Cessna 402

The aircraft ran off the runway and collided with a ditch at Great Harbour Airport, Great Harbour Cay, Bahamas, while on a foreign air taxi flight. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed. The aircraft was destroyed. The commercial-rated pilot and seven passengers received minor injuries. One passenger received serious injuries. The flight originated from Nassau, Bahamas, the same day, about 1630. The pilot reported the brakes failed during the landing roll. While approaching the end of the runway he elected to steer the aircraft off the left side of the runway to avoid a steep drop off at the end of the runway. The aircraft collided with a ditch and a post crash fire erupted and destroyed the aircraft.

During the initial climb after takeoff, while executing a dark-night departure, the pilot failed to maintain clearance from rising terrain about one and one-quarter mile off the end of the runway. Operator records indicated that the pilot had flown out of this airport in the past, and that the aircraft was approximately 600 pounds below maximum certificated gross weight at the time of departure. A teardown inspection of both engines revealed no pre-impact anomalies, and visual and teardown inspections of the propellers showed damage signatures consistent with ground contact in a flat pitch under significant power.

The twin engine aircraft departed Caracas-Maiquetía-Simon Bolívar Airport at 2145LT on a charter flight to Los Roques. Few minutes later, it went out of control and crashed in the sea bout 85 km north of Caracas. Some debris were found floating on water but no trace of the wreckage nor the six occupants.

As the flight made a visual approach to the airport from the south over the sea, at night, the pilot changed his navigation radio from the VOR to the ILS system for runway 10 and lost DME reading from the VOR located on a hill north of the localizer course. The localizer showed the flight was south of the localizer course, and without DME from the VOR the pilot believed he was much closer to the island and the airport than the aircraft actually was. As the pilot attempted to make visual contact with the airport and maintain clearance from the hills he allowed the aircraft to descend and crash into the sea about 3 miles southwest of the airport. The pilot had not filed a FAA flight plan for the scheduled commuter flight. The pilot had been flying the route for 5 days and had no previous experience in the area. The pilot reported he had no mechanical malfunctions with the aircraft systems, flight controls, or engines. No FAA Operations inspectors had conducted surveillance on the company's flight operations in the Caribbean since service had begun in December 1996.

On August 5, 1996, about 1335 Atlantic standard time, a Cessna 402B, N403N, registered to Virgin Air, Inc. dba Air St. Thomas, as flight 105, 14 CFR Part 135 scheduled international passenger service, from St. Barthelemy Island to St. Thomas, overran the runway during an aborted takeoff at St. Barthelemy Island. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and an instrument flight plan was filed. The aircraft received substantial damage and the airline transport-rated pilot and 6 passengers were not injured. One passenger received minor injuries. The flight was originating at the time of the accident. The pilot stated the elevator control jammed during the takeoff roll. He aborted the takeoff, but could not stop prior to over running the runway. The aircraft came to rest in about 3 feet of water.

Upon landing, the left main gear collapsed. The aircraft slid on its belly and came to rest, bursting into flames. There were no casualties.

The twin engine aircraft was completing a charter flight from Oranjestad to Punto Fijo with seven passengers and one pilot on board. While descending to Punto Fijo-Josefa Camejo Airport, the pilot informed ATC about the failure of the left engine. Shortly later, the left engine caught fire and detached, causing a part of the left wing to be torn off. Out of control, the aircraft crashed in the sea about 29,5 km north of Punto Fijo Airport. All eight occupants were killed.

Shortly after reaching a cruising altitude of 9,500 feet, the aircraft's course was observed on radar to change from southeasterly to southwesterly. Its average ground speed decreased from 170 knots to 108 knots during this track change. The pilot called ATC with his call sign, and about five seconds later, an unintelligible, one-second-long transmission was heard. At that same time, radar information showed the aircraft at 8,800 feet. Radar and radio contact were lost shortly thereafter. Three days later, wreckage was found where the aircraft had crashed. The crash site was 1,820 feet above sea level and 1/2 mile south-southwest of its last observed radar position; the aircraft's average descent angle from the 8,800-foot-altitude position to the crash site was about 51 degrees. The aircraft was extensively damaged during impact. No damage was noted on tall trees that surrounded the accident site. Also, no preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure of the aircraft or engines was found, and no pre-accident impairment of the pilot was found.

The aircraft departed at night from runway 4R on a flight to transport mail. The pilot-in-command (PIC) was in the left seat, a pilot-rated cargo loader was in the right seat, and another cargo loader was aboard the aircraft, but was not in a seat. During takeoff, the aircraft entered a turn and flew into gradually rising terrain. The initial impact point was about 15 feet higher than the runway elevation and about 0.3 miles abeam the departure end of the runway. Investigation revealed that the company allowed pilot-rated cargo loaders to fly the aircraft from the right seat during positioning and ferry flight segments (to build multiengine flight time) as part of their compensation. There was evidence that at the time of the accident, the aircraft was being piloted on this flight from the copilot's position. The right side of the instrument panel was equipped with only EGT gauges (no flight instruments on the copilot's side). There were cloud layers in the vicinity, no moon illumination, and no visible ground lighting in the direction of flight. No preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure was identified during the investigation. Except at the pilot and copilot positions, the airplane had no other seat and/or restraint system. The operator stated that the pilot was not authorized to carry company personnel or passengers without the required seating.

For unknown reasons, the aircraft belly landed and was damaged beyond repair. There were no casualties.