California

The pilot refueled the auxiliary tanks of the airplane at a different airport 1 month prior to the accident, and had not flown on the auxiliary tanks since that time. He was repositioning the airplane back to home base after a series of revenue flights when the accident occurred. About 20 minutes after takeoff he positioned the left and right engines to their respective auxiliary fuel tanks, and then returned to the mains 30 minutes later. The right engine began to surge and subsequently stopped running. Turning on the fuel boost pump restarted the engine. Five minutes later the engine quit and he secured it after unsuccessful restart attempts. Then the left engine began to surge and was developing only partial power. He diverted to an alternate airport with decaying altitude and power in the remaining engine. Crossing the airport, he saw he was too high to land with a tailwind so he circled to land into the wind. On the base leg he made the decision to land straight ahead in a field due to power lines in his path, rapidly decaying altitude, and power. During the landing roll, the airplane collided with a ditch. The left and right main fuel filters contained a foreign substance, which upon laboratory examination, was found to be a polyacrylamide. This is a manmade synthetic polymer that is used as an agricultural soil amendment that aids in reducing soil erosion. Distribution of the polymer is typically not done by aircraft. Inspection of the fueling facility revealed that the employees who do refueling did not have any formal or on-the-job training. There was no record that the delivery system filters had been examined or changed. The maintenance to the truck, delivery system, and storage facility are done by the employees on an as needed, time permitted basis. The fuel truck was found to be improperly labeled, and the fuel nozzle was lying in a compartment amid dirt, gravel, and other contaminates with no caps or covers for protection.

The airplane departed Houston, Texas, for a VFR flight to San Diego, California. The pilot in the left seat said that they originally planned to purchase fuel at Gila Bend, Arizona, but were told that the fueling was closed. The left seat pilot said they elected to land at a private airstrip and made arrangements to have an individual drive to Casa Grande airport to purchase fuel for them. The left seat pilot said they were worried about adequate runway length, so they elected to only purchase 65 gallons of fuel for the remainder of the flight to San Diego. En route to San Diego, the right seat pilot obtained weather for the destination from FSS and was advised of 1,000-foot overcast ceiling. The right seat pilot then requested and received an instrument clearance. The TRACON controller advised the pilot of the accident airplane that he would have to keep speed up due to jet traffic or be given delay vectors for traffic spacing. The pilot told ATC that they were fuel critical and later said they had about 45 minutes to 1 hour of fuel. The right seat pilot was cleared for the localizer runway 27 approach. Approximately 18 minutes later, the pilot elected to do a missed approach because he was too high to land and moments later told San Diego radar that he was fuel critical and only had about 5 minutes of fuel left. San Diego radar began to give the pilot vectors to the closest airport and told the pilot not to descend any further. The right seat pilot replied that they were a glider and later told San Diego police that they had run out of fuel. There were no discrepancies noted with either the airframe or the engines during the postaccident aircraft examination.

The pilot reported that about 150 miles southwest of Monterey, the right engine made unusual noises, began to run rough, and exhibited high cylinder head temperature at the limits of the gauge. He advised Oakland Center of his position and situation, but did not declare an emergency. The pilot attempted to open the right engine cowl flap; however, it malfunctioned. He then increased fuel flow to the right engine in order to cool it and eventually had to reduce power on that side to keep it running. To compensate for the power loss in the right engine, he had to add power to the left engine. The combination of remedial actions increased the fuel consumption beyond his planned fuel burn rate. The flight attitude required by the asymmetric power also induced a periodic unporting condition in the outboard fuel tank pickups. The pilot said he was forced to switch to the inboard tanks until that supply was exhausted and then attempted to feed from the outboard tanks. The pilot said he was unsuccessful in maintaining consistent engine power output and was forced to ditch 20 miles short of the coastline. The pilot's VFR flight plan indicated that the total time en route would be 13 hours 10 minutes and total fuel onboard was 14 hours. The lapsed time from departure until the aircraft ditching was approximately 13 hours 12 minutes.

Prior to departure the pilot believed that his airplane contained between 30 and 40 gallons of fuel, adequate for a 15-minute-long flight to another airport where he could purchase additional fuel. The pilot reported the fuel gauge registered 40 gallons, so he departed. During initial climb upon reaching an altitude of about 400 feet above the ocean, both engines simultaneously lost power. The pilot rocked the airplane's wings and experienced a 'short surge of power.' However, it lasted only a brief moment and all engine power was again totally lost. The pilot turned toward the shoreline, reduced airspeed, and ditched about 0.25 miles off shore. The overnight tide/wave action subsequently beached most of the airplane. In the pilot's report, he did not indicate having experienced any mechanical malfunctions. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) coordinator examined recovered portions of the airframe and engines. In pertinent part, the FAA reported finding no physical evidence of any mechanical malfunction with the examined components. However, because of the airframe damage sustained during immersion in the salt water and the subsequent destruction to components, the Safety Board was unable to document the integrity of the fuel quantity indicator system.

The airline transport pilot was repositioning the Beech C99 turboprop cargo hauler on a 73-mile trip without cargo. The pilot had been flying this route for some time and this was his last trip before upgrading to a larger aircraft and route. He told friends that he would take pictures of the scenic parts of the route on his last trip. Three witnesses reported seeing the airplane flying west at low altitude. Two of the witnesses were local ranchers who saw the airplane enter the White Mountains near Trace Plumas Canyon about 7,000 to 8,000 feet msl. White Mountain is 14,246 feet, tapering off north to 13,559 feet and south to 11,285 feet msl. The airplane was reported missing and 2 days later located on White Mountain about 9,400 feet msl. The company flight planned route is 15 miles south of the accident site through Westgard Pass, about 7,291 feet msl. Examination of the low energy impact and the subsequent recovery inspection failed to reveal any mechanical issues.

The air tanker pilot was on a fire suppression mission with fire retardant chemicals aboard, and had made two previous drops on the fire line. Another tanker and spotter pilot witnessed the last drop approach, and reported that the pilot was turning from base leg to the westerly drop heading downwind while in a 60-degree left bank. The aircraft suddenly rolled left to 90 degrees, and at that point the left wing tip struck the terrain. The winds were estimated by the tanker pilots to be 25 to 30 mph with gusts to 40 plus from the east. The pilots also reported turbulence and bad air. Airmet Tango was issued for turbulence and isolated severe conditions mainly below 10,000 in the vicinity of canyons and passes.

While departing on a local area aircraft checkout flight the aircraft stayed low and the pilot advised the tower that he had a fuel problem. The aircraft had been fueled with aviation grade 100LL twice the day before in preparation for a trip. The pilot attempted to return to the airport, but collided with power lines 1.5 miles north. Examination of the engines revealed severe detonation had occurred. A fuel sample was obtained from the aircraft and tested negative for jet fuel contamination. The aircraft had been modified by installation of higher horsepower engines and turbochargers with manual wastegates. During postaccident examination of the aircraft systems the manual wastegates were found partially closed; a position that can provide additional manifold pressure. The engines are restricted to a maximum of 29.5 inHg.

The pilot was cleared for a GPS approach. He stated that he was too high to make a good landing, so he opted for a circling approach to another runway. As he turned for the base leg, he lost visual contact and became disoriented. It was a dark night with no moon. The pilot realized that he was in a 70- to 80-degree left bank and returned the airplane to a level attitude, then noticed the ground directly in front of him. The aircraft ran through a barbed wire fence, collided with trees, and slid rearward to a stop in a high altitude meadow east of the airport. The FAA completed an evaluation of the circling approach procedures and night operations for that airport and did not find any problems.

The airplane was on a VFR dusk cross-country flight when it collided with the 1,500-foot level of a hill. Radar data showed the aircraft in a descent from 2,000 feet until radar contact was lost about 1,500 feet msl, with a final ground speed of 194 knots. The route taken by the pilot was about 5 miles west of the route that the company pilots routinely flew, but while crossing higher terrain, it was a more direct route to the destination. A company pilot flying a few minutes ahead of the accident flight reported it was necessary to descend to between 1,200 and 1,500 feet msl in order to maintain VFR. A low-pressure system approaching the area from the west had resulted in low stratus, rain, and fog. At the time of the accident, a nearby weather reporting facility reported a 1,300-foot broken ceiling with 5- to 6-mile visibility in light rain and mist. On the evening of the accident, the pilot was scheduled to give a speech as her final examination in an evening college course. She had informed the instructor that she might be late, but had been told that he could not hold the class past its scheduled dismissal time to accommodate her late arrival.

On March 4, 1998, at 1350 hours Pacific standard time, a Learjet 23, N37BL, was substantially damaged when it landed gear up at the Oakdale, California, airport. The airline transport pilot and check pilot, the sole occupants, were not injured and no property damage occurred. The flight was operating under 14 CFR Part 91 on a familiarization and training flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed. The pilot stated in his report "the landing gear was never extended and the aircraft was landed with the gear retracted."