United States of America

The pilot was operating his aircraft under the rules of 14 cfr 135, i.e., a scheduled domestic cargo flight. He made a normal departure and climb en route to Salt Lake City, UT. Normal communications and radar flight following was established with Denver ARTCC. Approximately 8 miles west of fort collins, the aircraft suddenly disappeared off of radar and voice contact with the pilot was lost.

Fisherman heard an aircraft overhead but did not see any sign of it in the night sky. Shortly thereafter they saw a flash and fire on the side of a mountain, then they heard the explosion. The sheriff was called and an investigation revealed a crashed aircraft. There were no signs of occupants in or near the aircraft. The next morning the body of a heavily armed man who had on a parachute and a deployed reserve parachute was found several miles away in a residential area. A key to the crashed aircraft was found on the body.

While engaged in a mosquito control flight, the right engine failed. The crew attempted an emergency landing when the aircraft crash landed east of Naples. Both crew members escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair. Registration to be confirmed.

Midwest Express Airlines Flight 206, DC-9 N100ME arrived at Milwaukee (MKE) at 13:15 on September 6, 1985. It departed Milwaukee at 13:36 and arrived in Madison at 13:55 after an uneventful flight. At Madison, N100ME was designated as flight 105 to Atlanta (ATL), with an intermediate stop in Milwaukee. Flight 105 departed Madison at 14:25 and arrived at Milwaukee, on time and without incident, at 14:41. About 14:49, the first officer of flight 105 contacted Milwaukee Tower to request an instrument flight rule (IFR) clearance to Atlanta. The clearance was received. The Atlanta forecast included a 1,000-foot ceiling, visibility 2 miles, thunderstorms and rain showers. At 15:12, the Before Engine Start Checklist was read and accomplished in accordance with Midwest Express operating procedures. Engine start was commenced at 15:14 and the After Start Checklist was accomplished. The first officer requested clearance to taxi to runway 19R for departure. About 15:17:50, the Taxi Checklist was completed, and the engine pressure ratio (EPR) and airspeed reference bugs were set to 1.91 and 133 knots, respectively. Both indications were correct for the departure conditions applicable to flight 105. At the conclusion of the Taxi Checklist, the captain advised the first officer "Standard briefing ..." At 15:19:15, the first officer reported to the tower local controller, "Milwaukee, Midex 105, ready on 19R." Flight 105 was cleared to "position and hold" on runway 19R. The captain called for the Before Takeoff Checklist, which was completed in accordance with the COM. Flight 105 was cleared for takeoff at 15:20:28; the first officer acknowledged the clearance. The captain operated the flight controls, and the first officer handled radio communications and other copilot responsibilities during the takeoff. The Midwest Express DC-9 Flight Operations Manual required the use of standard noise abatement takeoff procedures during all line operations, unless precluded by safety considerations or special noise abatement procedures. At the time flight 105 departed, noise abatement procedures were in effect. Midwest Express also utilized "reduced thrust" takeoff procedures (at the captain's discretion) to extend engine life. The flightcrew was complying with the reduced thrust and standard noise abatement takeoff procedures. The takeoff roll and liftoff were normal, with liftoff occurring near the intersection of the midfield taxiway and runway 19R, about 4,200 feet from the start of the takeoff roll. Rotation to the takeoff attitude occurred at 140 knots. The DC-9 accelerated to 168 knots with a rate of climb of about 3,000 feet/minute, indicating a normal two-engine initial takeoff flightpath. At 15:21:26 N100ME was about 7,600 feet down the runway, reaching a height of 450 feet above the ground. At that moment there was a loud noise and a noticeable decrease in engine sound. The captain then remarked "What the # was that?" The first officer did not respond. At 15:21:29, the local controller transmitted, "Midex 105, turn left heading 175." At the time of his transmission he observed smoke and flame emanating from the right airplane engine. The captain asked the first officer, "What do we got here, Bill?" The first officer did not respond to the captain but advised the local controller, "Midex 105, roger, we've got an emergency here." Two seconds later, the captain said, "Here"; again there was no response. Neither pilot made the call outs for "Max Power" or "Ignition Override-Check Fuel System," which were part of the Midwest Express "Engine Failure after V1" emergency procedure. Meanwhile the airplane began to deviate substantially to the right and the heading changed from 194 degrees to 260 degrees in eight seconds. The vertical acceleration dropped sharply to about 0.3 G and increased to a value of 1.8 G. At that point the airplane stalled. This accelerated stall occurred at a KIAS of about 156 kts.

The aircraft collided with trees during a forced landing following a loss of power. The student pilot stated the flight was normal until a 'violent right yaw' developed when the throttles were advanced to recover from a practice stall. As the cfi took over the controls and attempted recovery a 'substantial loss of power' occurred on both engines. A forced landing was made in a field during which the left wing contacted trees and the aircraft was engulfed in flames. Post accident examination of the left engine failed to disclose any discrepancies. Discrepancies were noted on the right engine.
1) The fuel controller fuel line 'tee' fitting was cracked around 50% of its circumference. (ductile overload).
2) The turbocharger gasket on the inlet side of the turbine showed leakage around 70% of the gasket are. The aircraft had a history of symptoms of fuel vaporization which subsided with use of the aux fuel pump as the engine manufacturer suggests. It is unknown if the aux pump was used during this accident.

Aircraft was on training flight for initial copilot qualification for commuter air carrier. Instructor and two trainees were on board. The aircraft departed Charlotte at about 2314 edt for the Hickory area for training. At about 0015 edt, it was reported that the crew visited the Hickory FSS. After departing Hickory, the aircraft climbed to 5,500 feet and remained generally between Charlotte. At about 0145 edt, radar data showed the aircraft to be in a steep descent and gaining speed. The aircraft collided with tree limbs, a utility pole and the ground in about 35° angle of descent in a residential area of Conover, NC. Investigation revealed a nose up trim, which was approximately 75% of the available up-trim (3.38° upnose). This is an abnormal setting; so the entire trim unit was retained and sent to the Talley Corp for detailed exam. The ram end fittings were sent to ga tech research for surface fracture analysis. The exam showed ductile overstress and no indication of pre-cracked condition. Pitch trim emergencies are a part of sunbirds c-99 training program (fit 1 & 2). All three occupants were killed.

The crew was dispatched at Beale AFB to follow a training program. Following several touch-and-go maneuvers, the crew started a new approach when the aircraft became unstable on final. The instructor allowed the pilot-in-command to continue the approach when the engine n°1 struck the runway surface, caught fire and exploded. Out of control, the airplane banked left and crashed, bursting into flames. All seven crew members were killed.

Flight 1808 took off from Boston runway 04L at 21:30 for a flight to Auburn. Clearance was received of 7000 feet and to contact Portland Approach Control. Portland Approach cleared Flight 1808 at 21:58 for a runway 04 ILS approach. Three minutes later the controller noticed that Flight 1808 was east of course and asked if the it was receiving the Lewiston localizer. The captain replied that they hadn't and were given instructions to turn left heading 340. A left turn to 354° started and the aircraft passed Lewie Outer Marker (LOM) at 165 knots, 2,600 feet (30 knots too fast and 600 feet too high). At 22:02 the aircraft exited the left side of the localizer, still at a 354° heading. The crew then tried to capture the glide slope and enter the localizer again until it entered the left side of the localizer (22:04:08) and descended through the bottom boundary of the glide slope. At ca 22:04:16 the aircraft struck trees 4,007 feet short of the runway and 440 feet right of the extended centreline, continued 737 feet and struck level ground in nearly an inverted attitude. One of the passengers killed in the crash was American schoolgirl, peace activist and child actress Samantha Smith. She was returning to Auburn with her father after taking part to a TV movie in Boston.

The pilot had recently purchased the aircraft and received 25 hours dual instruction to comply with his insurance requirements. Shortly thereafter he went out solo to practice steep turns. He climbed to 12,500 feet and leveled off. He then rolled into a 60° left bank at 200 knots airspeed by applying left aileron and back pressure. He then applied moderate left rudder. At this time the nose came up, the right wing came over the top, the nose tucked down and the aircraft entered a steep nose down spin. In his attempt to stop the spin the pilot shut down both engines. He got the spin stopped after 15 to 20 turns. He started pulling the nose up and the stall buffet was felt. Alt was 500 feet agl at this time and he was unable to restart the engines. He then made a gear up landing in a pasture which resulted in destruction of the aircraft. The pilot was uninjured.

Aircraft hit northwest side of ridge in level attitude, cruise speed, heading southeast. Conditions were dark night and the cloud ceiling was about 40 feet above the ridge. Pilot received weather brief before take off and en route which reported a ceiling of 10,000 feet at destination. Aircraft was flown at 17,500 feet en route. Pilot-in-command radioed GSP approach control, said he was VFR for landing, passing 6,000 feet. Two way communication not established but discrete tx code assigned. Controller saw tx code change northwest of crash site then radar target disappeared at accident site. All five occupants were killed.