London-Gatwick

The aircraft was engaged on a mail flight from London-Gatwick Airport to East Midlands Airport. During the initial descent in preparation for landing at its destination, the attendant in the cabin reported that the mechanical indicators on one of the cabin doors were showing an unlocked condition. Shortly afterwards the right hand rear door (baggage door) came open, detached from its hinge mountings and became lodged on the leading edge of the right horizontal tailplane. The aircraft became uncontrollable and went into an increasingly steep dive which terminated in several abrupt pitch oscillations. Both the mainplanes and the horizontal tailplanes were subjected to overstressing in upload which resulted in their detachment from the fuselage. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all three crew members were killed.

While approaching Innsbruck-Kranebitten Airport in limited visibility, the crew failed to realize his altitude was too low when the airplane struck trees and crashed on a mountain located few km from the airfield. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots were killed.

The crew was completing a positioning flight from Heathrow to Gatwick. After touchdown on runway 08, the pilot selected spoilers and reverse thrust when the airplane became airborne again then landed back heavily and bounced twice. The fuselage was bent just prior to the wings, a tyre on the nose wheel burst and a wheel separated. The aircraft rolled for several hundred meters before coming to rest. All four crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The aircraft departed London-Gatwick Airport on a charter flight (JJ130) to Rijeka, Croatia, carrying 76 British tourists and a crew of seven. While approaching runway 14 at Rijeka Airport, the crew encountered very bad weather conditions with cumulonimbus, heavy rain falls and turbulences. As the aircraft passed through the area, it was carried upwards and rolled to the right. The aircraft was now above the ILS glide slope. Some 800 meters short of the runway, at a height of 60 meters, the crew decided to continue the approach. Power was reduced and the angle of descent increased to 10°. The aircraft struck the runway surface with its right main gear at a speed of 260 km/h with 4 g deceleration force. On impact, the right wing was torn off, the airplane slid for about 760 meters and came to rest upside down, in flames. Three crew members and 75 passengers were killed. Brand new, the aircraft was totally destroyed.

On touchdown at Gatwick Airport, the nose gear collapsed. The airplane slid for dozen yards before coming to rest. All eight occupants were evacuated safely while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

The airplane arrived in Charleroi on January 24 and was parked there since. In June, a ferry permit was issued and on July 11, it was decided to ferry the airplane from Charleroi to London-Gatwick Airport. The pilot departed Charleroi-Gosselies Airport at 1551LT. At 1634LT, while at cruising altitude, the engine n°4 suffered vibrations and the pilot decided to shut it down. Three minutes later, the engine n°3 emitted smoke then caught fire. The pilot was able to shut it down but for unknown reason could not feather its propeller. He reduced his altitude and attempted to make an emergency landing when the airplane struck trees and crash landed in a potatoes field. The pilot was unhurt while the aircraft was considered as damaged beyond repair. The pilot's total flying hours was 8,530 with zero experience on this type of aircraft.

On 14 January 1969 the crew flew from Gatwick to Rotterdam and return, following which they departed on a scheduled international flight Gatwick-Genoa-Gatwick. For this flight Captain A occupied the left-hand seat as pilot-in-charge, Captain B the right hand seat as co-pilot and Captain C the centre supernumerary seat as pilot-in-command, ultimately responsible for the correct operation of the aircraft. Before leaving Gatwick Captain A briefed Captain B concerning the co-pilot duties assigned to him. Although Captain C, as pilot-in-command, did not himself formally brief Captains A and B there was no doubt that they were aware of their respective tasks. On the flight from Gatwick to Genoa the aircraft was forced, due to unfavourable weather conditions at Genoa, to divert to Milan-Linate Airport where it landed at 1430 hours. Before commencing the return flight to Gatwick the crew had to await the arrival of the passengers from Genoa. This took place at 1930 hours. During the five-hour waiting period on the ground, the aircraft APU was kept in operation to ensure cabin heating and air conditioning. While Captain C tried unsuccessfully to sleep in the aircraft, Captains A and B inspected the aircraft and found ice on the wings and tail unit. The aircraft was subsequently de-iced. Before boarding the aircraft, Captains A and B made another external inspection of the aircraft and established that there was no ice on any part of it. The result of this inspection was duly reported to Captain C. Captains A and B carried out the pre-flight checks in accordance with the company checklist and verified that the take-off weight and aircraft loading were within the permitted limits. The crew occupied the same positions as during the previous flight, Captain A being in the left-hand seat, Captain B in the right-hand seat and Captain C in the jump- seat. In view of the weather, temperature and runway conditions, the crew decided to use the 18O flap setting, Spey 2 thrust (full thrust), engine anti-icing and the APU for cabin air conditioning. V1 and Vr were established at 117 kt and V2 at 127 kt. At 2018 hours, after clearance from Linate ATC, the engines were started and engine anti-icing selected "ON". There was a considerable layer of snow along the sides of the taxiways and runway, but they themselves were clear and usable. In view of the isolated patches of slush or water on the runway, Captain A considered it essential for the engine igniter switches to be selected "ON" during the entire take-off. At 2028 hours the aircraft was cleared to enter runway 18 and, after receiving the latest information concerning visibility and wind, it was cleared for take-off at 2031 hours. Before the brakes were released, a check was made of engine P7 pressures and of the other engine instruments which were found to be normal. At about 80 kt Captain A took over the aircraft's control column. The airspeed indicators showed regular acceleration and Captain A stated that just before 100 kt the engine instruments were also registering normally. V1 and Vr were called and the aircraft was rotated into the initial climbing attitude; immediately after or during this manoeuvre, a dull noise was distinctly heard by all the crew members. This noise was variously described by them as: "not like a rifle shot, not like the slamming of a door or something falling in the aircraft but more like someone kicking the fuselage with very heavy boots, an expansive noise covering a very definite time span with a dull non-metallic thud". The bang was immediately associated by the crew with the engines. After looking at the TGT gauges, and observing that No. 1 engine was indicating a temperature 20°c higher than that of No. 2 engine, Captain C said: "I think it's number one" or wards to that effect, and after a brief pause "throttle it". On receipt of Captain C's comment Captain A closed the power level of No. 1 engine. During or just after the explosion, he had completed the rotation manoeuvre and the aircraft was climbing at 12O of pitch with reference to the flight director. As a precaution, after closing No. 1 power lever he reduced the angle of climb to 6O. At the same time the co-pilot (Captain B) who had reached for the check list and was looking for the page relating to an engine emergency, became aware of a sharp reduction in the aircraft's acceleration; he noticed that the undercarriage was still down and he retracted it immediately. According to the crew the aircraft reached a maximum height of 250 ft, after which a progressive loss of momentum became evident. A maximum speed of 1401145 kt was achieved immediately after rotation, but it fell to 127 kt after No. 1 engine had been throttled back, These figures were consistent with those subsequently derived from the flight recorder. The crew said that the stick-shaker operated three times between 125 and 115 kt. The co-pilot had a vague recollection that the stick-push and the warning klaxon operated during the critical phase before impact. The pilot-in-charge remembered vaguely that someone said "raise the flaps", but no crew member remembers doing so or making the re traction. On looking out of the aircraft the crew saw the ground and the obstructions close at hand and realized that contact of the aircraft with the ground was inevitable and imminent. Captain A controlled the aircraft extremely well during the touchdown; the aircraft slid along the snow-covered surface, passing over small obstructions, and came to a halt 470 m from the point of first contact with the ground (see Fig. 1-11. The co-pilot operated both engine fire-extinguishers and Captain C ordered the pilots to leave the aircraft immediately via the side windows. During the ground slide an orange glow was seen to light up the glass panels of the windows for a short time. There was no fire. After closing No. 1 power lever, Captain A remembered having ordered the shutdown drill for this engine but he could not say for certain whether this wae dme. It was established, however, that Captain B closed both the HP cocks at the first sensation of ground contact.

The accident occurred on a scheduled passenger flight from Frankfurt when the aircraft was making an ILS approach for a night landing on Runway 27 at Gatwick Airport. The weather was clear except that freezing fog persisted in places including the Gatwick area. The runway visual range (RVR) at Gatwick was 100 metres. The approach was commenced with the autopilot coupled to the instrument landing system (ILS) but after the glide-slope had been captured the commander who was at the controls, disconnected the autopilot because the "stabiliser out of trim" warning light illuminated. At the outer marker the flap setting was changed from 1° to 30° and shortly afterwards the rate of descent increased and the aircraft descended below the glide-slope. Some 200 feet from the ground the pilot realised that the aircraft was too low and initiated a missed approach procedure. The aircraft began to respond but the descent was not arrested in time to avoid a collision with trees and a house that destroyed both the aircraft and the house and set the wreckage on fire. 48 occupants as well as two people in the house were killed. 14 others were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.

After a touch-and-go landing at Gatwick Airport, the right main gear didn't lock up. The gear was recycled and the pilot then checked the gear visually and the gear appeared to be fully retracted. On gear extension for the next landing, the right main gear warning light remained on. The gear was recycled several times, but without success. Other attempts (high g turns, using the hand pump, and touching the runway) also failed. It was then decided to make a wheels-up landing on a foam carpet at Manston.

The pilot, sole on board, was completing a ferry flight from Nice to London-Gatwick. While descending to Gatwick Airport in VFR mode, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions with rain falls and turbulences. While flying in clouds, he lost control of the airplane that plunges into the earth and crashed in a field. The aircraft was destroyed and the pilot was killed.