Mitsubishi MU-2 Marquise

The aircraft was flown earlier in the day for a sales demonstration. On the return flight, when the landing gear were lowered, the pilot thought he heard a noise emitting from the gear, although cockpit indications were normal. The aircraft landed at Johnny Cake Airport and was refueled for a flight to Bradley Field where it is hangared. The pilot stated he intended to make the 22 miles flight with the gear down as a precaution. He also stated his intention to fly below the overcast because of delays of up to 45 minutes in obtaining IFR clearances. Moments after takeoff the aircraft collided with trees east of the airport. About one mile east of the airport is a north-south ridge. Another pilot, who departed 15-20 mins earlier, reported entering the overcast between 400 and 700 feet agl. Ground witnesses one mile southeast of the airport who heard the crash described the weather as heavy fog and mist. One witness estimated the ceiling as 100 feet agl. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft landed in a crosswind on a snow and ice covered runway. During landing, directional control was lost and the aircraft collided with a snowbank. The pilot stated he attempted to use propeller reversing for braking and the aircraft started to slide to the left. All four occupants escaped uninjured while the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

While approaching Ciudad Juárez Airport, the crew declared an emergency following an engine fire. The aircraft went out of control and crashed 10 km from the airport, bursting into flames. All 13 occupants were killed, among them the Mexican businessman Enrique Elías Miller.

The aircraft was established on final by the pilot under check. A 5 knot downwind component prevailed. The flare was commenced higher than is normal and the airspeed decreased below the optimum. The pilot did not react to prompting by the the check-pilot but, at about 20 feet, retarded the throttles. The aircraft struck the runway heavily in a left wing low attitude and the left main and nose landing gear was torn off. Command responsibility for the flight was not discussed and the check-pilot was under the misapprehension that his role was only that of safety pilot. Due to flight rescheduling, the pilot under check slept for only two and a half hours prior to commencing duty. The autopilot was unserviceable and the pilot under check flew the aircraft by hand for most of the four flight legs. During the last leg the check-pilot twice simulated an engine failure. The second failure was simulated on final approach at about 7 DME. Power was reinstated shortly afterwards and the approach continued normally until close to the threshold. At this time the pilot under check had been on duty for five and a half hours and the check-pilot for over twelve hours. Overseas research has shown that subtle errors in visual perception may be induced by an event which causes stress, and that this condition may persist for several minutes after the event. Fatigue may aggravate the problem. The errors in perception are the result of changes in focal length of the lens of the eye caused by the physiological effects of the stress resulting from the event. The experimental research and information from accident data has provided evidence that the effect of the changes in focal length may cause a pilot on final approach to perceive a runway to be on a higher plane than it actually is. In this case, with the particular combination of factors prevailing at the time, it is possible that the imposition of a simulated engine failure on approach within a few minutes prior to the final landing of a long and fatiguing night's operations caused a stress reaction in the pilot under check. The level of stress induced in this fatigued pilot may have been sufficient to cause the kind of perceptual error described above. The runway would thus appear to the pilot slightly higher than it actually was. His judgement of flare height, being based on this false perception, would therefore be incorrect.

While descending into the Patterson area on an IFR flight plan, the pilot was cleared to hold and was advised that he would be the #2 aircraft for an approach to the Patterson Airport. A few minutes later the pilot asked how long the delay would be. He subsequently stated he had the airport, cancelled IFR and was going in VFR. A pilot who had just departed the airport heard a Mitsubishi call 'turning base.' He could not see an aircraft on base for runway 05. He called but did not receive a reply. The aircraft contacted trees along a heading of about 225°. The flaps were extended about 5° and the landing gear were extended. All three occupants were killed.

The aircraft was cleared via a Standard Instrument DEPARTURE with an unrestricted climb to Flight Level (FL) 220. The aircraft climbed on track at an average rate of 1300 ft/min until FL130. The rate of climb then reduced to 350 ft/min until FL140, when the rate of climb increased to 1800 ft/min. At FL160 the aircraft entered a near vertical descent and radar contact was lost one minute later at 3100 feet. The aircraft impacted the ground in a near vertical attitude. The pilot, sole on board, was killed.

The aircraft was on the return portion of a round trip flight, hauling canceled bank checks. When they boarded before takeoff, the pilot's wife, who was not a pilot, occupied the right front seat and his two daughter's, ages 4 and 6, were in the passenger seats. Previous legs of the flight were accomplished without incident. While en route on the 4th leg, a radar handoff was made from Jacksonville to Atlanta Center at 0225 est and the pilot reported at FL180. This was his last known transmission. At 0230, the ATC controller noted the aircraft was passing Macon VOR. Shortly thereafter, radar contact was lost and efforts to make radio contact were unsuccessful. Several persons in the vicinity heard the aircraft engines alternately at high speed, then demishing, before the accident. The wreckage was found scattered over a 2 miles area. An exam revealed the right wing had failed upward and the left wing and left horizontal stabilizer had failed downward from overload. There was evidence of course reversal and descent before breakup; light turbulence and icing at cruise alt. Reason for descent unknown. All four occupants were killed.

At 1145 the pilot reported VFR conditions and requested radar vectors to the airport. He was issued a cruise clearance of 5,000 feet and given a heading. 18 miles from the airport he reported visual contact with the ground. At 1151 he was asked if he was familiar with the area to which he responded negative. He was then advised of rising terrain in all quadrants, including a mountain '...to almost 3,700 feet, three miles south of the airport.' At 1154 the pilot was advised that the airport was less than a mile at 12 o'clock. The aircraft impacted a mountain two miles south of the airport at about 2,700 feet msl. A witness described the sky conditions as a low ceiling with clouds obscuring the mountain peaks. The airport is uncontrolled and has no published instrument approach procedure. Both occupants were killed.

The aircraft diverted from Scottsdale to a flight course to Sedona because of thunderstorms and high winds at Scottsdale, but after a radio conversation with Scottsdale tower, the pilot decided to reroute to land at Scottsdale. The pilot did not read back the weather correctly to Scottsdale tower. After descending in rain and turbulence, the pilot reported to Scottsdale at 1857 that 'we think we have the arpt at nine o'clock.' the plt was cleared to make a visual approach to rwy 21. The twr never established visual contact with the acft & was unable to make further radio contact the last recorded radar contact showed the acft at 2200 ft descending, 2 miles from scottsdale on a bearing of 075 degrees. The acft contacted the ground left wing & nose low in a landing configuration on a heading of about 300 degrees. The acft slid about 770 ft, losing the engines, wings & landing gear before stopping. A post accident examination of the wreckage showed no signs of pre-impact conditions that would have affected normal operations.

A maintenance supervisor and two pilots noted that the left engine did not respond normally while being started. Aft starting, the pilot taxied to runway 10 for an IFR departure. Since the taxiway did not extend to the end of the runway, the pilot of another aircraft waited on the taxiway, just short of the runway, approximately 2,967 feet from the end. He observed smoke coming from the left engine of the MU-2 and reported this info on the unicom frequency. He reported that the MU-2 continued and rotated for takeoff approximately 200 to 250 yards east of his position. Reportedly, the aircraft climbed to approximately 300-400 feet afl, then turned left toward higher terrain. After turning, it enter what two witnesses described as a VMC roll, then crashed and burned. An examination of the airframe revealed no preimpact mechanical failures. A teardown of the left engine revealed that a turbine bearing, pn 3101092-1, had been misaligned and subsequently began to fail, damaging the 2nd and 3rd stages of the turbine section. The airport elev was 6,597 feet. The computed takeoff roll was 1,620 feet and the computed accelerate stop distance was 3,100 feet. The landing gear and selector found in down position. The aircraft was destroyed and all six occupants were killed.