Crash of a Boeing 727-193 near Juneau: 111 killed

Date & Time: Sep 4, 1971 at 1215 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N2969G
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Anchorage – Cordova – Yakutat – Juneau – Sitka – Seattle
MSN:
19304/287
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
AS1866
Location:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
104
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
111
Captain / Total flying hours:
13870
Captain / Total hours on type:
2688.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
5000
Copilot / Total hours on type:
2100
Aircraft flight hours:
11344
Circumstances:
Alaska Airlines, Flight 1866 (AS66) was a scheduled passenger flight from Anchorage (ANC), to Seattle (SEA), with intermediate stops at Cordova (CDV), Yakutat (YAK), Juneau (JNU), and Sitka (SIT). The IFR flight departed Anchorage at 09:13 and landed at Cordova at 09:42. AS66 departed Cordova at 10:34 after a delay, part of which was attributable to difficulty in securing a cargo compartment door. The flight landed at Yakutat at 11:07. While on the ground, AS66 received an air traffic control clearance to the Juneau Airport via Jet Route 507 to the Pleasant Intersection, direct to Juneau, to maintain 9,000 feet or below until 15 miles southeast of Yakutat on course, then to climb to and maintain FL230. The flight departed Yakutat at 11:35, with 104 passengers and seven crew members on board. At 11:46, AS66 contacted the Anchorage ARTCC and reported level at FL230, 65 miles east of Yakutat. The flight was then cleared to descend at the pilot's discretion to maintain 10,000 ft so as to cross the Pleasant Intersection at 10,000 feet and was issued a clearance limit to the Howard Intersection. The clearance was acknowledged correctly by the captain and the controller provided the Juneau altimeter setting of 29.46 inches and requested AS66 to report leaving 11,000 ft. At 11:51, AS66 reported leaving FL230. Following this report, the flight's clearance limit was changed to the Pleasant Intersection. At 11:54, the controller instructed AS66 to maintain 12,000 feet. Approximately 1 minute later, the flight reported level at 12,000 feet. The changes to the flight's original clearance to the Howard Intersection were explained to AS66 by the controller as follows: "I've got an airplane that's not following his clearance, I've got to find out where he is." The controller was referring to N799Y, a Piper Apache which had departed Juneau at 11:44 on an IFR clearance, destination Whitehorse, Canada. On two separate occasions, AS66 acted as communications relay between the controller and N799Y. At 11:58, AS66 reported that they were at the Pleasant Intersection, entering the holding pattern, whereupon the controller recleared the flight to Howard Intersection via the Juneau localizer. In response to the controller's query as to whether the flight was "on top" at 12,000 feet, the captain stated that the flight was "on instruments." At 12:00, the controller repeated the flight's clearance to hold at Howard Intersection and issued an expected approach time of 12:10. At 12:01, AS66 reported that they were at Howard, holding 12,000 feet. Six minutes later, AS66 was queried with respect to the flight's direction of holding and its position in the holding pattern. When the controller was advised that the flight had just completed its inbound turn and was on the localizer, inbound to Howard, he cleared AS66 for a straight-in LDA approach, to cross Howard at or below 9,000 feet inbound. The captain acknowledged the clearance and reported leaving 12,000 feet. At 12:08 the captain reported "leaving five thousand five ... four thousand five hundred," whereupon the controller instructed AS66 to contact Juneau Tower. Contact with the tower was established shortly thereafter when the captain reported, "Alaska sixty-six Barlow inbound." (Barlow Intersection is located about 10 nautical miles west of the Juneau Airport). The Juneau Tower Controller responded, "Alaska 66, understand, ah, I didn't, ah, copy the intersection, landing runway 08, the wind 080° at 22 occasional gusts to 28, the altimeter now 29.47, time is 09 1/2, call us by Barlow". No further communication was heard from the flight. The Boeing 727 impacted the easterly slope of a canyon in the Chilkat Range of the Tongass National Forest at the 2475-foot level. The aircraft disintegrated on impact. The accident was no survivable.
Probable cause:
A display of misleading navigational information concerning the flight's progress along the localizer course which resulted in a premature descent below obstacle clearance altitude. The origin or nature of the misleading navigational information could not be determined. The Board further concludes that the crew did not use all available navigational aids to check the flight's progress along the localizer nor were these aids required to be used. The crew also did not perform the required audio identification of the pertinent navigational facilities.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-64 in Mexico City: 27 killed

Date & Time: Sep 21, 1969 at 1720 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XA-SEJ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chicago - Mexico City
MSN:
19255/331
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
MX801
Country:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
115
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
27
Circumstances:
On final approach to runway 23L at Mexico City-Benito Juárez Airport, the three engine airplane lost height and struck the ground about 1,5 km short of runway threshold. It bounced and became airborne again when the nose gear and the forward fuselage struck a railway embankment. Out of control, the airplane crashed and broke into several pieces near the runway threshold. 80 people were wounded while 15 others were uninjured. Five crew members and 22 passengers were killed. The aircraft was destroyed.
Probable cause:
The exact cause of the accident could not be determined with certainty due to negligence on part of the technicians in charge of the aircraft maintenance. Investigations revealed that at the time of the accident, the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) was not properly installed and was unserviceable. It was later reported that the technicians failed to follow the published procedures regarding the FDR installation process. No Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) was on board at the time of the accident as the same technicians did not reinstall it prior to the flight. In such conditions, the airplane was unairworthy.

Crash of a Boeing 727-64 in Monterrey: 79 killed

Date & Time: Jun 4, 1969 at 0842 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
XA-SEL
Survivors:
No
Site:
Schedule:
Mexico City - Monterrey
MSN:
19256/355
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
MX704
Country:
Crew on board:
7
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
72
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
79
Circumstances:
Following an uneventful flight from Mexico City, the crew started the descent to Monterrey-General Mariano Escobido Airport. In a visibility reduced by heavy rain falls, the crew initiated a turn to the left to intercept the glide. After passing over the Monterrey VOR, the aircraft descended with a rate of 1,500 feet per minute when, at a speed of 250 knots, it struck the slope of Cerro del Fraile located some 23 km from the airport. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all 79 occupants were killed. The wreckage was found at an altitude of 1,800 meters few hours later.
Probable cause:
Wrong approach configuration on part of the flying crew who initiated a turn to the left instead to the right as mentioned in the published procedures. At the time of the accident, the aircraft speed was too high, which was considered as a contributing factor.

Crash of a Boeing 727-116 in Colina

Date & Time: Apr 27, 1969 at 2144 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
CC-CAQ
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Buenos Aires - Santiago
MSN:
19812/532
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
LA160
Country:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
52
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
13591
Captain / Total hours on type:
826.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3284
Copilot / Total hours on type:
211
Aircraft flight hours:
2354
Circumstances:
Flight 160 was a scheduled international flight from Buenos Aires, Argentina to Santiago, Chile. The aircraft took off at 2356 hours GMT from Ezeiza Airport, with an IFR flight plan for airways AJG 82 and UG-14, and left the Buenos Aires terminal area via the Mariana intersection, its route taking it over Junín, Villa Reynolds, El Pencal, Mendoza, Juncal and Tabón. The flight level was 310 (31 000 ft). Before flying over Juncal, the aircraft was cleared by the Mendoza Control Centre to descend and maintain flight level 260 (26 000 ft) and after passing Juncal, it was cleared by the Santiago Control Centre to descend and maintain level 250 (25 000 ft) and to pass the Tab6n NDB at flight level 150. It was also given the Santiago weather report, announcing 4/8 nimbostratus at 450 m and 8/8 altostratus at 2 400 m. At 0135 hours, the aircraft passed over Juncal at flight level 260 and then left this level for FL 150; it gave 0142 hours at its estimated time of passage over Tabón NDB and subsequently reported that it was passing through FL 180 (18 000 ft). At 0141 hours, the aircraft passed Tabón NDB and left FL 150 for FL 70 (7 000 ft) and gave 0142 hours as its estimated time of arrival over Colina NDB. Prior to that, Santiago Centre had cleared the aircraft to FL 70 at the Pudahuel Airport ILS outer marker. The aircraft subsequently reported to the Control Centre that it was passing through FL 70; the Centre acknowledged receipt of the message and cleared the flight to make an ILS approach and to change to frequency 118.1 for communication with the Pudahuel Control Tower. The aircraft passed over Colina NDB at about 5 500 ft and continued to descend intercepting the ILS (glide slope) beam at about 4 500 ft, one min 20 sec after passing FL 70. It continued its descent at a rate of about 1 500/2 000 ft/min and descended below the minimum height of 2 829 ft at the outer marker without either the pilot or the co-pilot noting this and on apparently correct indications from the Flight Director. The aircraft continued descending and passed below the minimum height of 1 749 ft published for Pudahuel Airport when suddenly the warning light on the radio altimeter lit up. At this very moment the aircraft levelled off, but its wheels touched the ground and it landed in a field 2 kms north of the ILS outer marker, suffering heavy damage, but without serious injuries to passengers or crew. The accident occurred at 0144 GMT on 28 April, 2144LT on 27 April.
Probable cause:
The investigating commission considered the causes of the accident to be as follows :
a) excessive concentration by the crew on the indications given by the Flight Director;
b) the crew erroneously operated the Flight Director equipment on a direct ILS approach;
c) as a result of a) above, the crew did not check the instruments, which indicated:
- descending below the minimum safety altitude;
- rate of descent greater than normal for an ILS approach;
- longitudinal attitude of the aircraft greater than normal for an ILS approach;
- position of the aircraft below the ILS glide path.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-22C off Los Angeles: 38 killed

Date & Time: Jan 18, 1969 at 1821 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7434U
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Los Angeles – Denver – Milwaukee
MSN:
19891/631
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
UA266
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
32
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
38
Captain / Total flying hours:
13665
Captain / Total hours on type:
1908.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
6642
Copilot / Total hours on type:
1842
Aircraft flight hours:
1036
Circumstances:
Boeing 727-22C N7434U operated Flight 266 from Los Angeles to Denver, CO and Milwaukee, WI. The aircraft had been operating since January 15, 1969, with the No. 3 generator inoperative. This was allowed because according to the Minimum Equipment List, the aircraft is airworthy with only two generators operable provided certain procedures are followed and electrical loads are monitored during flight. Flight 266 was scheduled to depart the gate at 17:55, but was delayed until 18:07 because of the inclement weather and loading problems. The flight commenced its takeoff roll on runway 24 at approximately 18:17. At 18:18:30 the sound of an engine fire warning bell was heard in the cockpit. The crew reported a no. 1 engine fire warning and stated that they wanted to return to the airport. Shortly after shutdown of the No. 1 engine, electrical power from the remaining generator (No. 2) was lost. Following loss of all generator power, the standby electrical system either was not activated or failed to function. Electrical power at a voltage level of approximately 50 volts was restored approximately a minute and a half after loss of the No. 2 generator. The duration of this power restoration was just 9 to 15 seconds. The Boeing descended and struck the sea 11.3 miles west of the airport. The ocean depth at this point is approximately 950 feet.
Probable cause:
The loss of attitude orientation during a night, instrument departure in which all attitude instruments were disabled by loss of electrical power. The Board has been unable to determine (a) why all generator power was lost or (b) why the standby electrical power system either was not activated or failed to function.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-113C in London: 50 killed

Date & Time: Jan 5, 1969 at 0134 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
YA-FAR
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Kabul - Kandahar - Beirut - Istanbul - Frankfurt - London
MSN:
19690/540
YOM:
1968
Flight number:
FG701
Region:
Crew on board:
8
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
54
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
50
Captain / Total flying hours:
10400
Captain / Total hours on type:
512.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3259
Copilot / Total hours on type:
210
Aircraft flight hours:
1715
Circumstances:
The accident occurred on a scheduled passenger flight from Frankfurt when the aircraft was making an ILS approach for a night landing on Runway 27 at Gatwick Airport. The weather was clear except that freezing fog persisted in places including the Gatwick area. The runway visual range (RVR) at Gatwick was 100 metres. The approach was commenced with the autopilot coupled to the instrument landing system (ILS) but after the glide-slope had been captured the commander who was at the controls, disconnected the autopilot because the "stabiliser out of trim" warning light illuminated. At the outer marker the flap setting was changed from 1° to 30° and shortly afterwards the rate of descent increased and the aircraft descended below the glide-slope. Some 200 feet from the ground the pilot realised that the aircraft was too low and initiated a missed approach procedure. The aircraft began to respond but the descent was not arrested in time to avoid a collision with trees and a house that destroyed both the aircraft and the house and set the wreckage on fire. 48 occupants as well as two people in the house were killed. 14 others were injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by impact forces and a post crash fire.
Probable cause:
The accident was the result of the commander inadvertently allowing the aircraft to descend below the glide slope during the final stage of an approach to land until it was too low for recovery to be effected. The following findings were reported:
- The deceptive nature of the weather conditions led the commander to an error of judgment in deciding to make an approach to Gatwick,
- The commander's decision to conduct an approach was not in itself a cause of the accident,
- Incorrect flap configuration at glide-slope interception led to a temporary out-of-trim condition during the automatic approach and the illumination of the stabilizer "out-of-trim" warning light,
- The commander interpreted the "out-of-trim" warning light as indicating a possible malfunction and disconnected the auto-pilot,
- Out-of-sequence and late selection of 30° flaps from 15° while the-aircraft was being flown manually resulted in an increase in the rate of descent, causing the aircraft to go rapidly below the glide-slope,
- The commander did not become aware of the deviation from the glide-slope until it was too late to effect a full recovery,
- The pilot's attention was probably directed outside the aircraft at the critical time in an attempt to discover sufficient visual reference to continue the approach rather than to the flight instruments,
- Monitoring by precision approach radar would have warned the pilots of the deviation in time, if corrective action was taken promptly, to avoid the accident.

Crash of a Boeing 727-22C in Chicago

Date & Time: Mar 21, 1968 at 0353 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N7425U
Flight Phase:
Flight Type:
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Chicago - San Francisco
MSN:
19200/416
YOM:
1967
Flight number:
UA9963
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
0
Captain / Total flying hours:
10500
Captain / Total hours on type:
1033.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
1280
Copilot / Total hours on type:
135
Aircraft flight hours:
2208
Circumstances:
The takeoff warning horn sounded shortly after commencing takeoff from runway 09R. The takeoff was continued as the crew tried to figure out what caused the warning. The horn ceased prior to reaching rotate speed. The stick shaker came on and thrust was added, but the aircraft failed to climb and the captain elected to discontinue the takeoff. The 727 settled back to the macadam shoulder off the right side of the runway and struck a ditch, coming to rest 1,100 feet beyond the runway end and 300 feet right of the extended centreline. The aircraft was destroyed by a post crash fire and all three crew members were injured. The flaps had been set at 2° instead of takeoff range of 5°-25°.
Probable cause:
The failure of the crew to abort the takeoff after being warned of an unsafe takeoff condition.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-92C in Taipei: 22 killed

Date & Time: Feb 16, 1968 at 2120 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
B-1018
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Hong Kong - Tainan - Taipei
MSN:
19175/339
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
CAT010
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
11
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
52
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
22
Captain / Total hours on type:
104.00
Copilot / Total hours on type:
108
Circumstances:
Flight No. 10 operated by Civil Air Transport was a scheduled international flight from Taipei to Hong Kong and return. The accident occurred on the return trip from Hong Kong to Taipei. The aircraft departed Hong Kong at 2018 hours local time. At 2045 hours it reported to Taipei Area Control Centre over Yellowtail, a compulsory reporting intersection, at flight level 29 000 ft. At 2059 hours it reported over Makung VOR, and was then cleared to descend to 11 000 ft. At 2111 hours it reported over Hsinchu (PO) NDB at 11 000 ft and was cleared to descend to 5 000 ft crossing Taoyuan (GM) NDB and to 2 000 ft crossing Linkuo outer marker for a straight-in ILS approach to runway 10. The current Taipei weather information was also given to the pilot at that time. At 2118 hours the aircraft reported approaching Linkuo outer marker at 2 000 ft and was cleared to continue its ILS approach and to contact Taipei Tower. The aircraft reported to Taipei Tower and requested landing instructions. The tower controller advised the pilot to continue his ILS approach to runway 10, gave him the surface wind and the altimeter setting and requested him to report approach lights in sight. The pilot acknowledged all this information. From that moment, even though repeated attempts to contact the aircraft were made by Taipei Tower and Taipei Area Control Centre, no further communication was received from the aircraft. Then, right after, Taipei Area Control Centre was informed that the aircraft had crashed in the vicinity of Linkou, about 8 miles west of Taipei City. Three crew members, 18 passengers and one person on the ground were killed. The aircraft was destroyed. It was found during the investigation that the left hand pilot seat was not occupied by the assigned pilot-in-command, but by another Senior Pilot of Civil Air Transport.
Probable cause:
The "Senior Pilot" who was actually at the controls failed to maintain proper altitude while approaching the Linkou outer marker and the aircraft was far below the required altitude; consequently the aircraft could not intercept the glide path. When the radio altimeter warning light came on, while the aircraft descended to an altitude of 350 ft, the pilot failed to take corrective action in time. The wheels touched the ground and the aircraft rolled on the ground for about 200 metres. The aircraft was then pulled up in the air but it hit trees and a farm house and subsequently crashed. It was concluded that this accident was caused by careless operation in piloting the aircraft. According to the Flight Plan and documents of this flight, the pilot-in-command was properly assigned. Although the above-mentioned "Senior Pilot" held an appropriate licence with a rating for Boeing 727 aircraft, he was neither the assigned pilot-in-command nor a pilot under training on this flight. It was concluded that in allowing him to perform the functions of pilot- in-command, the assigned pilot-in-command of this flight, was also at fault.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-22 in Hendersonville: 79 killed

Date & Time: Jul 19, 1967 at 1201 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N68650
Flight Phase:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Atlanta – Asheville – Roanoke – Washington DC
MSN:
18295
YOM:
1963
Flight number:
PI022
Crew on board:
5
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
74
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
79
Captain / Total flying hours:
18383
Captain / Total hours on type:
151.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3364
Copilot / Total hours on type:
135
Aircraft flight hours:
6445
Circumstances:
The three engine aircraft departed Asheville Regional Airport at 1158LT and climbed to its assigned altitude. About three minutes later, while climbing to an altitude of 6,132 feet in a limited visibility due to clouds, the aircraft collided with a Cessna 310 registered N3121S. Operated by Lanseair, it was carrying two passengers and a pilot. Following the collision, both aircraft dove into the ground and crashed in a dense wooded area located about nine miles southeast of Asheville Airport. The wreckage of the 727 was found in a forest along a highway located in Hendersonville. All 82 occupants in both aircraft were killed.
Probable cause:
The deviation of the Cessna from its IFR clearance resulting in a flight path into airspace allocated to the Piedmont Boeing 727. The reason for such deviation cannot be specifically or positively identified. The minimum control procedures utilized by the FAA in handling of the Cessna were a contributing factor. In June 2006, NTSB accepted to reopen the investigations following elements submitted by an independent expert who proved the following findings:
- Investigators ignored that the Cessna 310 pilot informed ATC about his heading,
- Investigators failed to report that a small fire occurred in the 727's cockpit 35 seconds prior to impact,
- The inspector in charge of investigations was the brother of the Piedmont Airlines VP.
Final Report:

Crash of a Boeing 727-21 near Berlin: 3 killed

Date & Time: Nov 15, 1966 at 0242 LT
Type of aircraft:
Operator:
Registration:
N317PA
Flight Type:
Survivors:
No
Schedule:
Frankfurt - Berlin
MSN:
18995
YOM:
1966
Flight number:
PA708
Country:
Region:
Crew on board:
3
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
0
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
3
Captain / Total flying hours:
14212
Captain / Total hours on type:
58.00
Copilot / Total flying hours:
17542
Copilot / Total hours on type:
32
Aircraft flight hours:
1804
Circumstances:
Pan Am's scheduled cargo flight 708 from Frankfurt to Berlin usually lands at Tempelhof Airport. However because of resurfacing of the runways at Tempelhof, Pan Am operated in and out of Tegel Airport since the evening of November 13th. Flight 708 departed Frankfurt at 02:04 and climbed to the cruising altitude of FL90. At 02:35 the flight reported leaving this altitude for FL30. Three minutes later Berlin Control cleared the flight to "turn left heading zero three zero, descend and maintain two thousand". When 6,5 miles from the Outer Marker, the controller cleared the flight to "turn right heading zero six zero cleared ILS runway eight right approach". Immediately after the acknowledgment from the flight crew, the aircraft struck the ground and crashed about 10 miles from the airport in the Soviet occupation zone. Weather was poor with 2,6 km visibility in snow; cloud coverage 3/8 at 500 feet and overcast a 600 feet with a temperature of -1deg C. The Soviet authorities returned about 50 percent of the wreckage. Some major components were not returned which included the flight data and cockpit voice recorders, flight control systems, navigation and communication equipment.
Probable cause:
The descent of the flight below its altitude clearance limit, but the Board has been unable to determine the cause of such descent.
Final Report: