Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood

While approaching Nassau-Lynden Pindling Airport runway 27 in poor weather conditions (cold front), the twin engine aircraft crashed into the sea few km offshore. Some debris were found floating on water north of Nassau. Both pilots were killed.

On September 19, 2010, at 1440 eastern daylight time, a Piper PA31-350, N84859, registered to Spirit Air Inc, and operated by Pioneer Air Service was on initial climb out when the lower half of the main cabin door came open. The pilot reversed his course and returned to the departure airport, landing on runway 27. The right main landing gear tire blew out on the landing roll. The airplane went off the right side of the runway, struck a tree, caught fire and came to a complete stop. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and an instrument flight plan was filed. The commercial pilot and five passengers were not injured and the airplane received substantial damage. The flight originated from Bimini Airport, South Bimini Island, Bahamas, at 1435, and was operated in accordance with 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135.

On December 17, 2009 at approximately 7:30 pm local (2330UTC), N28RK a Dassault Sud, Falcon Fan Jet, Mystere 20, Series D aircraft which departed Joaquin Balaguer Int’l Airport (MDJB) in the Dominican Republic, for Ft Lauderdale Executive Airport, (FXE) Ft Lauderdale, Florida, USA, crashed in a remote area of Matthew Town, Great Inagua, Bahamas. The accident occurred approximately 11.5 miles due east of Great Inagua International Airport at coordinates N 20˚ 58’ 30” latitude and W 073˚ 40’ 00.7” longitude. The aircraft made contact with the terrain on a heading of approximately 105 degrees magnetic. The accident occurred in area that was not accessible by land and the investigation team had to be airlifted by helicopter to the site. Witnesses on the island of Great Inagua reported hearing a loud bang that rattled doors and windows of their homes, but they did not report seeing the aircraft fall from the sky. The aircraft was under the command of Captain Harold Roy Mangels and First Office Freddy Castro. The aircraft reportedly departed Aruba, in the Netherland Antilles and made a fuel stop at Dr. Joaquin Balaguer Int’l Airport, Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic. The final destination filed by the crew was Ft. Lauderdale Executive Airport, Ft Lauderdale Florida. The accident occurred approximately 6 mile off the filed flight path. ATC records and instructions were for the aircraft N28RK to maintain 28,000 ft (FL280). The aircraft transponder was reported as inoperative. It begun a rapid descent, with no report of an emergency declared or mayday call out. Investigation of the crash site indicates the airplane made contact with the terrain at a high rate of speed and approximately a 45 degree angle. The aircraft was destroyed on impact. The crew of a United States Coast Guard helicopter was on a training mission in the Great Inagua area at the time of the accident. They reported hearing a loud bang and noticed a huge explosion and fireball emanating from the ground in an area close to their location. The crew of the US Coast Guard helicopter reported that they did not see any in-flight fire prior to the fireball that they saw. The post impact fire engulfed approximately five (5) acres of trees and brush in the National Wildlife Refuge at Great Inagua. The coast guard helicopter crew stated that they discontinued their training mission and went to the site to investigate. Upon arrival at the site the crew reported that they lowered rescue personnel to the ground to investigate and search for survivors, but, due to the heat and extent of the fire on the ground, they had to discontinue the search. They reported the accident to authorities at Great Inagua. This information was further passed along to the National Transportation Safety Board who alerted the accident investigation unit of the Bahamas Civil Aviation Department. Night time conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The crew of the aircraft received fatal injuries. A search of the area discovered no distinguishable human remains. Approximately less than 1% of what is believed to be possible human flesh / internal body parts were recovered. In addition clothing (piece of a pant with belt buckle fastened) was recovered, which possibly may have been worn by a member of the crew at the time of the accident. All recovered remains and clothing retrieved were gathered by officers of the Royal Bahamas Police Force that accompanied the investigation team and sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory at the Royal Bahamas Police Force, Nassau Bahamas for DNA analysis and possible identification. The aircraft broke into many pieces after contact with the terrain. Debris was spread over a large area of rough terrain. What remained of the aircraft post impact was either not found or possibly further destroyed by the post impact fire. The “four corners” of the airplane were confirmed in the area downstream of where the initial ground impact occurred. However, engine cowling parts were found prior to the point of initial ground impact. This may suggest an aircraft over-speed condition prior to ground impact. Less than 10% of the aircraft was recovered. An explosion occurred when N28RK made contact with the terrain. A post impact fire ensued. Approximately 5 acres of the national park was destroyed by the fire. Parts of the aircraft including personal effect, aircraft parts and furnishing, seat and seat cushions were also destroyed in the post impact fire.

The airplane's right engine experienced a complete loss of power immediately after takeoff and the airplane began to slow. The airplane reached an altitude of approximately 91 feet above ground level and then entered an uncontrolled descent consistent with the onset of a velocity minimum control (VMC) roll to the right. No evidence of any preimpact failures or malfunctions with either the engine or airframe was discovered, and evidence at the scene indicated that the landing gear had been retracted and the right engine propeller feathered. Examination of the cockpit revealed the right engine fuel selector was positioned between the "60 GAL RIGHT AUX" detent and the "RIGHT ENG OFF" detent. Examination of the fuel system between the selector and the right engine indicated that it was in this position prior to impact. Also, placards next to the fuel selectors stated, "WARNING POSITION SELECTORS IN DETENTS ONLY. NO FUEL FLOW TO ENGINES BETWEEN DETENTS." The pilot loaded the majority of the cargo and performed the weight and balance calculations. Examination of the fuselage revealed that all six cargo bins were full. The investigation also discovered that the furthest aft bin contained 265 pounds of cargo even though placarded for a maximum of 75 pounds. All other bins were loaded considerably below their maximum weight limits. Weight and balance calculations revealed the information listed on the weight and balance form produced by the pilot was erroneous and that the actual center of gravity (CG) of the airplane was rear of the aft CG limit, which would have created instability in the handling characteristics of the airplane, especially after a loss of engine power. In addition, the aft-of-limit CG would have increased the airspeed needed to prevent the airplane from entering a VMC roll. Performance calculations indicate that with the right engine having lost power immediately after takeoff, the airplane would most likely not have been able to continue the departure on one operating engine.

The pilot obtained two data user access terminal service (DUATS) preflight weather briefings for the intended flight from the U.S. to Nassau, Bahamas; the briefings included information that thunderstorms were forecasted. The pilot did not request a weather briefing with DUATS or Lockheed Martin flight service station before departure on the return accident flight. Although there was no way to tell whether he received a preflight weather briefing with Nassau Flight Service Station before departure on the accident flight, thunderstorms with associated severe turbulence were forecasted for the accident area well in advance of the aircraft's departure, and would have been available had the pilot requested/obtained a preflight weather briefing. After takeoff, and while in contact with Nassau terminal radar approach control, which had inoperative primary radar, the flight climbed to approximately 8,000 feet mean sea level and proceeded on a northwesterly heading with little deviation. The airplane, which was equipped with color weather radar and a stormscope, penetrated level 6 radar returns with numerous lightning strikes in the area, and began a steep descent. Prior to that there was no request by the pilot to air traffic control for weather avoidance assistance or weather deviation. Radar and radio communications were lost, and the wreckage and occupants were not recovered.

The pilot provided an emergency briefing to the passengers before departure. The outboard fuel tanks were empty and the inboard fuel tanks were filled before departure. After takeoff, the flight climbed to 8,500 feet msl and proceeded towards the destination airport. During cruise flight while flying at 1,000 feet msl approximately 10 miles from the destination airport , the left engine started losing power, but the airplane did not yaw; the left cowl flap was closed at the time. The pilot reported the left fuel flow light was on, but the fuel pressure was in the green arc (indicating approximately 38 to 42 psi). He switched each fuel selector to its respective outboard fuel tank though the outboard tanks were empty, turned on both emergency fuel pumps, and also attempted cross feeding fuel to the left engine in an effort to restore engine power but was unsuccessful. The left engine manifold pressure decreased to 18 inHg, and he was maintaining "blue line" airspeed plus a few knots with the right engine at full power. He slowed the airplane to less than blue line airspeed in an attempt to "gain altitude", and approximately 2 to 3 minutes after first noticing the loss of engine power from the left engine with the manifold pressure indication of 15 inHg, and after seeing boats nearby, he moved the left propeller control to the feather position but later reported the propeller did not feather. The left engine rpm was in the upper green arc through the whole event, and he did not see any oil coming out of the left engine cowling. The flight was unable to maintain altitude, and he advised the passengers to don but not inflate their life vests. He maneuvered the airplane into the wind near boats, and ditched with the flaps and landing gear retracted. All occupants exited the airplane and were rescued by one of the nearby boats. Each inboard fuel tank is equipped with a "surge tank" and a flapper valve, and also a sensing probe installed at the outlet of the tank. The airplane POH/AFM indicates that if the fuel flow light illuminates, and there is fuel in the corresponding tank, a malfunction of the flapper valve has occurred. The airplane was not recovered; therefore no determination could be made as to the reason for the reported loss of engine power from the left engine, nor the reason for the failure of the left propeller to feather.

Before the start of the trip, the pilot was reportedly given $500.00 cash by the operator to purchase fuel. The pilot stated that the first leg of the flight from KFLL to MYEF departed with the main fuel tanks full and approximately 10 gallons in each of the auxiliary fuel tanks. There were no deviations en-route, and the uneventful flight lasted a reported 1 hour 40 minutes. After landing in Exuma International Airport, the main fuel tanks contained slightly more than 1/2 fuel capacity. Ten gallons of fuel were added to each of the two auxiliary fuel tanks at MYEF, no additional fuel was purchased. The flight departed for KFLL, and during the climb to 10,000 feet, he leaned the fuel/air mixture. During the cruise portion of the flight, the fuel in the auxiliary fuel tanks was consumed then he switched to the main fuel tanks to supply fuel to the engines. The flight crossed the DEKAL intersection at 4,000 feet, which is about 31 nautical miles southeast of KFLL, continued, and the right engine manifold pressure decreased, the cylinder head temperature reached red line indication, and the engine sputtered. He declared an emergency with air traffic control and the controller provided vectors to KFLL which he verbally acknowledged but did not comply with. While operating single engine, with the engine operating at full power, he reported no discrepancies with the left engine. He reported he could reach KFLL but was concerned about flying over a populated area at a low altitude, and was losing altitude. Contrary to the statement made by the pilot that he was not able to maintain altitude while flying single-engine, the airplane was capable of a rate of climb greater than 170 feet-per-minute if flown properly. He elected to ditch the airplane in the Atlantic Ocean; the airplane was not recovered. The operator was asked repeatedly by NTSB for historical fuel receipts and flight hours for N61518 but did not comply. NTSB review of fuel consumption calculations performed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Inspector-In-Charge revealed the aircraft would have experienced fuel exhaustion at the approximate location and time when the pilot declared an emergency with ATC following failure of the right engine. The NTSB did not receive the NTSB requested detailed, signed, dated statement from the pilot.

The flight was a VFR positioning flight from FLL to FXE. Transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) showed that while waiting for takeoff from FLL the flightcrew heard the local controller reported to a Delta Airlines flight that was on a seven mile final approach to land on runway 27R that the winds were 250 degrees at 19 knots, gusting to 50 knots. The Delta Airlines flight crew then informed the controller they were making a missed approach. At 1130:05 the captain asks the first officer if "can you see the end of the weather? If we make a hard right turn, can we stay clear of it?" The first officer responded "I believe so." At 1130:06 the local controller reported "wind shear alert. The centerfield wind 230 at 22. Runway 27R departure 25 knot loss one mile departure." The captain stated to the first officer "sweet." At 1132:11 the captain transmitted to the local controller "tower, any chance of Hop-a-Jet 55 getting out of here?" The local controller responded wind 230 at 17, right turn direct FXE approved, runway 27R cleared for takeoff. The captain responded "cleared to go, right turn out." At 1133:10 the captain asks for gear up. At 1133:15 the local controller responded to a Southwest Airlines Flight waiting for takeoff "no, don't look like anyone's gonna go." "The uh, weather is due west moving rapidly to the north. It looks like a few minutes, and you all be in the clear straight out." At 1133:17, the captain stated to the first officer "oh #. Think this was a bad idea." The first officer responded "no airport in sight." At 1133:43 the sound similar to precipitation hitting the windshield is recorded. At 1133:46 the FLL local controller instructs the flight crew to contact FXE Tower. At 1133:54 the CVR records the FXE local controller transmitting "wind 200, variable 250 at 15, altimeter 29.99. Heavy cell of weather to the west moving eastbound. Low level wind shear possible. At 1134:16, the FXE local controller transmits "attention all aircraft, low level wind shear advisories are in effect. Use caution. Wind 240 at 10." At 1134:51, the first officer transmitted to the FXE local controller that the flight was over the shoreline inbound full stop. At 1135:02, the FXE local controller transmitted "Hop-a-Jet 55, Executive tower, wind 210 variable 250 at 35, 35 knots and gusting. Winds are uh, heavy on the field. Low level wind shear advisories are in effect. Heavy rains from the west, eastbound and would you like to proceed inbound and land Executive? Say intentions." The first officer responded "that's affirmative." The local controller responded, "Hop-a-Jet 55 straight in runway three one if able. The winds 230 gusts, correction, winds 230 variable 210 at 25." At 1135:48, the local controller transmitted, "Hop-a-Jet 55, wind 230 variable 300 at 25 gusts 35. Altimeter 30.00. Runways are wet. Traffic is exiting the runway prior to your arrival, a Dutchess. Caution standing water on runways. Low level wind shear advisories in effect, Runway 31. Cleared to land." The first officer responded "cleared to land, Hop-a-Jet 55." At 1136:35, the local controller transmitted "wind 230 at 25, gusts 35." At 1136:58, the CVR records the sound similar to precipitation on the windshield. At 1137:17, the CVR records a sound similar to the aircraft touching down on the runway. At 1137:19, the sound of a repetitive tone similar to the thrust reverser warning starts and continues to the end of the recording. At 1137:23 a loud unidentified roaring sound starts and lasts 8 seconds. At 1137:30, loud rumbling noises similar to the aircraft departing the runway start. At 1137:36, a continuous tone similar to landing gear warning signal sounds and continues to the end of the recording. The rumbling noises stop. At 1137:39 the captain states the thrust reversers didn't stow and at 1138:36, the captain states "I went around and the # TRs stayed. The CVR recording ended. The 1132, Goes-12 infrared image depicts a rapidly developing cumulonimbus cloud between and over the FLL and FXE airports. The top of the cloud over FXE was in the range of 22,000 feet. The top of the cloud southwest of FXE was in the 39,000 feet range. The 1145, Goes-12 infrared image depicts a developing cumulonimbus cloud over FXE with the cloud top in the 42,000 feet range. Data was obtained from the Melbourne, Florida Doppler Weather Radar System, located 118 miles north-northwest of the accident site. The data showed that at FXE, between 1130 and 1145, a VIP Level 1 to 2 echo evolved into a VIP Level 5 "intense" echo at 1135 and a VIP Level 6 "extreme" echo by 1145.

On August 14, 2003, about 2222 central daylight time, a Gates LearJet Corporation 35A, N403FW, registered to Aircraft Holdings LLC, operated by Air America Flight Services, Inc., was landed with the landing gear retracted at the Cancun International Airport, Cancun, Mexico. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the 14 CFR Part 91 positioning flight. The airplane was substantially damaged and there were no injuries to the airline transport rated pilot and copilot, nor to the three medical personnel on board the airplane. The flight originated about 2145 eastern daylight time from the Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. According to the director of operations for the operator, the airplane was cleared for a visual approach to runway 12, and the flightcrew advised him they did read the landing checklist. The landing gear was down and locked as indicated by the three green lights; though they didn't recall if the landing gear was extended as evidenced by the landing lights. They also advised him of feeling fuselage to runway surface contact; the airplane slid approximately 4,000 feet before coming to rest upright. Following the occurrence, the nose of the airplane was raised and the nose landing gear was observed to be inside the wheel well. Emergency extension of the landing gear was initiated and the nose landing gear extended and locked; the main landing gear did not extend as fuselage to runway contact prevented extension of the main landing gears. The airplane was dragged from the runway where approximately 2 days later, a crane raised the airplane. At that time, the main landing gears which were in the wheel wells, extended and locked into position.

On July 13, 2003, about 1530 eastern daylight time, Air Sunshine, Inc. (doing business as Tropical Aviation Services, Inc.), flight 527, a Cessna 402C, N314AB, was ditched in the Atlantic Ocean about 7.35 nautical miles west-northwest of Treasure Cay Airport (MYAT), Treasure Cay, Great Abaco Island, Bahamas, following the in-flight failure of the right engine. Four of the nine passengers sustained no injuries, three passengers and the pilot sustained minor injuries, and one adult and one child passenger died after they evacuated the airplane. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as a scheduled international passenger commuter flight from Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to MYAT. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on a visual flight rules flight plan.