Ilyushin II-76

It was determined that prior to takeoff from Belgrade-Surčin Airport, while preparing the flight, the crew forgot to switch on the VU-6A AC/DC converter after start-up of the engines, causing the 27 volts electrical system to be constantly fed from the batteries. When batteries ran flat, all the avionic and boosters were left without power.

The crew failed to prepare the flight according to published procedures and failed to extend flaps prior to takeoff. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Poor flight preparation,
- Poor crew coordination,
- Misunderstanding by the crew about the aircraft configuration,
- The pilot-in-command failed to reject takeoff.
- Crew's fatigue,
- The aircraft was not equipped with an alarm in case of wrong flaps' position.

The accident was the consequence of a controlled flight into terrain. The following contributing factors were reported:
- Following a wrong setting of the navigation system, the crew failed to follow the approach procedures and was not on the correct track for the airport,
- ATC gave a premature clearance to the crew to descent while he was not aware of the exact position of the aircraft that was not yet on his radar,
- Lack of visibility due to low clouds,
- At the time of the accident, the aircraft was off course by 23 km.

The crew completed the approach at a too high altitude to avoid hostile fire, causing the aircraft to land too far down the runway and reducing the landing distance available. The runway surface was wet at the time of the accident, which was considered as a contributing factor as well as poor weather conditions.

The exact cause of the fire on board could not be determined. However, it is believed that fire started in the cargo hold during the takeoff roll or maybe after rotation, probably in a box containing ammunition. Fire and explosion damaged elevator control systems, causing the aircraft to become uncontrollable.

It was determined that the flight time between Cologne and Bakhtaran was five hours and 10 minutes. Following a poor flight planning, the fuel quantity prior to departure from Cologne was insufficient in case of a diversion or possible go-around maneuver. At the time of the accident, the visibility was below minimums.

Shot down by a Stinger missile.

The accident was the consequence of the combination of the following factors:
- Crew failure to maintain flight speed modes recommended by IL-76 for various airplane configurations, which reduced the available margin of angle of attack to critical modes;
- Insufficient control of crew members over the determining flight parameters, which led to a violation of the established restrictions on the permissible angle of attack and the minimum flight speed;
- Lack of piloting skills at high angles of attack, due to the imperfection of the training system for crews in special flight situations;
- The pilots were unable to recognize the exit to critical angles of attack and implement the IL-76 recommendations to prevent stall;
- The need for maneuvering according to the descent scheme in combat conditions at close to flight restriction conditions and the presence of three aircraft flying in clouds at short intervals without appropriate radar control created a difficult situation for the crew, which was aggravated after the controller informed about the need to temporarily stop the descent in connection with the take-off of the An-32 aircraft, which led to a change in the prevailing stereotype of crew actions.