Positioning

The crew was on a positioning flight for a crop-spraying mission in North Kazakhstan when he lost his orientation between the villages of Taiynsha and Sorochinskiy. He landed on a small field near the village of Sarybulak to establish his position. After takeoff with a slight tail wind, at a height of 15 metres, the pilot-in-command initiated a left turn when the left lower wing struck a tree. The aircraft stalled and crashed, bursting into flames. Both pilots were killed while the engineer was seriously injured. The aircraft was totally destroyed by a post crash fire.

The pilot of the single-engine turboprop was on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight and cancelled his IFR flight plan after being cleared for a visual approach to the destination airport. He flew a left traffic pattern for runway 32, a 4,202-foot-long, 75-foot-wide, asphalt runway. The pilot reported that the airplane crossed the runway threshold at 81 knots and touched down normally, with the stall warning horn sounding. The airplane subsequently drifted left and the pilot attempted to correct with right rudder input; however, the airplane continued to drift to the left side of the runway. The pilot then initiated a go-around and cognizant of risk of torque roll at low speeds did not apply full power. The airplane climbed to about 10 feet above the ground. At that time, the airplane was in a 20-degree left bank and the pilot applied full right aileron input to correct. The airplane then descended in a left turn, the pilot retarded the throttle, and braced for impact. A Federal Aviation Administration inspector reported that the airplane traveled about 100 feet off the left side of the runway, nosed down in mud, and came to rest in trees. Examination of the wreckage by the inspector did not reveal any preimpact mechanical malfunctions, nor did the pilot report any. The reported wind, about the time of the accident, was from 310 degrees at 10 knots, gusting to 15 knots.

During the early evening, at 1946 hrs, after a flight time of one hour and 50 minutes the airplane came back to Prague, Czech Republic, after a flight to France. For the Pilot in Command (PIC) it was the first flight of the day. The co-pilot left the airplane after the landing and was replaced by the copilot of the subsequent accident flight. The co-pilot had already flown two flights that day - around midday - with a total flight time of one hour and 40 minutes. There were no passengers on board. The aircraft departed Prague at 2008 hrs for a ferry flight to Karlskrona, Sweden. The flight was conducted in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). The course of events is described based on the analysis of the recordings of the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), radar and radio communications. The appendix shows two different FDR recording diagrams. Diagram 1 shows the entire flight (time in UTC) and diagram 2 shows the flight from 1918:30 UTC on. Take-off took place on runway 31. The co-pilot was Pilot Flying (PF). The flight was conducted manually, neither of the two autopilots was engaged. From 2012 hrs on, after a right hand turn, the flight proceeded toward the north. The airplane was in climb attitude. At 2014:16 hrs, still in climb, the PIC said "I didn't fly night time for long time". The co-pilot asked: "Have you already experienced a roll during night?" She answered laughing: "Yes, really." He: "Better we won't." She laughing: "Do you enjoy that thing?" Co-pilot: "You are the first one with whom I talked about it, don't tell it [...]." PIC: "Whom shall I not tell?" [...] She again: "I also do it always, but I persuade [...] to do that." Co-pilot: "[...] Bravo does it better." At 2015:00 hrs, during this short conversation, the crew received the instruction from ATC Prague to climb to FL260 and to level off above reporting point DEKOV. The conversation in the cockpit continued. Co-pilot: "Bravo does the roll faster with the ailerons but the spoilers are slower." At 2015:33 hrs ATC repeated the instruction. At 2015:40 hrs the PIC acknowledged the instruction. Between 2017:10 hrs and 2017:20 hrs the airplane rolled about its longitudinal axis; initially to the left up to a bank angle of 30°, and right afterwards to the right up to a bank angle of 20°, then back again to the horizontal. At 2017:20 hrs the PIC responded to it with the words: "Let's go, we are already high enough, you nettle me - come on [...]." At 2017:22rs ATC Prague instructed the crew to contact ATC Munich; at 2017:35 hrs the PIC confirmed the instruction. At 2017:42 hrs she said: "Later but." The co-pilot replied: "Let's do it at higher altitude." At 2018:29 hrs, the PIC contacted ATC Munich. At 2018:36 hrs the crew received the instruction from ATC Munich to climb to FL330. This was confirmed at 2018:44 hrs. Between 2018:51 hrs and 2019:00 hrs the following conversation took place:
- 2018:51 hrs PIC: "Sufficient, is it sufficient?"
- 2018:53 hrs Co-pilot: "For what?"
- 2018:54 hrs PIC: "Sufficient."
- 2018:56 hrs PIC: "The altitude."
- 2018:58 hrs Co-pilot: "For what?"
- 2018:58 hrs PIC: "For that,"
- 2019:00 hrs Co-pilot: "It is sufficient."
At 2019:00 hrs the airplane levelled off in FL270, at 2019:05 hrs the airplane nose moved upward until a pitch angle of about 14° was reached. At 2019:09 hrs the aircraft began to roll about its longitudinal axis to the right. Within 4 seconds the airplane reached the inverted flight attitude and in another 4 seconds it rolled another 90°. Simultaneously the heading changed right toward the east, then toward the south and finally toward the west. During the roll the pitch angle decreased to almost -85° which is almost a vertical nose dive. The computed airspeed increased
significantly. The airplane crashed near Reinhardtsdorf-Schöna, Saxon Switzerland, about 500 m north of the border to the Czech Republic.

The aircraft departed Broome on a charter flight to Koolan Island, WA. At about 0645 Western Standard Time1, when the aircraft was at an altitude of about 9,500 feet, the pilot noticed a drop in the engine torque indication with a corresponding drop in the engine oil pressure indication. The pilot increased the power lever setting but the engine torque and oil indications continued to reduce, all other engine indications were normal. During an interview with the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) the pilot stated that he felt a power loss associated with the drop in indicated engine torque. The pilot diverted to the nearest airstrip, which was Beagle Bay, WA. He stated that the low oil pressure warning light illuminated so he shut the engine down and prepared for an emergency landing. The pilot reported that on the final approach to the airstrip he realized that the aircraft was too high and its airspeed was too fast. The aircraft touched down about mid way along the runway and overran the end of the runway by about 200 metres. The aircraft impacted a mound of dirt, coming to rest upside down. The pilot, who was the only occupant sustained minor injuries. Examination of the aircraft by a third party and inspection of the photographs taken of the accident site, revealed that the engine, left main gear and nose gear had separated from the airframe during the accident sequence. There was a significant amount of oil present on the underside of the aircraft, indicating that the oil had leaked from the engine during operation. The
engine was removed from the accident site as an assembly by a third party. The propeller was removed and the engine was shipped to an engine overhaul facility where a disassembly and
examination was conducted under the supervision of the ATSB.

The crew was completing a positioning flight to Talil AFB (Imam Ali), Iraq. On approach, the aircraft was too high and descended with an excessive speed and a tailwind component of 10 knots. The crew failed to initiate a go-around and the aircraft landed about two-third down the runway. Unable to stop within the remaining distance, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage and came to rest in a sandy area about 60 metres past the runway end. Both pilots escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair and later destroyed by soldiers from the 68th Transportation Company.

The four engine aircraft departed Mirny on a positioning flight to Chita with an intermediate stop in Irkutsk, carrying four passengers and a crew of seven on behalf of the Russian Ministry of the Interior. Shortly after takeoff by night, the aircraft rolled to the right to an angle of 90° then crashed at a speed of 364 km/h some 1,893 metres past the runway end. The aircraft was totally destroyed and all 11 occupants were killed. The accident occurred 59 seconds after takeoff.

Following an uneventful flight from Campo de Marte, the crew initiated the approach to runway 10 which is 961 metres long. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure but the aircraft skidded on runway and cartwheeled. It overran, lost its both main gears and came to rest six metres further. Both pilots escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

En route from Reggio de Calabre to Parma, the twin engine aircraft crashed in unknown circumstances in hilly terrain near Canevare, about 50 km south of Modena. Both occupants were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.

During the take-off roll, the cockpit crew of another airliner observed smoke pouring from the right engine of ZS-NRM. They were shocked, yet reluctant to tell the crew of ZS-NRM to abort the take-off as they felt that they might be blamed had the abort gone wrong. Instead, the witnessing pilots enquired from the tower whether the aircraft was aware of the smoke. By the time the ATC responded, the aircraft was already in the air, but with its landing gear not yet retracted. Another aircraft lining up at the holding point informed ZS-NRM that their undercarriage was still extended, and the captain of ZS-NRM then transmitted (instead of using the intercom) an instruction to his co-pilot to raise the gear. During this transmission, the sound of what was possibly a warning sound could be heard in the background. The aircraft became airborne and climbed to approximately 500 ft above mean sea level before losing altitude and making a forced landing on a small field in the Merebank residential area, about 1,4 km from the end of the runway. During the forced landing, a member of the public was struck by the wing of the aircraft and the three crew members were seriously injured in the accident. The captain subsequently died from his injuries.

The airplane just had undergone a routine maintenance and this was planned to be the first flight after the inspection. During the initial climb, the pilot observed that the airplane was drifting to the left. The pilot attempted to counteract the drift by application of right aileron and right rudder, but the airplane continued to the left. The pilot reported that, despite having both hands on the control yoke, he could not maintain directional control and the airplane collided into a building. The airplane subsequently came to rest on railroad tracks adjacent to the airport perimeter. A post accident examination revealed that the elevator trim wheel was located in the 9-degree NOSE UP position; normal takeoff range setting is between 2 and 3 degrees NOSE UP. The rudder trim control knob was found in the full left position and the right propeller lever was found about one-half inch forward of the FEATHER position; these control inputs both resulted in the airplane yawing to the left. The pilot did not adequately follow the airplane manufacturer's checklist during the preflight, taxi, and before takeoff, which resulted in the airplane not being configured correctly for takeoff. This incorrect configuration led to the loss of directional control immediately after rotation. A post accident examination of the airframe, engines, and propellers revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.