Ferry

The aircraft departed Budapest-Ferihegy Airport at 0829LT on a VFR flight to Tunis. According to the flight plan the aircraft would fly over Split, Pescara, crossing the Apennines towards Ostia and then onwards to Tunis. Weather conditions over the central part of Italy were poor with a cold front associated with thunderstorm activity, low clouds and icing conditions. After passing over the Adriatic sea, the aircraft overflew Pescara at 1320LT where the pilot informed ATC that the aircraft was inbound Aneda (a reporting point 19 NM East of Monte Rotondo) at a cruising altitude of 5.500 feet. While in vicinity of Pescara, ATC requested and obtained confirmation from the crew that he was able to continue under VFR mode. Shortly later, at a speed of 115 knots, the single engine aircraft struck the slope of Mt Rotondo (1.880 metres high) located near Rocca di Mezzo. The aircraft disintegrated on impact and all three occupants were killed.

At 19:43:49 UTC the crew of EAB 220 called clearance delivery (CLD) for the first time and asked if their flight plan to Bern-Belp was available. The answer was in the affirmative and the CLD air traffic controller informed the crew that they would need authorisation for the landing in Bern-Belp. Once it had been clarified that this authorisation had been obtained, EAB 220 called back a little later. CLD informed the pilots that their departure was planned from runway 34. However, they would have to expect a delay at that time, as arrivals and departures were being handled in batches. EAB 220 was scheduled in the next batch for take-off. CLD intimated to the crew an approximate departure time of 20:30 UTC. When the crew called back at 20:13:49 UTC to ask for any news, CLD informed them that departure would now take place in about 45 minutes. Since visual conditions were deteriorating due to the thickening fog, air traffic control had to increase the separation between arriving aircraft. As a result, flight EAB 220’s estimated departure time was delayed to about 21:00 UTC. At 20:24:38 UTC CLD transmitted to the crew a departure clearance. Flight EAB 220 was assigned the standard instrument departure (SID) “WILLISAU 3N” and transponder code 1403. In addition, a departure time of 21:07 UTC was estimated. The CEO of Eagle Air Ltd. had applied in Bern-Belp for a special authorisation for a late landing after 21:00 UTC and obtained a slot until 21:30 UTC at the latest. Since the departure of HB-VLV in Zurich was being further and further delayed, the crew found themselves under increasing time pressure. The crew were in contact with the CEO several times; at the time, the latter was performing the function of the dispatcher. In order to ensure the arrival of HB-VLV in Bern-Belp by 21:30 UTC at the latest, he also telephoned the duty manager in Zurich control tower and urged him several times for an earlier departure time. After a frequency change to apron control, the apron controller cleared EAB 220 to start its engines at 20:43:50 UTC. Approximately at the same time, an airport manager observed that HB-VLV’s right-hand engine was running, although only one pilot was present in the cockpit. He was sitting in the right-hand seat. The other crew member, probably the commander, was using a scraper to remove ice deposits from the left wing. The eye witness later observed how this crew member occupied the left-hand position in the cockpit, shortly before taxiing. Since the pilots were eager to leave their stand in the General Aviation Centre (GAC) Sector 1 as quickly as possible, they were cleared to taxi as far as the holding point for runway 28 just 2 minutes later. There they had to wait for a taxiing Saab 2000 to pass in the opposite direction. EAB 220 was then instructed by the apron controller to continue taxiing to the holding point for runway 34 via taxiways ALPHA, INNER and ECHO. One minute after taxi clearance had been given, the crew of EAB 220 again asked for the wording of this clearance: “Swiss Eagle 220, sorry for that, can you say the clearance again?” It must remain open whether HB-VLV had missed the intersection in the direction of the INNER taxiway. It is clear, however, that the apron controller had to intervene shortly afterwards with a correction: “220, continue on taxiway INNER, INNER, and then ECHO to Holding Point 34, Echo 9”. At 20:56:50 UTC flight EAB 220 made contact with Aerodrome Control (ADC) and stated that the aircraft was on Echo 9 just before the start of runway 34. The air traffic controller (ATCO) requested the crew to wait short of runway 34, since approaches were still taking place in the opposite direction on runway 16. At 21:04:51 UTC ADC cleared the aircraft to line up on runway 34. The crew taxied onto runway 34 and – after they had received take-off clearance at 21:05:54 UTC – initiated a rolling take-off by setting take-off power. At this time, meteorological visibility was 100 m with partial fog. Since the left-hand engine was run up within six seconds to 102 percent of take-off power and the right-hand engine to 58 percent, for a few seconds during the acceleration phase the aircraft veered on the runway to such an extent that it’s heading changed 10 degrees to the right. The crew were only able to bring the aircraft back into alignment with the runway by making a major nose-wheel control correction and by distinctly reducing the thrust of the left-hand engine. Afterwards the two engines were brought synchronously to take-off power and the take-off continued. Flight EAB 220 lifted off from runway 34 at 21:06:40 UTC. Shortly after take-off, the commander of EAB 220 acknowledged the request to change frequency to departure control. At about the same time various members of the airport fire-fighting services, who were inside and in front of the fire-fighting unit satellite “North” between runways 34 and 32, heard noises and saw visual indications of a low-flying aircraft. Immediately afterwards the noise of a crash and the flash of a fire were noted. At 21:07 UTC the aircraft impacted onto the frozen ground 400 m to the south-east of the end of runway 34 and skidded in a northerly direction, leaving a trail of debris. The main body of the wreck finally came to rest 500 m beyond the site of initial impact on runway 14/32. The rescue services reached the burning wreck after a few minutes. DFDR data revealed that the autopilot was disengaged during the whole flight.

Following an uneventful ferry flight from Braunschweig, the crew was cleared to land on runway 27 at Bremen-Neuenland Airport. After touchdown, the crew started the braking procedure and activated the reverse thrust systems on both engines. At a speed of 60 knots, the aircraft deviated to the right so the captain applied left rudder. The aircraft turn 15° to the left so the captain applied right rudder when the aircraft turned 135° to the right. This turn was so abrupt that it caused the left main gear to collapse. The aircraft rolled for about 1,150 metres before coming to rest. All three crew members evacuated uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

At 1623:41, the pilot requested taxi clearance. The Green Bay (GRB) tower (ATCT) told the pilot to taxi to runway 18. At 1626:47 the pilot said that he was ready for takeoff. The ATCT local controller (LC) told the pilot, "proceed on course, cleared for takeoff". At 1627:33, radar showed the airplane began to accelerate down runway 18. At 1628:17 the LC told the pilot to contact departure control. The pilot responded, "ah papa charlie we have a little problem here we're going to have to come back." The LC asked the pilot, "what approach would you like?" The pilot responded, "like to keep the vis." At 1628:35, the LC asked the pilot, "like the contact approach that what you're saying?" There was no response from the pilot. At 1628:50, GRB radar showed the airplane on a heading of 091 degrees, at an altitude of 855 feet msl (160 feet agl), and at an airspeed of 206 knots. The airplane was 1.28 miles southeast of the airport radar. Radar contact with the airplane was lost at 1628:55. A witness to the accident said, "It was snowing moderately at that time. The road was wet but not slippery. Crossing the intersection of Morning Glory Rd. & Main St., I noted a white private jet flying from the south. It was flying at approximately a 75-80 degree angle perpendicular to the ground with its left wing down & teetering slightly." The witness said, "It then crossed Main Street with the lower wing tip approximately 20 to 30 feet above the power wires. The plane became more perpendicular to the ground at a 90 degree angle with the left wing down & (and) lost altitude crashing into the Morning Glory Dairy warehouse building." An examination of the airplane revealed no anomalies. At 1638, GRB weather was reported as ceilings of 200 feet broken, 800 feet overcast, visibility 1/2 statute mile with snow and fog, temperature 32 degrees F, dew point 32 degrees F, winds 120 degrees at 3 knots, and an altimeter setting of 29.99 inches Hg. Witnesses at the FBO said the pilot arrived to pick up the airplane after 1600. The pilot was briefed by the mechanic as he did his walk around inspection of the airplane. The pilot then
got into the airplane. The airplane was towed out and the tow bar removed. About two minutes later, the engines started. Less than five minutes after the engines started, the airplane taxied. The NTSB Audio Laboratory reviewed radio communications between ATCT and the pilot to determine from the speech evidence the pilot's level of psychological stress and workload. The examination indicated the pilot's speech characteristics were consistent with an increased stress/workload that might accompany a developing emergency. Referring to the pilot's final transmissions, "His unusually long reaction time suggests that he was distracted by competing cockpit priorities and/or was having a difficult time determining his answer, while his fast speech and microphone keying provide further evidence of an urgency to return to other cockpit activities." The report states that the pilot's statements remained rational and showed good word choice and grammar. "These factors, along with the relatively small change in fundamental frequency, suggest that the pilot did not reach an extreme level of stress."

During an inspection of the right engine a technician found chips in the oil filter. The damage should have been repaired within the next 20 flight hours. Since the maintenance organization in Switzerland, who usually carry out necessary repairs, did not have the spare parts available on time, the task was assigned to an organization in Nuernberg. On 07.02.2001, the airplane was ferried to Nuernberg and repaired in the presence of the chief technician of the operator. The repairs and the replacement of the parts exclusively on the right engine were certified properly. The return flight to Rome was planned for the 8th of February 2001 at about 1530 o’clock. A charter flight from Rome was to be carried out on the following day. Two pilots and the chief technician of the operator were aboard the aircraft. The flight preparation was carried out by phone from the repair facility. A weather briefing and the NOTAM´s for the flight were obtained properly. The check lists for the take-off were read. During the preparation the unbalanced fuel distribution between the right and left-hand tanks, and the fact that the total amount yet was equal on both sides was discussed. Immediately afterwards the second pilot noticed the failure of his gyro instruments. The airplane was taxied via the taxiways "Juliet" and "Foxtrot" to runway 10. Pilot at the controls was the pilot in command while the second pilot carried out the radio communications with the air traffic control. The pilots received the clearance for a departure via the departure route Noerdlingen (NDG 1 M) to Rome. The take-off was at 1531 o'clock. After 5 nautical miles the airplane turned to the south, following the departure route. At 15:33:49 o'clock the left-hand engine failed without a previous warning. The noise of a down running engine was also heard by several witnesses on the ground. Smoke or a fire was not seen by them. The second pilot reported an emergency with the left-hand engine shortly after the occurrence to the control tower and informed them that they wanted to return for a landing on the runway 10. At that time there were visual meteorological conditions, and the runway was continuously to be seen. Since the departure control Nuernber APP wished to coordinate the flight, the frequency was changed for a short time upon request. After the second pilot had declared the emergency once again they switched back to the tower again and continued the approach to runway 10. Up to the final approach the flight was without particular occurrences. The flaps were first set to 8° and later on to 20°, afterwards the landing gear was extended. At this time the airplane was somewhat north of the extended centerline slightly above the glide path for an instrument approach. Approximately one kilometer in front of the runway, when flying over the main road no. 4 near the small town of Buch, the airplane was observed by different witnesses as it made unusual flight maneuvers. The airplane deviated then from the landing direction to the north, and made some reeling movements. Afterwards it seemed for a short
period that the pilot intended to turn right to reach the runway. Immediately afterwards and near the ground the airplane abruptly stalled to the left approximately maintaining its height, then assuming a bank angle of more than 90°, and crashed nearly upside down at 1540 o’clock into a forest north of the runway. The airport fire service, who were in a standby position due to the announced safety landing of the Learjet reached the accident site approximately 4 minutes later and started to extinguish the fire. All three occupants had lost their lives during the impact. The airplane was destroyed.

The pilot had submitted a flight plan nominating a charter category, single pilot, Instrument Flight Rules flight, from Darwin to Port Keats and return. The Piper Aerostar 600A aircraft, with 6 Passengers on board, departed Darwin at 2014 Central Standard Time and arrived at Port Keats at 2106 hours after an uneventful flight. The passengers disembarked at Port Keats and the pilot prepared to return to Darwin alone. At 2119 hours the pilot reported taxying for runway 34 to Brisbane Flight Service. That was the last radio contact with the aircraft. Witnesses noted nothing unusual as the aircraft taxied and then took off from runway 34. As a departure report was not received, a distress phase was declared and subsequently a search was instigated. The following morning a number of major structural components of the aircraft, including the outer left wing, were located at a position 24 km north-east of Port Keats aerodrome and close to the aircraft's flight planned track. The main portion of wreckage was found four days later, destroyed by ground impact. The impact crater was located a considerable distance from the previously located structural components and indicated that an inflight breakup had occurred. The accident was not survivable.

On 25 and 26 May 2000 aircraft HB-LTC was used for a commercial flight from Zurich to Béziers (F) and back. To this end, the pilot made a positioning flight from Geneva to Zurich on 24 May 2000. The reconstruction of the following events is based on recorded radio conversations and witness statements. On 25 May 2000 at approx. 07:20 hrs, the pilot placed a telephone order with the refuelling service of Jet Aviation Zurich AG. According to statements from aircraft refuelling attendant A concerned, the pilot asked for the aircraft to be fully refuelled with aviation gasoline (AVGAS) for a flight to France. When aircraft refuelling attendant A arrived at the aircraft, the pilot was present. The refuelling attendant saw the winglets on the HB-LTC and asked the pilot whether the machine had been modified and therefore needed jet kerosene. Before the pilot could even answer, the refuelling attendant realised, from the square engine housings, that the machine was equipped with reciprocating engines. The pilot confirmed that HB-LTC had been modified but pointed out that this modification involved only the airframe and that the aircraft had not been converted to turboprop operation. Refuelling attendant A then filled the HB-LTC’s four fuel tanks with 372 l of AVGAS 100LL (low lead). The aircraft was therefore fully refuelled and at that time had 726 l of fuel. Refuelling attendant A later reported that he had not noticed markings which described the types of fuel permitted for this aircraft, either on the wing or on the tank seals. During the refuelling operation, which ended at approx. 07:30 hrs, the pilot was in the cockpit. Nobody observed him draining the tanks after refuelling. The seven passengers for the flight to Béziers (F) arrived on 25 May 2000 at about eight o’clock in the morning at the General Aviation Centre (GAC) at Zurich airport. At 08:18:42 hrs the pilot received start-up clearance from Zurich Apron (ZRH APR) and at 08:26:25 hrs indicated that he was ready to taxi. Taxi clearance was granted without delay and the aircraft taxied to the holding point of runway 28. Several passengers later stated that the pilot carried out a run up of the engines while the following time of waiting. At 08:32:01 hrs HB-LTC indicated to aerodrome control (Zurich Tower – ZRH TWR) that it was ready to take off. The aircraft was queued in the traffic and was cleared for take-off at 08:45:27 hrs. The aircraft landed in Béziers (F) some two hours later. On 26 May 2000 between 15:35 and 15:45 hrs HB-LTC was refuelled in Béziers with 107 l of AVGAS 100LL. The aircraft then flew with the same passengers from Béziers (F) back to Zurich, where it landed at 19:10 hrs. Before the flight back to Geneva, the pilot obviously decided to refuel. According to the statements of aircraft refuelling attendant B at approx. 19:45 hrs the pilot ordered “Kraftstoff JET-A1” by telephone. Unlike the telephone conversations of air traffic control at Zurich airport, incoming and outgoing telephone calls made to and from the refuelling service of Jet Aviation Zurich AG were not recorded. The precise wording of the pilot’s fuel order cannot therefore be established with certainty. Aircraft refuelling attendant B then forwarded the order by radio to his colleague, aircraft refuelling attendant C. A third aircraft refuelling attendant D heard on his radio how aircraft refuelling attendant B gave the instruction to aircraft refuelling attendant C to refuel aircraft HB-LTC with JET A-1 fuel. Then aircraft refuelling attendant C drove tanker FL 7 to HB-LTC, which was parked in GAC Sector 1. According to his statements, he positioned the tanker with its right-hand side in front of the aircraft so that he could reach the filler caps on both wings using the hose affixed to that side of the tanker. Then aircraft refuelling attendant C, still next to the tanker, began to complete the delivery note, while the pilot came up to him and indicated the desired quantity of fuel in English. The pilot gave him a credit card and aircraft refuelling attendant C then explained to him that after refuelling he would have to complete the transaction in the office. The pilot remarked that he had a slot. Aircraft refuelling attendant C later stated that this gave him to understand that the pilot did not have much time. The aircraft refuelling attendant replied to the pilot that he would only need an additional two or three minutes. Because it had started to rain shortly before refuelling, the pilot evidently withdrew into the aircraft after his conversation with aircraft refuelling attendant C. According to his partner, the pilot conducted a brief conversation with her from his mobile telephone during this phase. As the investigation showed, this telephone call took place between 19:50:06 and 19:51:28 hrs. In the meantime, aircraft refuelling attendant C had connected HB-LTC to the tanker and then pumped 50 l of JET A-1 fuel into each of the two inboard main cells. The aircraft refuelling attendant later stated that he had not noticed markings or labels which described the permitted types of fuel for this aircraft, either on the tank seals or in the vicinity of the tank openings. He then drove the tanker to the office, debited the credit card and returned it with the receipt and the delivery note to the aircraft. He presented the debit slip and the delivery note to the pilot for signature. In the process the aircraft refuelling attendant asked the pilot what aircraft type HB-LTC was. The pilot answered that his aircraft was a modified PA31. The aircraft refuelling attendant then entered “PA31” on the delivery note and then gave the pilot the carbon copy. At 20:08:44 hrs the pilot made radio contact with Zurich Clearance Delivery (ZRH CLD) air traffic control and received departure clearance with the instruction to change to the ZRH APR frequency for start-up clearance. The apron gave HB-LTC start-up clearance at 20:10:00 hrs. Three minutes and 50 seconds later the pilot requested taxi clearance and was then instructed to taxi to the holding point of runway 28. After the transfer to ZRH TWR at 20:15:02 hrs the pilot stated he was ready for take off at 20:17:30 hrs. A short time after this he was able to line up runway 28 and at 20:20:58 hrs ZRH TWR gave him take-off clearance. According to witness statements, HB-LTC took off normally and went into a climb. In the region of runway intersection 28/16 and at an altitude of approx. 50 m AGL the aircraft stopped climbing, maintained level flight briefly and began to descend slightly. At the same time, HB-LTC began to make a gentle right turn and overflew the woods to the north of runway 28. Because of this unusual flight pattern, the duty aerodrome controller (ADC) at 20:22:08 hrs asked the pilot whether everything was normal: “Tango Charlie, normal operations?” The pilot replied in the negative: “(Ne)gative, Hotel Tango Charlie!” In this phase, the aircraft began to make a left turn with a high bank angle and witnesses observed that the landing gear was lowered. At 20:22:21 hrs the pilot radioed that he was in an emergency situation: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, Hotel Tango Charlie”. During the first 90° of the turn, HB-LTC descended only slightly. After crossing the extended centerline of runway 28 the aircraft increasingly lost height in the tight left turn. When the aircraft had almost completed the full turn, its bank attitude began to reduce. At a height of approx. 10 m AGL HB-LTC collided with the trees in a copse. The aircraft passed through the copse and came to rest upside down in the “Glatt” river. The pilot was fatally injured on impact. Coordinates of the final position of the wreck: 682 700/256 700, elevation 420 m AMSL corresponding to 1378 ft AMSL.

On a ferry flight from Kiev to Tehran, while in cruising altitude over the Black Sea, the crew reported an unexpected situation and requested a clearance to divert to Ankara Airport. Shortly later, the twin engine aircraft went out of control and crashed in the sea about 50 km off Inebolu. Few debris were found floating on water but the wreckage was not found. All six occupants were killed.

With an auxiliary fuel tank system installed, the pilot filled the tanks and departed. A few minutes later, he noticed fuel on the floor of the cabin, and tried to reach an airport. However, the fuel fumes were so strong he elected to land in an open field. After touchdown, the airplane passed through a ditch the pilot had not observed from the air. The nose landing gear collapsed and the airplane nosed over. An airborne witness reported the pilot exited the airplane after about 5 minutes, and about 5 minutes later, the airplane caught fire and burned. The post crash fire consumed the cabin. In an interview, the pilot reported that he had not initiated use of the auxiliary fuel tank system when the accident occurred. He also reported he could not see where the fuel was coming from. The investigation revealed the tank installation did not match the FAA Form 337, the instructions for use of the ferry tank system were inadequate, and the pilot had reported that the auxiliary fuel pumps were secured to a board which was not secured to the airplane.

Following an uneventful cargo flight to Pescara, the crew was returning to UK. Few minutes after takeoff from Pescara Airport, the crew encountered poor weather conditions. Control was lost and the aircraft crashed, killing both occupants.