Boston

On November 15, 1961, at approximately 1710LT, 47 minutes after sunset, a ground collision occurred at Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, between a National Airlines DC-6B, N8228H, attempting a takeoff on runway 09 and a Northeast Airlines Viscount N6592C, during its landing roll on runway 04R. National Airlines Flight 429 originated at Boston. Its destination was Norfolk, Virginia, with five intermediate stops. Northeast Airlines Flight 120 originated at Washington, D. C. Its destination was Boston, Massachusetts, with an intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport, New York. There were no serious injuries to either the crew or passengers of the DC-6; however, four passengers of the Viscount received minor cuts and abrasions while deplaning. There was major damage to both aircraft. As a result of this accident the Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that consideration be given to requiring that all restrictive clearances or instructions issued by air traffic control be acknowledged by pilot repetition.

On November 15, 1961, at approximately 1710LT, 47 minutes after sunset, a ground collision occurred at Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts, between a National Airlines DC-6B, N8228H, attempting a takeoff on runway 09 and a Northeast Airlines Viscount N6592C, during its landing roll on runway 04R. National Airlines Flight 429 originated at Boston. Its destination was Norfolk, Virginia, with five intermediate stops. Northeast Airlines Flight 120 originated at Washington, D. C. Its destination was Boston, Massachusetts, with an intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport, New York. There were no serious injuries to either the crew or passengers of the DC-6; however, four passengers of the Viscount received minor cuts and abrasions while deplaning. There was major damage to both aircraft. As a result of this accident the Board recommended to the Federal Aviation Agency that consideration be given to requiring that all restrictive clearances or instructions issued by air traffic control be acknowledged by pilot repetition.

On October 4, 1960, at 1740 e.d.t., an Eastern Air Lines Lockheed Electra, N 5533, crashed into Winthrop Bay immediately following takeoff from runway 9 at Logan International Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. Ten of the 72 persons aboard survived the crash. The aircraft was totally destroyed. A few seconds after becoming airborne, the aircraft struck a flock of starlings. A number of these birds were ingested In engines Nos. 1, 2, and 4. Engine No. 1 was shut down and its propeller was feathered. Nos. 2 and 4 experienced a substantial momentary loss of power. This abrupt and intermittent loss and recovery of power resulted in the aircraft yawing to the left and decelerating to the stall speed. As speed decayed during the continued yaw and skidding left turn, the stall speed was reached; the left wing dropped, the nose pitched up, and the aircraft rolled left into a spin and fell almost vertically into the water. An altitude of less than 150 feet precluded recovery. The Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the unique and critical sequence of the loss and recovery of engine power following bird ingestion, resulting in loss of airspeed and control during takeoff.

The Electra scheduled as Flight 361 departed Boston at 0716LT with its destination St Louis, Missouri, and with a planned intermediate stop at LaGuardia Airport. About ten minutes prior to departure a crew change was made when a check pilot boarded the aircraft to flight-check the flight engineer. This check pilot, by mutual agreement with the crew and in accordance with existing company policy, took over the left or pilot-in-command seat with the previously assigned captain moving to the jump seat. The trip was routine until final approach at LaGuardia. On final approach, the airplane aircraft was too low and struck a dyke with its main landing gear and crash landed. Approximately half of the 76 persons on board suffered minor injuries or shock; no one was killed. The aircraft was severely damaged by impact forces and fire.

After an uneventful instrument flight involving no Air Route Traffic Control routing and control, Flight 451 reported at 1122 to the Idlewild Approach Control as being aver the Mitchell Radio Range Station at 7,000 feet. The flight was then cleared to enter the Scotland holding pattern (located approximately 13 nautical miles southwest of the airport) and was subsequently "laddered down" to the number one position to approach. Between 1147 and 1159 weather conditions deteriorated below the ceiling minimum of 400 feet for landing on runway 22, the runway then in use. The flight continued to hold. At 1159 reported weather conditions improved and I-LINE was cleared for an approach to runway 22 using the back course of the ILS (Instrument Landing System). At 1218 the flight reported it had discontinued this approach. It was then issued missed-approach instructions and returned to the Scotland holding pattern. Shortly thereafter weather conditions were again reported below minimums for runway 22. They were then reported as: Ceiling 300 feet, broken, 2,500 feet, overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 20 knots. While holding, the flight was asked by Approach Control if it would be able to make an approach to runway 4, the ILS runway, considering the tailwind component. The flight accepted runway 4 and was cleared at 1307 for an ILS approach. At 1313 the tower was advised by 451 that the approach had been missed. The flight was next offered, and it accepted, a GCA (Ground Controlled Approach). This approach was abandoned at 1324, a missed-approach procedure was followed, and the flight returned to Scotland. At 1327 the Italian Airlines Station Manager, in a message relayed by the tower, asked the flight its remaining fuel, and received the reply that there was three hours of holding fuel. The Station Manager then suggested that the flight hold for 1-1/2 hours and if unable to land to proceed to Washington, D. C. At 1329 the flight acknowledged this message. At 1349 the flight was again cleared for an ILS approach, the third approach to runway 4 and its fourth to the airport. At approximately 1400 the aircraft struck the left pier. The impact was accompanied by a violent explosion and followed by an intense fire. Tower personnel immediately sounded the crash alarm and initiated emergency procedures. At the time of the accident weather conditions were reported as: Ceiling 200 overcast; visibility 2-1/2 miles, light rain and fog; wind south-southeast 16 knots. Italian Airlines' minimums for ILS approaches to runway 4 are ceiling 200 feet and visibility 1/2 mile. The aircraft was destroyed and all 10 crew members and 16 passengers were killed, six others were injured.

At approximately 1845, N9201H departed LaGuardia Airport, New York, on a VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flight to Logan Airport, Boston, Massachusetts. The crew consisted of Captain John K. MacKenzie and Copilot Whitney H. Welch. The passengers were Robert W. Mudge, Raymond J. Halloran, both airline pilots, and Mathew C. Abbott, an electrical engineer. Climbing to an altitude of 3,500 feet m. s. l. (mean sea level), the flight proceeded toward Boston. Approximately 12 miles southeast of Hertford, Connecticut, the right engine became very rough and backfired frequently. The captain was unable to correct this condition and later feathered the right propeller when in the vicinity of Willimantic, Connecticut. A wide right turn was made from a northeasterly to a northwesterly heading toward Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut. Communication was established with Bradley Field and the flight was cleared for a straight-in approach to runway 33. The aircraft descended to 2,500 feet m. s. l. during the turn and thereafter continued descending on a northwest heading until it struck trees and crashed. Nearby residents quickly reached the scene, gave assistance and notified authorities. The Bradley Field 1930 weather was: Scattered clouds at 4,500 feet, visibility 15 miles plus, temperature 40 degrees, dewpoint 32, wind northwest 6 m. p. h. La Guardia weather at the time of departure was: Ceiling unlimited, visibility 15 miles plus. Conditions en route were clear with excellent visibility. The twin engine airplane was the property of Mr. John Fox.

Flight 801 originated at Boston, Massachusetts, for LaGuardia Field, nonstop, with a crew of Captain A. V. R. Marsh, First Officer Austin Officer Austin E. Briggs, and Stewardess Carolyn Mc Hull. It departed Boston at 0745, as schedules, in accordance with Instrument Flight Rules, via Airways Amber 7 and Red 3 to LaGuardia, Idlewild (New York International) Airport was the specified alternate. Upon departure from Boston the aircraft's gross weight was 38, 23 pounds, with a maximum allowable weight of 39,650 pounds, and the center of gravity was within prescribed limits. The flight proceeded uneventfully at its assigned altitude of 6,000 feet MSL in instrument weather with almost continuous rain. No actual icing occurred although the aircraft's de-icing equipment was used as a precaution because of the near freezing air temperatures. All required position reports were routine. At approximately 0845, the flight contacted LaGuardia approach control and advised, "Northeast 801 over New Canaan - cleared to New Rochelle." (The flight had been cleared to New Rochelle by ARTC.) Approach control then requested the flight to report over the Port Chester, New York, fan marker, and gave it an expected approach clearance time of an the hour (0900), Runway 22, and the 0828 LaGuardia weather, as follows: "estimated 3,000 overcast, one end one-half miles, rain and smoke, Wind southeast six, altimeter zero-zero-zero" (30.00). The light reported over Port Chester at 0849 and was successively cleared to descend to 4,500 foot, to 3,500 foot, and to 2,500 foot altitudes. At 0855 it was cleared to leave New Rochelle, inbound, and shortly was instructed to make a 360-degree turn to assure separation from a preceding aircraft. The flight acknowledged and complied. At 0858 it reported leaving New Rochelle and was cleared for an approach to Runway 22, and at 0859, was told that Ground Control Approach advisories were available on a frequency of 109.9 megacycles. The flight acknowledged, and then was given the 0900 LaGuardia weather, ceiling 1,700 feet and visibility 1 1/2 miles. Flight 801 reported leaving the LaGuardia range at 0900 and was cleared to land on Runway 22. There was no further message from the flight. At 0903 it struck the water of Flushing Bay some 3,600 feet from the approach end of Runway 22. A motorboat operated by the Edo Corporation, docked about one-half mile away, reached the site approximately four minutes later. Passengers and crew, who had climbed out through the emergency exits and who were standing on and holding to the fat sinking aircraft, were taken aboard and then transferred to a tugboat that arrived shortly. All occupants were taken ashore and hospitalized.

On November 1, 1949, Eastern's Flight 537 was flying from Boston via intermediate points to Washington. Over Beltsville, 15 miles northeast of the Washington National airport, it contacted the Washington Control Tower on 119 1 megacycles voice communications and was cleared by the tower to enter a left traffic pattern for landing on Runway 3 One minute before, at 11 37, the P-38 flown by Erick Rios Bridoux, a Bolivian national, had taken off from Runway 3 at Washington National Airport. Rios was test flying the P-38 for acceptance by the Bolivian Government Previously, he had notified the tower through Paul M. Aubin, that he intended to make the flight and that his communications with the tower would be accomplished over VHF radio, Channel B on 126 18 megacycles. Rios also stated that he requested Aubin to notify the tower to give him a light if radio contact could not be established. This message was not transmitted to the tower and Aubin denied hearing Rios make this last request. Throughout the entire ground operation of the P-38, including clearance for take-off, no difficulty was experienced by either the tower or Rios in communication. Departure of the P-38 was noted by the tower to be at 11 37, and from that time until after the accident, visibility in the vicinity of the airport remained at 15 miles, ceiling was 6,500 feet with scattered clouds at 3,500, and surface wind was from the northeast 20 to 25 miles per hour. Testimony of control tower personnel and that of the pilot of the P-38 were in conflict. Rios stated that he had taken off not from Runway 3, but from Runway 36, turning left at an altitude of about 300 feet. His climb was made, he said, to the north of the Pentagon, and because of the erratic operation of the right engine, he decided to land as soon as possible. Continuing to climb to about 2,500 feet or more, he made a second left turn so as to fly south, parallel to Runway 36, and when abeam of the control tower, he transmitted, "Washington Tower, this is Bolivian P-38 I got engine trouble--request landing instructions." His testimony continues to the effect that because no answer was received, he turned left again to circle the field where he could see light signals from the tower. He stated that he received none, but that when he was between Bolling Field and the National Airport and at about 3,500 feet altitude, the tower asked, "Bolivian P-38, you were asking landing instructions?" Rios stated that he answered, "Yes, I have engine trouble. I am in a hurry," and that the tower at that time responded, "Bolivian P-38 cleared to land number two on Runway 3" Rios stated that the tower did not inform him that the aircraft ahead of him was an Eastern DC-4 Rios said that he continued to turn left, and at a reduced speed of 150 miles per hour, started a descent of 500 to 600 feet per minute, completing a second 360-degree turn around the airport until reaching an altitude of approximately 2,400 feet. Rios said that a downwind leg was flown at about 1,500 feet, and when about five miles south of the field, he turned left 90 degrees, flying east on a short base leg at an altitude of about 1,200 feet. During his downwind leg, he observed a C-60 or C-45 on approach to Runway 3 or 36, and while on his base leg, he saw it complete its landing and turn off the runway to the left. Rios made a left turn from the base leg to an approach course of 20 degrees for landing on Runway 3. As soon as the turn had been completed, Rios transmitted, "Washington Tower, this is Bolivian P-38 on approach." The tower responded, said Rios, "Bolivian P-38 cleared to land on Runway 3." Rios stated that his approach was made a little higher than normal, for safety reasons, and that one minute after leaving the base leg, he extended the flaps, the landing gear having been put down previously when he was west of the field Rios heard the tower say, "Clear to the left, clear to the left," but he stated that he did not know for whom it was intended because the tower did not use any call sign. Almost immediately afterwards, he felt the shock of the collision with the DC-4. According to control tower personnel, the P-38 took off from Runway 3, turned left, and proceeded in a climb 10 miles west of the field. Then a second left turn was made, and the aircraft, still climbing, continued in a southerly direction. The P-38 was next observed from the control tower circling left, south of Alexandria at an estimated altitude between 3,000 and 4,000 feet. The tower operators stated that while the P-38 was circling south of Alexandria, they received, "Washington Tower, this is Bolivian 927 requesting landing instruction." After the controller had asked if Bolivian 927 had requested landing instructions, and the pilot had replied affirmatively, the controller instructed the P-38 to enter a left traffic pattern for Runway 3 and to report when west of the tower on downwind leg. When the instruction was not acknowledged by Rios, it was repeated. Prior to these instructions, the tower had cleared the Eastern flight to land number one on Runway 3. Shortly after the Eastern DC-4 was observed 1 1/2 miles west to southwest from the end of Runway 3, making a continuous left turn from the downwind leg to final approach, tower personnel observed the P-38 on a long high final approach. The controller thereupon requested Rios to make a 360-degree turn to his left, saying that he was number two to land following an Eastern DC-4 turning on its final approach below. Since there was neither acknowledgment nor compliance with this second instruction, another transmission was made to the P-38, which was identified as Bolivian 927, and Rios was then told. "Turn left, turn left," and was again told that the DC-4 was turning on final approach below. Again there was no response or compliance by the P-38, whereupon the tower then instructed the Eastern DC-4 to turn left. The DC-4 promptly acted in response to this instruction, but before 5 degrees of turn were made, the two aircraft collided at an approximate altitude of 300 feet about 1/2 mile southwest of Runway 3. While the Bolivian pilot survived, all 55 occupant on board the DC-4 were killed, among them George Bates and Michael Kennedy, two US politicians.

The trip from Boston was routine and at 2112 the flight contacted the Portland tower and received landing instructions as follows "Northeast 812 Able cleared to enter traffic pattern Runway 20. Wind east variable southeast 5. The altimeter 2998. Check on base leg." At 2116 the flight reported turning into final approach and was cleared to land on Runway 20. As the aircraft passed over the approach end of the runway, at an estimated altitude of 20 to 25 feet and an indicated airspeed of 120 mph, the throttles were brought back to what was expected to be the closed position, preparatory to landing. However, due to malfunctioning of the propeller reverse lock mechanism, the throttles were actually brought back beyond the closed position and into the propeller reverse pitch position instead. This unexpected reversal of propeller pitch in flight resulted in an extremely hard landing 237 feet past the approach end of the runway with serious damage to the aircraft structure. The airplane, however, continued along the runway a distance of 1,065 feet from the point of initial impact before it came to rest. Fuel which had been spilled along the runway was ignited by sparks from the damaged aircraft and propellers scraping along the runway surface. The fire became concentrated for a period on the right side adjacent to the right engine and right wing root, but subsequently enveloped the major portion of the aircraft. All passengers were evacuated in an orderly manner through the rear cabin exit door. The captain and first officer made their escape through the left cockpit window after all effective action possible had been taken to control the fire. The airport fire equipment arrived shortly thereafter but was unable to extinguish the fire before the aircraft had been damaged beyond economical repair. Five people were slightly injured while all other occupants were unhurt.

The flight departed from Miami, Fla., for Boston, Mass., at approximately 1610, January, 1949, with a crew consisting of Stuart L. Morrill, pilot, and Theodore Catz, copilot. A landing was made at Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Fla., where 6,255 pounds of flowers were loaded. With the flowers, 3,600 pounds of fuel, 254 pounds of oil, and the crew, the airplane weighed 26,944 pounds at time of takeoff, which was 44 pounds above the allowable of 26,900 pounds. All cargo was loaded so that the center of gravity of the airplane was within the certificated limits. Departure from West Palm Beach was accomplished at approximately 1900 after which the flight proceeded without incident to its first fueling stop, Raleigh-Durham, NC. While on the Raleigh-Durham Airport the airplane was fueled to its capacity of 700 gallons, which was 100 gallons more than was on board at West Palm Beach. As a result, the airplane weighed 27,544 pounds when taking off from Raleigh, which constituted an overload of 644 pounds. Because of unfavorable weather conditions, takeoff had been delayed until 0610, January 6, 1949. The flight then continued en route to Boston following an instrument flight plan. Forty-five minutes after departure from Raleigh, at 0655, a routine position report was received by Richmond Radio that the flight was over Richmond, Va., at 9,000 feet. Washington Radio attempted to contact the flight at 0707, but no further communication was received from the flight by any CAA communication station although continuous efforts were made for a period of approximately 50 minutes. The airplane was observed at approximately 0720 over Brandywine, MD, at considerable altitude immediately underneath a cloud deck, proceeding in normal level flight in a northerly direction. Then, to those on the ground, it appeared that the airplane turned left and spun for two complete turns, losing considerable altitude. Partial recovery was made, but the airplane began spinning for a second time to the left. Again it appeared that a partial recovery was made, but again the aircraft spun to the left, losing altitude to below 3,000 feet. After this, ground observers watched the aircraft fly level but erratically for a brief period. They were able to see that the right horizontal stabilizer was deflected upward to a near vertical position, and that the right elevator was missing. The airplane then entered a diving left turn, and crashed 1,500 yards southeast of the Brandywine radio range station. Fire started shortly after impact. Both crew members were killed.