United States of America

As the pilot and 16 jumpers departed on a skydiving flight, the engine lost power at approximately 300 feet agl. The aircraft then banked steeply left, spiraled in a steep nose down attitude and crashed. An exam revealed fuel in the tanks was contaminated with water and foreign material with the appearance of brown algae. Milky fluid (approximately 65% jet fuel and 34% water) was found in the engine fuel control, as well as iron contaminants. Dark stringy material was found in the fuel filters. The aircraft had been refueled from 55 gallons drums which contained contaminated fuel. The drums were stored upright and rain water could leak thru the filler caps. N551CC had a history of fuel contamination which on occasions caused the fuel bypass indicator to display. Reportedly, the stall warning circuit breaker had been disengaged on other occasions, so as not to startle the jumpers; however, due to damage, its preimpact position could not be verified. Aircraft was estimated to be 370 lbs over its max weight limit and 1 foot forward of the cg limit. The nine pax seats had been removed to haul up to 18 jumpers. Pax seat belts were not used. Lack of FAA surveillance was noted. All 17 occupants were killed.

The aircraft collided with terrain in a mountain pass at an elevation of 3,600 feet msl. The pilot obtained a weather briefing at 1329 gmt on 9/26/85 at which time Merrill Pass was forecast to be closed by 1100 adt due to deteriorating weather. The last radio communication with the aircraft was at 1803 gmt when contact was made with McGrath FSS. At this time the pilot made a pilot report stating the weather at Merrill Pass was marginal; 2 miles visibility with snow and occasional moderate turbulence. The wreckage was located on 9/29/85 and indicated the aircraft contacted the terrain in a relatively level attitude with considerable airspeed. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft contacted the terrain with the left wing tip, cartwheeled and came to rest inverted during an ILS runway 12 approach at Huntington (HTS). Minimum approach visibility for the ILS is 3/4 of a mile. While en route the pilot was informed the HTS visibility was 1/8 of a mile. A missed approach was performed on the first ILS. During the missed approach climb the transponder code in the aircraft was changed to 7600. Radar data indicated that after the 2nd ILS approach, the aircraft made a climbing left turn. When approximately 2 miles southeast of the airport, at 2,100 feet, the aircraft made a sharp right turn. The radar target disappeared shortly thereafter. The aircraft contacted the terrain on a heading of 260° between runway 30 and the parallel taxiway. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

Pilot ditched aircraft in Atlantic Ocean after losing power in both engines. The three occupants escaped uninjured and were picked up by a nearby boat. The aircraft sank in approximately 800 feet of water about 5 minutes after ditching. Post accident inspection of operator records along with a statement from the previous pilot who flew the aircraft revealed that approximately 26 pounds of fuel remained on board the aircraft at the time of the accident. Cessna Aircraft Company representative stated that the cessna 402C aircraft has an unusable fuel capacity of 44.4 pounds in critical flight attitudes and that this figure is lower in more normal attitudes.

The Falcon 10 touched down long and fast on a wet runway, experienced hydroplaning and went off the end of the runway, struck a drainage ditch and collapsed the landing gear. The nose gear came back and bent the throttle quadrant bracket, pulled the fuel controls to 90% power. This pushed the aircraft on its belly another 1,000-1,600 feet until it came to a stop on a hillside. Both pilots were uninjured.

Henson Airlines flight 1517 was cleared for an instrument approach to the Shenandoah Valley Airport, Weyers Cave, Virginia, at 0959 on September 23, 1985, after a routine flight from Baltimore-Washington International Airport, Baltimore, Maryland. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed at Shenandoah Valley Airport. there were 12 passengers and 2 crew members aboard the scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under 14 CFR 135. Radar service was terminated at 1003. The crew of flight 1517 subsequently contacted the Henson station agent and Shenandoah unicom. The last recorded radar return was at 1011, at which time the airplane was east of the localizer course at 2,700 feet mean sea level and on a magnetic track of about 075°. At 1014 the pilot said, '..we're showing a little west of course...' and at 1015 he asked if he was east of course. At 1017, the controller suggested a missed approach if the airplane was not established on the localizer course. There was no response from the crew of flight 1517 whose last recorded transmission was at 1016. The wreckage of flight 1517 was located about 1842 approximately six miles east of the airport. Both crew members and all 12 passengers were fatally injured.

During arrival, the aircrew of a Gates Learjet 35A, N873LP, canceled their IFR clearance and contacted the Auburn unicom, then entered the traffic pattern to land on runway 18. The unicom operator reported that the Learjet crew had reported their position on each portion of the traffic pattern. At approximately the same time, the pilot of an unregistered, experimental, Challenger II was in the traffic pattern for runway 10. The two runways intersected at their approach ends. Just before landing, the two aircraft collided as they were crossing over the intersection and crashed on the airport. The challenger (a two place version of an ultralight vehicle) was not equipped with a radio and the unicom operator was unaware of its presence in the traffic pattern. The Learjet pilot stated that neither he nor his copilot had seen any other traffic at the airport. No indication was found that either crew had taken evasive action. An exam of the crash site revealed evidence that the collision had occurred approximately 50 feet above the intersection. A pilot on board the Learjet was killed while six other occupants were injured. The pilot of the Challenger II was also killed.

A distress message was received from the pilot stating he was 100 miles south of Grand Isle, LA, and had lost an engine and was unable to maintain altitude. A second message was received shortly afterwards stating that the aircraft was at 1,500 feet and the pilot was preparing to ditch the aircraft. No further contacts and no ELT signals were heard. The aircraft wreckage has not been located.

The pilot expected the weather to be below minimums but flew the approach anyway. He did not have a second pilot on board per company rules. The aircraft collided with trees about 3 miles from the approach end of runway 17. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

During an IFR arrival/descent, the pilot stated he 'had to feather one engine, I have an oil leak and I'm just trying to descend . . .' he then said he was descending thru 5,300 feet. As he continued the approach, he informed the controller he would be unable to go around since the hydraulic system was powered by the affected right engine. Subsequently, the pilot said he was at 1,500 feet and was having a hard time holding altitude. A witness heard and saw the aircraft in a level attitude at low altitude, then saw the aircraft dive toward the ground. It impacted in a steep descent just short of a long field and burned. The right propeller was feathered, but there was no evidence of oil starvation in either engine. The pilot's neighbor said he (the pilot) was aware of a hydraulic leak, but he was awaiting the annual inspection (due in September) to repair it. An exam revealed the flaps were partially extended, the landing gear control was in the 'up' position, and the gear was down. The flight manual stated that with a hydraulic failure downstream of the accumulator, the flap handle should be in 'neutral' to prevent gear and flap extension. The flap control could not be found. All six occupants were killed.