California

During the flight, the instrument-rated private pilot was monitoring the weather at his intended destination. He noted the weather and runway conditions and decided to conduct a global-positioning-system instrument approach to a known closed runway with the intention of circling to a different runway. As the airplane neared the missed approach point, the pilot established visual contact with the airport's runway environment and canceled his instrument flight rules clearance. As he entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for his intended runway, the pilot noticed that the first part of the runway was covered in fog and that the visibility was 0.75 of a mile with light snow. With at least 5,000 feet of clear runway, he opted to land just beyond the fog. Prior to touchdown, the pilot concluded that there was not enough runway length left to make a landing and performed a go-around by applying power, pitching up, and retracting the landing gear. During the go-around, the pilot focused outside the airplane cockpit but had no horizon reference in the dark night conditions. He heard the stall warning and realized that the aircraft was not climbing. The pilot pitched the nose down and observed only snow and trees ahead. Not being able to climb over the trees, the airplane subsequently impacted trees and terrain, coming to rest upright in a wooded, snow-covered field. The pilot stated that there were no anomalies with the engine or airframe that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane.

While performing a SAR mission for a 12 foot boat that was missing since two days, the aircraft collided with a Bell AH-1 Suber Cobra operated by the US Marine Corps. Both machines crashed into the sea some 24 km off the San Clemente Island and all occupants were missing. SAR were abandoned on 01NOV2013 as no trace of the Hercules and the Cobra were found. It appears that the Cobra's crew was taking part of an exercise in an area reserved for training missions. At the time of the accident, the Cobra had its anticollision lights and IFF transponder switched off.

The airplane just had undergone a routine maintenance and this was planned to be the first flight after the inspection. During the initial climb, the pilot observed that the airplane was drifting to the left. The pilot attempted to counteract the drift by application of right aileron and right rudder, but the airplane continued to the left. The pilot reported that, despite having both hands on the control yoke, he could not maintain directional control and the airplane collided into a building. The airplane subsequently came to rest on railroad tracks adjacent to the airport perimeter. A post accident examination revealed that the elevator trim wheel was located in the 9-degree NOSE UP position; normal takeoff range setting is between 2 and 3 degrees NOSE UP. The rudder trim control knob was found in the full left position and the right propeller lever was found about one-half inch forward of the FEATHER position; these control inputs both resulted in the airplane yawing to the left. The pilot did not adequately follow the airplane manufacturer's checklist during the preflight, taxi, and before takeoff, which resulted in the airplane not being configured correctly for takeoff. This incorrect configuration led to the loss of directional control immediately after rotation. A post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

During the takeoff roll, the airplane began to drift to the right. Despite the certified flight instructor's and student's attempts, they were unable to stop the yaw and drift. As the airplane was about to depart the runway, the pilots did not reduce the throttles or apply brakes as they felt that it would be safer to attempt to get airborne. After departing the runway surface, the airplane collided with a series of berms, which sheared off the left landing gear and left engine. The right landing gear collapsed, and the airplane came to rest in a nose down attitude. Post accident e examination revealed that the student pilot had inadvertently set the rudder trim to the full right position when he adjusted the rudder pedals during the prestart checks. The rudder trim was in the full right position for the takeoff, and found in the same position upon post accident inspection.

On June 28, 2008, about 2215 Pacific daylight time, an ABX Air Boeing 767-200, N799AX, operating as flight 1611 from San Francisco International Airport, San Francisco, California, experienced a ground fire before engine startup. The captain and the first officer evacuated the airplane through the cockpit windows and were not injured, and the airplane was substantially damaged. The cargo flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. At the time of the fire, the airplane was parked near a loading facility, all of the cargo to be transported on the flight had been loaded, and the doors had been shut.

The airplane departed under daytime visual meteorological conditions on a cross-country flight from an airport on the east side of a mountain range to a destination on the west side of the mountains. The airplane, which had been receiving flight following, then collided with upsloping mountainous terrain in a mountain pass while in controlled flight after encountering instrument meteorological conditions. The controller terminated radar services due to anticipation of losing radar coverage within the mountainous pass area, and notified the pilot to contact the next sector once through the pass while staying northwest of an interstate highway due to opposing traffic on the south side of the highway. The pilot later contacted the controller asking if he still needed to remain on a northwesterly heading. The controller replied that he never assigned a northwesterly heading. No further radio communications were received from the accident airplane. Radar data revealed that while proceeding on a northeasterly course, the airplane climbed to an altitude of 6,400 feet mean sea level (msl). A few minutes later, the radar data showed the airplane turning to an easterly heading and initiating a climb to an altitude of 6,900 feet msl. The airplane then started descending in a right turn from 6,900 feet to 5,800 feet msl prior to it being lost from radar contact about 0.65 miles southeast of the accident site. A weather observation station located at the departure airport reported a scattered cloud layer at 10,000 feet above ground level (agl). A weather observation system located about 29 miles southwest of the accident site reported a broken cloud layer at 4,000 feet agl. A pilot, who was flying west bound at 8,500 feet through the same pass around the time of the accident, reported overcast cloud coverage in the area of the accident site that extended west of the mountains. The pilot stated that the ceiling was around 4,000 feet msl and the tops of the clouds were 7,000 feet msl or higher throughout the area. Postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.

The accident flight was the pilot's first 700 nm cross-country flight in the newly purchased airplane. Prior to departing he had the airplane refueled with the airplane on a slope. The individual who refueled the airplane estimated that the left wing tip was 12 to 14 inches lower than the right wing tip. He stated that the pilot was very concerned about getting as much fuel in the airplane as possible because of his up-coming flight. After climbing to his assigned cruising altitude of 21,000 feet and about two hours into the flight the pilot reported to ATC that he needed to divert. During the descent the pilot reported that he was experiencing a fuel problem and that one engine was sputtering. Two minutes later the pilot declared an emergency and reported that both engines were sputtering. The pilot reported at that time that he had 15 total gallons of fuel remaining A witness to the accident reported that he saw the airplane flying southbound and that the wings were rocking side-to-side. The airplane then rolled to the right before crashing into the citrus grove. Examination of the airframe revealed no pre-impact failure to any flight control surface or control system component. The power plant investigation did not disclose any pre-impact mechanical failure of any rotating or reciprocating component of the engine. Interviews with pilots who had flown with the accident pilot indicated that this was his first flight above 13,000 feet in the accident airplane, and was probably his longest distance attempted flight since he had purchased the airplane. According to information contained within the Pilot's Operating Handbook and FAA Approved Airplane Flight Manual (VB-1190), "The full amount of usable fuel is based on the airplane sitting on a level ramp, laterally level, and longitudinally (approximately 1 1/2 degree nose up) with each tank fueled to 0.6 inches below filler neck. The wing tanks are extremely sensitive to attitude and if not level, they cannot be fueled to the full usable capacity." This information is also included in the FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet No. A17WE under the section Data Pertinent to All Models, Note 1.

The reported weather at the time of the accident was calm winds, a 1/4-mile visibility in fog and a vertical visibility of 100 feet. Shortly after takeoff for the instrument-flight-rules flight, the airplane made a slight turn to the left and impacted the tops of 25-foot trees about a 1/2 mile from the runway. An enhanced ground proximity warning system was installed on the airplane and data extraction from the system indicated that the airplane achieved an initial positive climb profile with a slight turn to the left and then a descent. A witness reported hearing the crash and observed the right wing impact the ground and burst into flames. The airplane then cartwheeled for several hundred feet before coming to rest inverted. The airframe, engines, and propeller assemblies were inspected with no mechanical anomalies noted that would have precluded normal flight.

The pilot arrived in the vicinity of his destination airport, which was located in a narrow river valley. The airport was located within a large area of Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions with clear skies and almost unlimited visibility, but the pilot discovered that the airport was covered by a localized dense layer of fog about 200 to 250 feet thick. There were no instrument approaches to the non-controlled airport. Witnesses reported that the pilot flew at low-level up the valley, and eventually entered the fog as the flight approached the airport. About one mile prior to reaching the airport, the pilot attempted to climb out of the valley, but the airplane began impacting trees on the rising terrain. The airplane eventually sustained sufficient damage from impacting the trees that it descended into the terrain. Post-accident inspection of the airframe and engines found no evidence of a mechanical failure or malfunction.

The airport is on a plateau, and the surrounding terrain is lower than the runway. After departing runway 24, the airplane collided with the top conductor of a telephone line an estimated 2,500 feet from the departure end of the runway. The airport elevation was 331 feet msl and the estimated elevation of the line was 245 feet. The debris path was along a magnetic bearing of 270 degrees. Both left and right engines displayed contact signatures to their internal components that were characteristic of the engines producing power at the time of impact. Fire consumed the cabin and cockpit precluding a meaningful examination of instruments and systems. An aviation routine weather report (METAR) issued about 13 minutes before the accident stated that the winds were calm, visibility was 1/4 mile in fog; and skies were 100 feet obscured. An examination of the pilot's logbook indicated that the pilot had a total instrument flight time of 268 hours as of June 21, 2007. In the 90 prior days he had flown 11 hours in actual instrument conditions and logged 20 instrument approaches.