to the right. Application of the left brake had no effect. The airplane skidded, exited the runway, struck a runway marker, and collapsed the nose landing gear. The steering actuator had failed, the hydraulic fluid was lost from the steering actuator, and the fuselage received structural damage. The steering actuator assembly, p/n 1501-4, had accumulated 5,938.0 hours since new and had not been repaired or overhauled. Examination of the nose gear steering actuator cylinder by the metallurgist revealed that the cylinder fracture was the result of fatigue cracking initiated by an abrupt machining transition from the 45 degree thread ring chamfer to the straight wall of the cylinder. The engineering drawings appear to depict the radius at the fatigue origin as a continuation of the 0.03 inch to 0.06 inch radius adjacent to the fracture. However, the drawing is not clear on the specific intent of the transition between the nearby radius and the internal threads for the nut.

The airplane impacted terrain during takeoff initial climb in dark night conditions with a 100 ft ceiling and 1/4 mile visibility in fog. The instrument rated private pilot sustained serious injuries and does not recall the flight. No discrepancies were found with the aircraft, flight instruments, or engines that would have contributed to the accident. A weather briefing was obtained and an IFR flight plan was filed. The pilot had 312.8 hrs total time (54.2 hrs in this aircraft), 61 hrs night flight time (36.9 hrs in this aircraft) and 26.8 hrs actual instrument time (19.6 hrs in this aircraft). Toxicological findings were positive for benzoylecgonine (metabolite of cocaine), ethanol, and cocaethylene (substance formed when cocaine and alcohol are simultaneously ingested) in a urine sample subpoenaed by the NTSB from the hospital that treated the pilot. Benzoylecgonine can be found in urine for 3 to 5 days after cocaine use. Since blood was not available for analysis, it could not be determined how much of each substance was ingested and when they were ingested. The pilot stated that he was not under the influence of cocaine or alcohol on the day of the crash.

Following an uneventful flight from Rio de Janeiro-Santos Dumont Airport, the pilot started the descent to Joinville Airport by night and marginal weather conditions. He was informed about the visibility at destination being 2 km with ceiling at 650 feet. At 2032LT, he initiated the approach and reported to ATC that if it was raining, he would divert to Curitiba. Four minutes later, on final approach, the twin engine aircraft struck trees and crashed about 15 km southeast of runway 33 threshold. The aircraft was destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire and all three occupants were killed.

For unknown reasons, the twin engine airplane belly landed at Myrtle Beach and was damaged beyond as a result. The pilot, sole on board, escaped uninjured.

The pilot departed from an intersection 2,100 feet from the approach end of the 6,700 feet long runway. Immediately after takeoff the right engine failed. The pilot told the NTSB investigator-in-charge that he feathered the right propeller, and began a wide right turn away from terrain in an attempt to return to the airport. He stated the airspeed did not reach 90 knots, the airspeed and altitude slowly decayed, and the airplane was ditched into smooth water. After recovery, the cowl flaps were found in the 50% open position. No anomalies were found with the fuel system. The airplane departed with full fuel tanks, at a takeoff weight estimated at 6,606 pounds. The right engine was disassembled and no mechanical anomalies were noted. The best single engine rate of climb airspeed is 106 knots, based on cowl flaps closed, and a five degree bank into the operating engine.