California

After takeoff from Palm Springs Airport, while on a positioning flight to Boise, the crew encountered technical problems with the undercarriage. Following a holding circuit, the crew decided to return to Palm Springs and to complete a gear up landing. Upon touchdown, the aircraft slid on its belly for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both pilots evacuated safely and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

According to the pilot, he checked the winds via his onboard weather reporting device during the run-up, and he stated that the 25 knot wind sock was about ¾ full just moments before the takeoff roll. He reported that during the takeoff roll the airplane encountered a significant wind gust from the right. He stated that the wind gust forced the airplane to exit the left side of the runway, the landing gear collapsed, and the airplane collided with metal pylons which surrounded the wind sock. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, fuselage, horizontal stabilizer and elevator. The pilot reported that there were no mechanical failures or anomalies prior to or during the flight that would have prevented normal flight operation. According to the Airport/Facility Directory, the Airport Remarks state: Airport located in mountainous terrain with occasional strong winds and turbulence. Lighted windsock available at runway ends and centerfield. With southerly crosswinds in excess of 15 knots, experiencing turbulence and possible windshear along first 3000´ of Runway 27. The reported wind at the airport during the time of the accident was from 200 degrees true at 22 knots, with gusts at 33 knots, and the departure runway heading was 27. According to the pilot operating hand book the maximum demonstrated crosswind component for this airplane is 17 knots. The crosswind component during the time of the accident was 26 knots.

The Cessna 172 (N1285U) was conducting touch-and-go landings at Brown Field Municipal Airport (SDM), San Diego, California, and the experimental North American Rockwell NA265-60SC Sabreliner (N442RM, call sign Eagle1) was returning to SDM from a mission flight. SDM has two parallel runways, 8R/26L and 8L/26R; it is common in west operations for controllers to use a right traffic pattern for both runways 26R and 26L due to the proximity of Tijuana Airport, Tijuana, Mexico, to the south of SDM. On the morning of the accident, the air traffic control tower (ATCT) at SDM had both control positions (local and ground control) in the tower combined at the local control position, which was staffed by a local controller (LC)/controller-in-charge, who was conducting on-the-job training with a developmental controller (LC trainee). The LC trainee was transmitting control instructions for all operations; however, the LC was monitoring the LC trainee's actions and was responsible for all activity at that position. About 13 minutes before the accident, the N1285U pilot contacted the ATCT and requested touch-andgo landings in the visual flight rules (VFR) traffic pattern. About that time, another Cessna 172 (N6ZP) and a helicopter (N8360R) were conducting operations in the VFR traffic pattern, and a Cessna 206 Stationair (N5058U) was inbound for landing. Over the next 5 minutes, traffic increased, with two additional aircraft inbound for landing. (Figure 1 in the factual report for this accident shows the aircraft in the SDM traffic pattern about 8 minutes before the accident.) The LC trainee cleared the N1285U pilot for a touch-and-go on runway 26R; the pilot acknowledged the clearance and then advised the LC trainee that he was going to go around. The LC trainee advised the N1285U pilot to expect runway 26L on the next approach. At that time, three aircraft were using runway 26R (Global Express [N18WZ] was inbound for landing, N6ZP was on a right base for a touch-and-go, and a Cessna Citation [XALVV] was on short final) and three aircraft were using runway 26L (N1285U was turning right downwind for the touch-and-go, a Skybolt [N81962] was on a left downwind for landing, and N8360R was conducting a touch-and-go landing). After N1285U completed the touch-andgo on runway 26L, the pilot entered a right downwind for runway 26R. Meanwhile, Eagle1 was 9 miles west of the airport and requested a full-stop landing; the LC trainee instructed the Eagle1 flight crew to enter a right downwind for runway 26R at or above an altitude of 2,000 ft mean sea level. At this time, about 3 minutes before the accident, the qualified LC terminated the LC trainee's training and took over control of radio communications. From this time until the collision occurred, the LC was controlling nine aircraft. (Figure 2 and Figure 4 in the factual report for this accident show the total number of aircraft under ATCT control shortly before the accident.) During the next 2 minutes, the LC made several errors. For example, after N6ZP completed a touch-andgo on runway 26R, the pilot requested a right downwind departure from the area, which the LC initially failed to acknowledge. The LC also instructed the N5058U pilot, who had been holding short of runway 26L, that he was cleared for takeoff from runway 26R. Both errors were corrected. In addition, the LC instructed the helicopter pilot to "listen up. turn crosswind" before correcting the instruction 4 seconds later to "turn base." (Figure 2 in the factual report for this accident shows the aircraft in the traffic pattern about 2 minutes before the accident.) About 1 minute before the collision, the Eagle1 flight crew reported on downwind midfield and stated that they had traffic to the left and right in sight. At that time, N1285U was to Eagle1's right, between Eagle1 and the tower, and established on a right downwind about 500 ft below Eagle1's position. N6ZP was about 1 mile forward and to the left of Eagle1, heading northeast and departing the area. Mistakenly identifying the Cessna to the right of Eagle1 as N6ZP, the LC instructed the N6ZP pilot to make a right 360° turn to rejoin the downwind when, in fact, N1285U was the airplane to the right of Eagle1. (The LC stated in a postaccident interview that he thought the turn would resolve the conflict with Eagle1 and would help the Cessna avoid Eagle1's wake turbulence.) The N6ZP pilot acknowledged the LC's instruction and began turning; N1285U continued its approach to runway 26R. However, the LC never visually confirmed that the Cessna to Eagle1's right (N1285U) was making the 360° turn. Ten seconds later, the LC instructed the Eagle1 flight crew to turn base and land on runway 26R, which put the accident airplanes on a collision course. The LC looked to ensure that Eagle1 was turning as instructed and noticed that the Cessna on the right downwind (which he still mistakenly identified as N6ZP) had not begun the 360° turn that he had issued. The LC called the N6ZP pilot, and the pilot responded that he was turning. In the first communication between the LC and the N1285U pilot (and the first between the controllers in the ATCT and that airplane's pilot in almost 6 minutes), the LC transmitted the call sign of N1285U, which the pilot acknowledged. N1285U and Eagle1 collided as the LC tried to verify N1285U's position. A postaccident examination of both airplanes did not reveal any mechanical anomalies that would have prevented the airplanes from maneuvering to avoid an impact.

The captain reported that, while returning to the departure airport following an uneventful aerial drop, he noticed that the hydraulic pressure gauge indicated 0. The first officer subsequently verified that the sight gauge for the main hydraulic fluid reservoir was empty. The flight crew began performing the emergency gear extension checklist and verified that the nosewheel landing gear was extended. The captain stated that the first officer then installed the pin in the nosewheel landing gear as part of the emergency checklist. As the flight crewmembers diverted to a nearby airport because it had a longer runway and emergency resources, they briefed the no-flap landing. The first officer extended the main landing gear using the emergency gear release, which resulted in three down-and-locked landing gear indications. Subsequently, the airplane landed normally; however, during the landing roll, the nosewheel landing gear collapsed, and the airplane then came to rest nose low. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the nosewheel landing gear pin was disengaged from the nosewheel jury strut, and the pin was not located. The disengagement of the pin allowed the nosewheel landing gear to collapse on landing. It could not be determined when or how the pin became disengaged from the jury strut. Installation of the pin would have required the first officer to maneuver in a small area and install the pin while the nose landing gear door was open and the gear extended. Further, the pin had a red flag attached to it. When inserted during flight, the flag encounters a high amount of airflow that causes it to vibrate; this could have resulted in the pin becoming disengaged after it was installed. Evidence of a hydraulic fluid leak was observed around the right engine cowling drain. The right engine hydraulic pump case was found cracked, and the backup ring was partially extruded, which is consistent with hydraulic system overpressurization. The reason for the overpressurization of the hydraulic system could not be determined during postaccident examination.

The commercial pilot, who was the pilot flying (PF), and the airplane transport pilot, who was the pilot not flying (PNF), were conducting an aeromedical positioning flight. The pilots reported that, during a night approach, they visually identified the airport, activated the runway lighting system, and then canceled the instrument flight plan for a visual approach. The PNF reported that, after turning onto the final approach, the flaps were fully lowered and that the airplane was in a “wings level, stabilized approach.” The PF reported that he was initially using the vertical approach slope indicator (VASI) for guidance but that the airplane drifted below the glidepath during the approach, and he did not correct back to the glidepath. On short final, the pilots verified that the landing gear were in the down-and-locked position by noting the illumination of the three green landing gear indicator lights, and the airspeed indicator indicated 110 knots. Both pilots reported that the landing was “firm” and that it was followed by a loud bang and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear. The airplane slid on its belly for about 825 ft down the runway before coming to rest. Both pilots evacuated the airplane, which was subsequently consumed by a postaccident fire. Both pilots reported that the airplane was operating normally with no discrepancies noted. Postaccident examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed that the airplane impacted the runway about 100 ft short of its displaced threshold. Broken components of the landing gear were located along the debris field, which extended about 565 ft beyond the initial impact point. It is likely that the PF's failure to correct and maintain the VASI glidepath after allowing the airplane to descend below the glidepath and the touchdown at a high descent rate resulted in a hard landing and the subsequent failure of all three landing gear.

The private pilot was returning to his home airport; the approach was normal, and the airplane landed within the runway touchdown zone markings and on the runway centerline. About midfield, the airplane started to drift to the right side of the runway, and during the landing roll, the nose pitched up suddenly and dropped back down. The airplane veered off the runway and impacted the 1,000-ft runway distance remaining sign and continued to travel in a righthand turn until it impacted a hangar. The airplane came to rest inside the hangar, and the damage to the structure caused the roof to collapse onto the airplane. A postaccident fire quickly ensued. The subsequent wreckage examination did not reveal any mechanical anomalies with the airplane's engines, flight controls, steering, or braking system. A video study was conducted using security surveillance video from a fixed-base operator located midfield, and the study established that the airplane was not decelerating as it passed through midfield. Deceleration was detected after the airplane had veered off the runway and onto the parking apron in front of the rows of hangars it eventually impacted. Additionally, video images could not definitively establish that the flaps were deployed during the landing roll. However, the flaps were deployed as the airplane veered off the runway and into the hangar, but it could not be determined to what degree. To obtain maximum braking performance, the flaps should be placed in the ”ground flap” position immediately after touchdown. The wreckage examination determined that the flaps were in the ”ground flap” position at the time the airplane impacted the hangar. Numerous personal electronic devices that had been onboard the airplane provided images of the passengers and unrestrained pets, including a large dog, with access to the cockpit during the accident flight. Although the unrestrained animals had the potential to create a distraction during the landing roll, there was insufficient information to determine their role in the accident sequence or what caused the delay in the pilot’s application of the brakes.

On July 6, 2013, about 1128 Pacific daylight time, a Boeing 777-200ER, Korean registration HL7742, operating as Asiana Airlines flight 214, was on approach to runway 28L when it struck a seawall at San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California. Three of the 291 passengers were fatally injured; 40 passengers, 8 of the 12 flight attendants, and 1 of the 4 flight crewmembers received serious injuries. The other 248 passengers, 4 flight attendants, and 3 flight crewmembers received minor injuries or were not injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 214 was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea, operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 129. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed. The flight was vectored for a visual approach to runway 28L and intercepted the final approach course about 14 nautical miles (nm) from the threshold at an altitude slightly above the desired 3° glidepath. This set the flight crew up for a straight-in visual approach; however, after the flight crew accepted an air traffic control instruction to maintain 180 knots to 5 nm from the runway, the flight crew mismanaged the airplane’s descent, which resulted in the airplane being well above the desired 3° glidepath when it reached the 5 nm point. The flight crew’s difficulty in managing the airplane’s descent continued as the approach continued. In an attempt to increase the airplane’s descent rate and capture the desired glidepath, the pilot flying (PF) selected an autopilot (A/P) mode (flight level change speed [FLCH SPD]) that instead resulted in the autoflight system initiating a climb because the airplane was below the selected altitude. The PF disconnected the A/P and moved the thrust levers to idle, which caused the autothrottle (A/T) to change to the HOLD mode, a mode in which the A/T does not control airspeed. The PF then pitched the airplane down and increased the descent rate. Neither the PF, the pilot monitoring (PM), nor the observer noted the change in A/T mode to HOLD. As the airplane reached 500 ft above airport elevation, the point at which Asiana’s procedures dictated that the approach must be stabilized, the precision approach path indicator (PAPI) would have shown the flight crew that the airplane was slightly above the desired glidepath. Also, the airspeed, which had been decreasing rapidly, had just reached the proper approach speed of 137 knots. However, the thrust levers were still at idle, and the descent rate was about 1,200 ft per minute, well above the descent rate of about 700 fpm needed to maintain the desired glidepath; these were two indications that the approach was not stabilized. Based on these two indications, the flight crew should have determined that the approach was unstabilized and initiated a go-around, but they did not do so. As the approach continued, it became increasingly unstabilized as the airplane descended below the desired glidepath; the PAPI displayed three and then four red lights, indicating the continuing descent below the glidepath. The decreasing trend in airspeed continued, and about 200 ft, the flight crew became aware of the low airspeed and low path conditions but did not initiate a go-around until the airplane was below 100 ft, at which point the airplane did not have the performance capability to accomplish a go-around. The flight crew’s insufficient monitoring of airspeed indications during the approach resulted from expectancy, increased workload, fatigue, and automation reliance. When the main landing gear and the aft fuselage struck the seawall, the tail of the airplane broke off at the aft pressure bulkhead. The airplane slid along the runway, lifted partially into the air, spun about 330°, and impacted the ground a final time. The impact forces, which exceeded certification limits, resulted in the inflation of two slide/rafts within the cabin, injuring and temporarily trapping two flight attendants. Six occupants were ejected from the airplane during the impact sequence: two of the three fatally injured passengers and four of the seriously injured flight attendants. The four flight attendants were wearing their restraints but were ejected due to the destruction of the aft galley where they were seated. The two ejected passengers (one of whom was later rolled over by two firefighting vehicles) were not wearing their seatbelts and would likely have remained in the cabin and survived if they had been wearing their seatbelts. After the airplane came to a stop, a fire initiated within the separated right engine, which came to rest adjacent to the right side of the fuselage. When one of the flight attendants became aware of the fire, he initiated an evacuation, and 98% of the passengers successfully self-evacuated. As the fire spread into the fuselage, firefighters entered the airplane and extricated five passengers (one of whom later died) who were injured and unable to evacuate. Overall, 99% of the airplane’s occupants survived.

Two technicians were performing engine tests on apron at Chino Airport. While facing a hangar, the aircraft jumped over the chocks and collided with the metallic door of the hangar before coming to rest half inside. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

During a cross-country instrument flight rules (IFR) flight, the air traffic controller cleared the pilot to begin his initial descent for landing and issued a heading change to begin the approach. The pilot acknowledged the altitude and heading change. One minute later, the controller noticed that the airplane's radar track was not tracking the assigned heading. The controller queried the pilot as to his intentions, and the pilot replied that he was in a spin. There were no further communications with the pilot. The wreckage was subsequently located in steep mountainous terrain. A study of the weather indicated widespread cloud cover in the area around the time of the accident. A witness near the accident site reported that he heard an airplane in a dive but could not see it due to the very dark clouds in the area. He heard the engine noise increase and decrease multiple times. It is likely that the pilot entered into the clouds and failed to maintain airplane control. The changes in the engine noise were most likely the result of the pilot's attempt to recover from the spin. About 8 months before the accident, the pilot completed the initial pilot training course in the accident airplane and was signed off for IFR currency; however, recent or current IFR experience could not be determined. Examination of the fragmented airplane and engines revealed no abnormalities that would have precluded normal operation.

The aircraft impacted terrain following an in-flight breakup near Shaver Lake, California. The private pilot/registered owner was operating the airplane under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage during the accident sequence, and was partially consumed by postimpact fire. The cross-country flight departed Salinas Municipal Airport, Salinas, California, at 1837, with a planned destination of Eppley Airfield, Omaha, Nebraska. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan had been filed. The pilot was the son of the passenger. Both had spent the weekend attending a driving academy at the Laguna Seca Raceway, having arrived in the accident airplane earlier in the week. According to the pilot's wife, they had encountered strong headwinds during the outbound flight from Omaha, and had decided to take advantage of tailwinds for the return flight that night, rather than stay in a hotel. The pilot planned to return his father to Omaha, and then fly to his residence in Missouri the following day. Radar and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that prior to departure, the pilot was given an IFR clearance to Omaha, and that during his interaction with clearance delivery personnel he read back the clearance correctly. A few minutes after departing Salinas the airplane was cleared to fly direct to the Panoche VORTAC (co-located very high frequency omnidirectional range (VOR) beacon and tactical air navigation system). The airplane followed a direct course of 60 degrees; reaching Panoche at a mode C reported altitude of 17,200 feet, about 14 minutes later. The airplane continued on that course, reaching the Clovis VOR at 1912, coincident to attaining the pilots stated cruise altitude of 27,000 feet. The pilot reported leveling for cruise, and flying direct to Omaha. The sector controller reported that the pilot should fly direct to the Coaldale VOR and then to Omaha, and the pilot responded, acknowledging the correction. For the next 5 minutes, the airplane continued at the same altitude and heading, with no further transmissions from the pilot. The airplane then began a descending turn to the right, with a final mode C reported radar target recorded 60 seconds later. During that period, it descended to 22,600 feet, with an accompanying increase in ground speed from about 190 to 375 knots. For the remaining 6 minutes, a 6.5-mile-long cluster of primary targets (no altitude information) was observed emanating from the airplane's last location, on a heading of about 150 degrees. Following the initial route deviation, the air traffic controller made five attempts to make contact with the pilot with no success. Throughout the climb and cruise portion of the flight, the airplane flew directly to the assigned waypoints with minimal course variation, in a manner consistent with the pilot utilizing the autopilot.