United States of America

Ten minutes prior to landing heavy rain fell on airport. Aircraft made normal touchdown, spoilers and lift dump activated. Pilot-in-command delayed brake application as usual and did not get thrust levers in idle. After aircraft passed mid-field taxiway pic reported brakes became ineffective. Aircraft hydroplaned on water-covered runway and overran departure end, down and embankment, and hit a ditch. Runway had an off center crown, grass was about two feet tall at runway edge, and a dam had formed from previously cut grass which prevented water drainage. Airport manager said he was not aware water would stand on runway.

Atr pilot departing airport under VMC experienced failure of the right engine shortly after lift-off. The aircraft yawed right followed by a steep right roll, contacting power lines with the right wing and subsequently impacted the ground. A post-crash fire destroyed the aircraft with the exception of both engines and a portion of the right wing panel. The engine failed due to lack of lubrication to the impeller shaft caused by blockage of oil jet due to fod. Oil line from scavenge sump to scavenge pump inlet had been replaced prior to accident. The aircraft had experienced maintenance problem (oil leak) approximately 2 weeks prior to accident. Source of fod is undetermined. Both occupants were killed.

A total loss of power was experienced on takeoff due to the fuel selector being in the off position. The pilot attempted to restart the engine during which time the aircraft entered a stall and collided with the terrain. According to passengers the pilot did not use a checklist nor where the passengers briefed before the flight. The wreckage was visible from the airport control tower but was not located until several hours after the accident by air search. Two passengers were seriously injured while a third passenger and the pilot were killed.

During arrival to pick up a medevac patient, the flight was cleared for an LDA-1 runway 08 approach via the Asort transition. Thus, the pilot should have continued southeast on J-541 toward the SSR vortac and intercepted the localizer (loc) at Asort; then track inbound on the loc (062°), using I-JDL frequency 109.9 MHz (frequency for loc and co-located DME). After Asort, minimum altitude was 6,500 feet to Dibol intersection, 5,100 feet to Lynns intersection and 3,400 feet to the faf at Barlo intersection. DME from I-JDL to the intersections was: 18.2, 13.5 and 8 miles. DME from SSR (south of loc track) to the intersections was 11.2, 12.7 and approximately 16 miles. Flight reported Asort inbound while descending thru approximately 9,500 feet. Last radio call was 30 seconds later while descending thru 8,200 feet, 14 miles west of Dibol. Approximately 4 miles west of Dibol, aircraft impacted mountain side at 3,500 feet msl. No preimpact mechanical malfunction was found. There was evidence that both nav's were tuned to 109.9 MHz, but DME control head was inadvertently left in 'hold' position (locking DME to SSR rather than I-JDLl) and crew began a premature descent. Juneau weather was in part: 600 feet scattered, 3,000 feet overcast, 7 miles visibility. Pilot-in-command was currently flying both Learjet and DHC-7. All four occupants, two pilots and two doctors, were killed.

During an ILS to runway 35, the approach was normal until the aircraft was approximately 100 feet above the decision height, except there was condensation on the windshield. Touchdown was hard. A witness said the aircraft landed approximately 1/3 of the way down the 5,200 feet runway. After landing, with the props in 'ground fine,' braking action was ineffective on the wet runway. The aircraft was not equipped with an anti-skid braking system. Subsequently, the aircraft continued off the runway and went down an embankment into a field. Scrub marks on the runway and reverted rubber on the tires indicated the aircraft was hydroplaning. According to the flight manual, 4,500 feet (plus a 10% factor for no anti-skid) would have been required to stop on a dry runway in the prevailing weather conditions, which included a slight tailwind. Two pax, acting as flight attendants (f/a's), assisted the other pax in evacuating. An investigation revealed the f/a's were not properly trained; the pax were not completely briefed before the flight; and the passenger briefing cards were inadequate. The aircraft was on a business flight to transport an entertainment troupe.

The pilot canceled his IFR flight plan and attempted to fly VFR at a relatively low altitude over mountainous terrain with low scattered clouds on a dark night. He reported a large lighted area as being downtown El Paso when in reality it was most likely Coronado Hills, a development on the west side of Franklin Mountain located approximately 4 miles north of the south end of the mountain. This was probably due to having just descended from IFR conditions into VFR conditions. His familiarity with the area, combined with his method of flight operation (as related by a professional acquaintance), probably gave a false sense of security and overconfidence in his personal ability. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was observed flying at low altitude along about a 5 mile distance. Some witnesses described the aircraft altitude as just above treetops. Witness heard engine sounds and saw lights on the aircraft. The aircraft flight was on a southeast direction before it collided with rising terrain at a height of about 1,250 feet. The wreckage was scattered along a distance of 375 feet and oriented on a 160° magnetic heading. The destination, Pittsburgh, is located southwest of the departure point, State College. Evidence of aircraft malfunction was not disclosed. The aircraft had 1,902 lbs of cargo including 65 lbs of dry ice which was contained in styrofoam boxes. Autopsy and toxicological findings were negative. The pilot flew nightly, from State College to Pittsburgh and returned the following morning. He operated a business during the day. Witnesses stated the pilot was well rested and in good spirits before the flight.

The aircraft was cleared for an NDB approach to Cadillac. The weather was 300 feet overcast, one mile visibility. Shortly after cancelling IFR the aircraft crashed on the opposite side of the airport from the approach end of the runway. The pilot activated runway lights were never turned on during the approach. It was a newly commissioned system not yet on approach plates. They were on a notam. An ntap revealed that the aircraft was following the rnav final approach course rather than the NDB final approach course. In addition, a lighted christmas tree farm was located adjacent to the airport. Lastly, no evidence of mechanical malfunction could be found in the wreckage. Both occupants were killed.

A student pilot in a Cessna 152, N5522L, had departed Redbird Airport at Dallas. He was practicing solo maneuvers in a privately designated practice area that overlapped the extended inbound course to runway 31L and 31R at Love Field. At the same time, a Cessna 441, N400BG, was being vectored for a back course ILS to rwy 31R. DFW approach control cleared N400BG to continue descending to 3,000 feet and fly heading 290°. While N400BG was descending thru approximately 3,600 feet, about 14 miles southeast of Love Field, the two aircraft collided. The Cessna 152 pilot was maneuvering at or near the edge of the practice area when the collision occurred. An investigation revealed the Cessna 152 had just completed an approximately 180° turn toward an easterly heading. Both aircraft were demolished in a quartering head-on collision. Radar info from both aircraft was displayed on the controller's scope. The Cessna 152 was depicted as a 1200 beacon code; however, it was not equipped with a mode C (altitude reporting) transponder. The controller did not provide a traffic advisory for the Cessna 441 pilot; but, in this situation, an advisory was not mandatory. All five pilot on both aircraft were killed.

Crashed in unknown circumstances in the desert somewhere in Arizona while engaged in an illegal flight. There were no casualties.