California

The copilot inadvertently induced a lateral oscillation and lost control of the airplane while practicing touch-and-go landings. The pilot made the first touch-and-go. The copilot successfully made the second touch-and-go. The copilot attempted the third touch-and-go. At 50 feet, he disengaged the yaw damper and entered a pilot induced lateral oscillation. The airplane rapidly decelerated and developed a high sink rate. The airplane dragged the right tip fuel tank, which separated from the airplane, and the airplane bounced back into the air. The airplane landed hard, the main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane skidded to a stop off the right side of the runway. Both pilots and the passenger deplaned through the main entry door. The pilot-in-command had not demonstrated the handling characteristics of the airplane with the yaw damper off, and he felt he did not react quickly enough to prevent the accident.

The accident occurred during a dark night departure from a private unlighted airstrip. The pilot had landed, assisted by the headlights of a car, on the landing strip/road about 1830. After dropping off a passenger, he departed about 1900. The departure direction was towards a sparsely populated area of rolling hills. Local area residents reported hearing a plane depart, followed by a loss of engine sound, and an impact in a grape vineyard. Examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted the ground in a nose down attitude. According to maintenance records, the last recorded annual inspection occurred 12 months and about 299.5 flight hours prior to the accident. Approximately 5 months before the accident, the FAA Certified Repair Station (CRS) that performed the maintenance on the airplane had given the pilot/owner a 15-item list of "grounding discrepancies." The discrepancies were: Cracked nose cowling; fraying seat belts; LH mag switch broken; LH window cracked; LH windshield crazed; stall warning inoperative; turbine inlet temperature inoperative; door latch safety inoperative; several hydraulic components leaking; main gear trunion pins worn; several cracks in wing lower skins; fuel leaks; loose rivets on RH flap; wing spar bolts loose; and elevator trim cable frayed. According to the CRS manager, the only item that had been repaired prior to the accident was the cracked nose cowling. However, an engine log entry indicated the TIT gage had also been replaced. Additionally, several witnesses reported that the pilot had been flying the airplane with an inoperative landing gear retract system for about 4 months. During post accident examination of the wreckage, investigators were able to verify that many of the listed discrepancies still existed; however, none of these discrepancies could be directly linked to the accident.

The airline transport rated pilot was returning an organ transplant nurse passenger to an uncontrolled, no facilities airport, with ground fog present about 0400 in the morning. The pilot had obtained two abbreviated preflight weather briefings while waiting for his passenger, and prior to departing at 0235. According to witnesses he attempted to land twice on runway 28, then he made an approach and attempted a landing on runway 10. Witnesses reported that the airport was engulfed in ground fog at the time of the approaches. They said that you could see straight up but not horizontally. The airplane collided with grape vineyard poles and canal/wash berms, about 250 feet short of the runway 10 displaced threshold. Approach charts for two airports with instrument approaches within 20 miles were found lying on the instrument panel glare shield. The passenger's car was parked at the uncontrolled airport.

During en route cruise flight at an assigned altitude of 11,000 feet (msl) in instrument meteorological conditions, the airplane impacted mountainous terrain at 5,300 feet, in wings level, descending flight. During the final 12 minutes of the flight (from 1046 to 1058 Pacific daylight time), recorded military search radar height values (primary radar returns) show the aircraft in a steady descent from 11,000 feet to 5,600 feet, where radar contact was lost. During the same time interval, recorded Mode C altitudes received at Los Angeles Air Traffic Control Center (Center) and SoCal Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) indicated the aircraft was level at 11,000 feet. At 1055:49, when the pilot was handed off from SoCal TRACON to Los Angeles Center, the pilot checked in with the Center ". . . level at one one thousand." At 1057:28, the pilot asked the Center controller "what altitude you showing us at" to which the controller responded "not receiving your mode C right now sir." At 1057:37, the pilot transmitted "o k we'd like to climb to vfr on top, our uh altimeter just went down to uh fifty three hundred." The controller approved the pilot's request to climb to VFR conditions on-top and, at 1057:54, the pilot responded "roger we're out." No further transmissions were received from the aircraft. The airplane was equipped with a single instrument static pressure system with two heated static ports. The static system and static system instruments were damaged or destroyed by impact and post-crash fire sufficiently to preclude post-accident testing.

The twin turboprop airplane overran the runway, impacted two fences, and an occupied automobile after the airline transport pilot attempted to abort a takeoff. The pilot performed a rolling takeoff and was paying close attention to balancing the engine power and keeping runway centerline alignment. As the airplane accelerated, the pilot set the power above 80 percent and began an instrument scan. He then noted the airspeed indicator was reading zero with the needle resting on the peg. After a moment's hesitation, the pilot attempted to abort the takeoff by reducing the power levers to flight idle, and subsequently over the gate to ground fine. He reported to the FAA that he did not place the power controls into the reverse position. Air traffic controllers reported they observed the airplane with its nose wheel off of the ground approximately 3/4 of the way down the 4,602-foot long runway. The aircraft's left and right pitot/static systems were examined and tested after the accident, and no anomalies were noted. The pilot obtained verbal training on rejected/aborted takeoffs for the accident airplane. He obtained his type rating and 14 CFR 135 check-out in the accident airplane approximately 1 month prior to the accident. The pilot had accumulated a total of 10,867.5 hours of flight time, of which 34.7 hours were accumulated in the accident aircraft make and model. The pilot reported his total pilot-in-command flight time in the accident aircraft make and model as 20 hours, all of which were accumulated within the preceding 30 days of the accident. Examination of the airplane, the flight instruments and the pitot/static system found no explanation for the pilot reported lack of airspeed reading. The brakes were found to be fully functional. Review of the performance charts for the airplane disclosed that for the weight and ambient conditions of the takeoff, the airplane required 4,100 feet for an
accelerate-stop distance; the runway was 4,602 feet long.

The airplane took off from the airport on a left downwind departure and after reaching an altitude of approximately 300 feet, banked steeply and dove into the ground. Witness statements indicated that the takeoff ground roll extended to midfield of the runway, a distance of 4,850 feet before the airplane lifted off. According to the Airplane Flight Manual performance charts, the normal ground roll should have been about 2,100 feet. While turning crosswind, the airplane steepened its bank and continued toward the downwind. As the angle of bank approached 90 degrees, the nose dropped and the airplane descended to impact with trees and the ground. Several trees were struck before the airplane came to rest on the underlying terrain in the backyard of a residence. The airplane was thermally destroyed in the impact sequence and post crash fire. Calculations of the airplane weight and balance data put it at least 251 pounds over maximum allowable gross takeoff weight. Remaining wreckage not consumed in the ground fire was examined and the engine was sent to the manufacturer for inspection. No discrepancies were found. Cockpit instrumentation and all autopilot components were thermally destroyed. Flaps and landing gear were found in the retracted position and the elevator trim surface was slightly nose up from the takeoff setting. The autopilot had a reported history of malfunction and the electric elevator trim system was scheduled for repair a week before the accident, but the owner took the airplane prior to the work being performed. The airplane had been modified with the addition of several Supplemental Type Certificates, one of which was a wing spoiler system. The controls and
many of the actuating linkages for the spoiler system were destroyed in the fire.

The aircraft collided with the ground in a steep nose down descent angle while maneuvering to return to the runway during the takeoff initial climb from the airport. Pilot and mechanic witnesses on the airport described the engine sounds during the takeoff as abnormal. The takeoff ground roll was over 3,000 feet in length, and the airplane's climb out angle was much shallower than usual. Two other witnesses said the engine sounded "like a radial engine," and both believed that the power output was lower than normal. One mechanic witness said the engine was surging and not developing full power; he believed the symptoms could be associated with a fuel feed problem, a turbocharger surge, or an excessively lean running condition. The ground witnesses located near the impact site said the airplane began a steep left turn between 1/4- and 1/2-mile from the runway's end at a lower than normal altitude. The bank angle was estimated by the witnesses as 45 degrees or greater. The turn continued until the nose suddenly dropped and the airplane entered a spiraling descent to ground impact. The majority of these witnesses stated that they heard "sputtering" or "popping" noises coming from the airplane. Engineering personnel from the manufacturer developed a performance profile for a normal takeoff and climb under the ambient conditions of the accident and at gross weight. The profile was compared to the actual aircraft performance derived from recorded radar data and the witness observations. The ground roll was 1,300 feet longer than it should have been, and the speed/acceleration and climb performance were consistently well below the profile's predictions. Based on the radar data and factoring in the winds, the airplane's estimated indicated airspeed during the final turn was 82 knots; the stall speed at 45 degrees of bank is 82 knots and it increases linearly to 96 knots at 60 degrees of bank. No evidence was found that the pilot flew the airplane from December until the date of the accident. The airplane sat outside during the rainy season with only 10 gallons of fuel in each tank. Comparison of the time the fueling began and the communications transcripts disclosed that the pilot had 17 minutes 41 seconds to refuel the airplane with 120 gallons, reboard the airplane, and start the engine for taxi; the maximum nozzle discharge flow rate of the pump he used is 24 gallons per minute. Review of the communications transcripts found that a time interval of 3 minutes 35 seconds elapsed from the time the pilot asked for a taxi clearance from the fuel facility until he reported ready for takeoff following a taxi distance of at least 2,000 feet. During the 8 seconds following the pilot's acknowledgment of his takeoff clearance, he and the local controller carried on a non pertinent personal exchange. The aircraft was almost completely consumed in the post crash fire; however, extensive investigation of the remains failed to identify a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure in the engine or airframe systems. The pistons, cylinder interiors, and spark plugs from all six cylinders were clean without combustion deposits. The cockpit fuel selector lever, the intermediate linkages, and the valve itself were found in the OFF position; however, an engineering analysis established that insufficient fuel was available in the lines forward of the selector to start, taxi, and perform a takeoff with the selector in the OFF position.

Shortly after liftoff from Point Mugu NAS, the aircraft collided with a flock of pelicans. The crew attempted an emergency landing and the aircraft belly landed before coming to rest. All three crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

On March 5, 2000, about 1811 Pacific standard time (PST), Southwest Airlines, Inc., flight 1455, a Boeing 737-300 (737), N668SW, overran the departure end of runway 8 after landing at Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport (BUR), Burbank, California. The airplane touched down at approximately 182 knots, and about 20 seconds later, at approximately 32 knots, collided with a metal blast fence and an airport perimeter wall. The airplane came to rest on a city street near a gas station off of the airport property. Of the 142 persons on board, 2 passengers sustained serious injuries; 41 passengers and the captain sustained minor injuries; and 94
passengers, 3 flight attendants, and the first officer sustained no injuries. The airplane sustained extensive exterior damage and some internal damage to the passenger cabin. During the accident sequence, the forward service door (1R) escape slide inflated inside the airplane; the nose gear collapsed; and the forward dual flight attendant jump seat, which was occupied by two flight attendants, partially collapsed. The flight, which was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan, was conducted under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121. Visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident, which occurred
in twilight lighting conditions.

On February 16, 2000, about 1951 Pacific standard time, Emery Worldwide Airlines, Inc., (Emery) flight 17, a McDonnell Douglas DC-8-71F (DC-8), N8079U, crashed in an automobile salvage yard shortly after takeoff, while attempting to return to Sacramento Mather Airport (MHR), Rancho Cordova, California, for an emergency landing. Emery flight 17 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a cargo flight from MHR to James M. Cox Dayton International Airport (DAY), Dayton, Ohio. The flight departed MHR about 1949, with two pilots and a flight engineer on board. The three flight crew members were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Night visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan.