Beechcraft 90 King Air

Operator:

J & G Aviation

Registration:

N269JG

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Pine Bluff - Bentonville

MSN:

LJ-949

YOM:

1981

Location:

Springdale

Arkansas

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

3367

Captain / Total hours on type:

100.00

Aircraft flight hours:

11396

Circumstances:

As the airplane was descending toward its destination airport, the pilot reported to an air traffic controller en route that he needed to change his destination to a closer airport because the airplane was low on fuel. The controller advised him to land at an airport that was 4 miles away. Shortly after, the pilot contacted the alternate airport’s air traffic control tower (ATCT) and reported that he was low on fuel. The tower controller cleared the airplane to land, and, about 30 seconds later, the pilot advised that he was not going to make it to the airport. The airplane subsequently impacted a field 3.25 miles southeast of the airport. One witness reported hearing the engine sputter, and another witness reported that the engine “did not sound right.” Forty-foot power lines crossed the field 311 feet from the point of impact. It is likely that the pilot was attempting to avoid the power lines during the forced landing and that the airplane then experienced an inadvertent stall and an uncontrolled collision with terrain. About 1 quart of fuel was observed in each fuel tank. No evidence of fuel spillage was found on the ground; no fuel stains were observed on the undersides of the wing panels, wing trailing edges, or engine nacelles; and no fuel smell was observed at the accident site. However, the fuel totalizer showed that 123 gallons of fuel was remaining. Magnification of the annunciator panel light bulbs revealed that the left and right low fuel pressure annunciator lights were illuminated at the time of impact. An examination of the airframe and engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. About 1 month before the accident, the pilot had instructed the fixed-base operator at Camden, Arkansas, to put 25 gallons of fuel in each wing tank; however, it is unknown how much fuel was already onboard the airplane. Although the fuel totalizer showed that the airplane had 123 gallons of fuel remaining at the time of the crash, information in the fuel totalizer is based on pilot inputs, and it is likely the pilot did not update the fuel totalizer properly before the accident flight. The pilot was likely relying on the fuel totalizer instead of the fuel gauges for fuel information, and he likely reported his low fuel situation to the ATCT after the annunciator lights illuminated.

Probable cause:

A total loss of power to both engines due to fuel exhaustion. Also causal were the pilot’s reliance on the fuel totalizer rather than the fuel quantity gauges to determine the fuel on
board and his improper fuel planning.

Final Report:

G-JOTA

Read more about G-JOTA

Crash of a Beechcraft C90A King Air in Idaho Falls

Date & Time: Sep 19, 2013 at 1553 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

We Fly

Registration:

N191TP

Flight Phase:

Charter/Taxi (Non Scheduled Revenue Flight)

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Yes

Site:

Schedule:

Pocatello – Idaho Falls

MSN:

LJ-1223

YOM:

1989

Location:

Idaho Falls

Idaho

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

3975

Captain / Total hours on type:

2500.00

Aircraft flight hours:

4468

Circumstances:

The airplane was equipped with two main fuel tanks (132 usable gallons each) and two nacelle fuel tanks (60 usable gallons each). In normal operation, fuel from each nacelle tank is supplied to its respective engine, and fuel is automatically transferred from each main tank to its respective nacelle tank. While at the airplane's home airport, the pilot noted that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges indicated that the nacelle tanks were full, and he believed that the main tanks had fuel sufficient for 30 minutes of flight. The pilot did not verify by any other means the actual fuel quantity in any of the tanks. Thirty gallons of fuel were added to each main tank; they were not topped off. The airplane, with two passengers, then flew to an interim stop about 45 miles away, where a third passenger boarded. The airplane then flew to its destination, another 165 miles away. The pilot reported that, at the destination airport, he noted that the cockpit fuel quantity gauges indicated that the nacelle tanks were full; he surmised that the main fuel tanks were not empty but did not note the actual quantity of fuel. Forty gallons of fuel were added to each main tank. Again, the main tanks were not topped off, and the pilot did not verify by any other means the actual fuel quantity in any of the tanks. The return flight to the interim stop was uneventful. The third passenger deplaned there, and the airplane departed for its home airport. While on final approach to the home airport, both engines stopped developing power, and the pilot conducted a forced landing to a field about 1.2 miles short of the runway. The pilot later reported that, at the time of the power loss, the fuel quantity gauges indicated that there was still fuel remaining in the airplane. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that all four fuel tanks were devoid of fuel. The examination did not reveal any preimpact mechanical anomalies, including fuel leaks, that would have precluded continued flight. The airplane manufacturer conducted fuel-consumption calculations for each of the two city pairs. Because the pilot did not provide any information regarding flight routes, altitudes, speeds, or times for any of the flight segments, the manufacturer's calculations were based on direct routing in zero-wind conditions, nominal airplane and engine performance, and assumed cruise altitudes and speeds. Although the results are valid for these input parameters, variations in any of the input parameters can significantly affect the calculated fuel requirements. As a result, although the manufacturer's calculations indicated that the round trip would have burned less fuel than the total available fuel quantity that was derived from the pilot-provided information, the lack of any definitive information regarding the actual flight parameters limited the utility of the calculated value and the comparison. The manufacturer's calculations indicated that the accident flight leg (from the interim airport to the home airport) would have consumed about 28.5 gallons total. Given that the airplane was devoid of fuel at the accident site, the pilot likely departed the interim airport with significantly less than the manufacturer's minimum allowable departure fuel quantity of about 39.5 gallons per side. The lack of any observed preimpact mechanical problems with the airplane, combined with the lack of objective or independently substantiated fuel quantity information, indicates that the airplane's fuel exhaustion was due to the pilot's inadequate and improper pre- and inflight fuel planning and procedures.

Probable cause:

The pilot's inadequate preflight fuel planning, which resulted in departure with insufficient fuel to complete the flight, and consequent inflight power loss due to fuel exhaustion.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft C90 King Air in Sainte-Radegonde

Date & Time: Mar 29, 2013 at 1250 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Registration:

N90KH

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Bordeaux – Bergerac

MSN:

LJ-542

YOM:

1971

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

2640

Captain / Total hours on type:

300.00

Circumstances:

The pilot and two passengers departed Sarlat-Domme Airport for a training mission over the region of Bordeaux. A precision approach was completed at Bordeaux-Mérignac Airport followed by a go-around procedure. The IFR flight plan was closed and the pilot continued under VFR mode to Bordeaux-Léognan-Saucats Aerodrome where he landed. A passenger deplaned, the engine remained running and the aircraft took off few minutes later to Bergerac where a refueling was planned. Approximately 10 minutes after takeoff, while cruising at an altitude of 2,000 feet, both engines failed. The pilot reduced his altitude, selected gear down and attempted and emergency landing in a vineyard. Upon landing, the undercarriage were torn off and the aircraft slid for few dozen metres before coming to rest. Both occupants escaped uninjured and the aircraft was damaged beyond repair.

Probable cause:

Failure of both engines in flight due to fuel exhaustion. It was determined that the pilot took off with 800 lbs of fuel on board, thinking having enough fuel for an hour and a half flight which corresponds to an autonomy with 800 liters. In such conditions, the fuel quantity was not sufficient to complete the flight and there were no required reserves. It is believed that the double engine failure was caused by the fact that the pilot mistook pounds for liters (livres - litres in French). The lack of a preflight visual check of the fuel gauges could did not allow the pilot to notice his mistake.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft E90 King Air in Casa Grande: 2 killed

Date & Time: Feb 6, 2013 at 1135 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Sauo Aero Services

Registration:

N555FV

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Training

Survivors:

Site:

Schedule:

Marana - Casa Grande

MSN:

LW-248

YOM:

1977

Location:

Casa Grande

Arizona

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

1079

Captain / Total hours on type:

112.00

Copilot / Total flying hours:

8552

Copilot / Total hours on type:

325

Aircraft flight hours:

8345

Circumstances:

The lineman who spoke with the pilot/owner of the accident airplane before its departure reported that the pilot stated that he and the flight instructor were going out to practice for about an hour. The flight instructor had given the pilot/owner his initial instruction in the airplane and flew with the pilot/owner regularly. The flight instructor had also given the pilot/owner about 58 hours of dual instruction in the accident airplane. The pilot/owner had accumulated about 51 hours of pilot-in-command time in the airplane make and model. It is likely that the pilot/owner was the pilot flying. Several witnesses reported observing the accident sequence. One witness reported seeing the airplane pull up into vertical flight, bank left, rotate nose down, and then impact the ground. One witness reported observing the airplane go from east to west, turn sharply, and then go north of the runway. He subsequently saw the airplane hit the ground. One witness, who was a pilot, stated that he observed the airplane enter a left bank and then a nose-down attitude of about 75 degrees at an altitude of about 300 feet above ground level, which was too low to recover. It is likely that the pilot was attempting a go-around and pitched up the airplane excessively and subsequently lost control, which resulted in the airplane impacting flat desert terrain about 100 feet north of the active runway at about the midfield point in a steep nose-down, left-wing-low attitude. The airplane was destroyed by postimpact forces and thermal damage. All components necessary for flight were accounted for at the accident site. A postaccident examination of the airframe and both engines revealed no anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, an examination of both propellers revealed rotational scoring and twisting of the blades consistent with there being power during the impact sequence. No anomalies were noted with either propeller that would have precluded normal operation. Toxicological testing of the pilot was negative for drugs and alcohol. The flight instructor’s toxicology report revealed the presence of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Given the elevated levels of metabolite in the urine and kidney, the absence of quantifiable THC in the urine, and the low level of THC in the kidney and liver, it is likely that the flight instructor most recently used marijuana at least several hours before the accident. However, the effects of marijuana use on the flight instructor’s judgment and performance at the time of the accident could not be determined. A review of the flight instructor’s personal medical records indicated that he had a number of medical conditions that would have been grounds for denying his airman medical certificate. The ongoing treatment of his conditions with more than one sedating benzodiazepine, including oxazepam, simultaneously would also likely not have been allowed. However, none of the prescribed, actively sedating medications were found in the flight instructor’s tissues, and oxazepam was only found in the urine, which suggests that the flight instructor used the medication many hours and possibly several days before the accident. The toxicology findings indicate that the flight instructor likely did not experience any impairment from the benzodiazepine medication itself; however, the cognitive effects from the underlying mood disturbance could not be determined.

Probable cause:

The pilot’s loss of control of the airplane after pitching it excessively nose up during a go-around, which resulted in a subsequent aerodynamic stall/spin.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft King Air C90A in Cândido Mota: 5 killed

Date & Time: Feb 3, 2013 at 2030 LT

Type of aircraft:

Z. Air Investimentos e Participações

Operator:

Registration:

PP-AJV

Flight Phase:

Flight

Flight Type:

Executive/Corporate/Business

Survivors:

Site:

Plain, Valley

Schedule:

Maringá – São Paulo

MSN:

LJ-1647

YOM:

2001

Location:

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total hours on type:

441.00

Aircraft flight hours:

3137

Circumstances:

The twin engine aircraft departed Maringá Airport at 1837LT on a flight to São Paulo, carrying four passengers and one pilot. 35 minutes into the flight, about five minutes after he reached its assigned altitude of 21,000 feet, the aircraft stalled and entered an uncontrolled descent. The pilot was unable to regain control, the aircraft partially disintegrated in the air and eventually crashed in a flat attitude in a field. The aircraft was destroyed and all five occupants were killed.

Probable cause:

The following findings were identified:
- The lack of a prompt identification of the aircraft stall by the captain may have deprived him of handling the controls in accordance with the prescriptions of the aircraft emergency procedures, contributing to the aircraft entry in an abnormal attitude.
- The captain’s attention was focused on the passengers sitting in the rear seats, in detriment of the flight conditions under which the aircraft was flying. This had a direct influence on the maintenance of a poor situational awareness, which may have made it difficult for the captain to immediately identify that the aircraft was stalling.
- There was complacency when the copilot functions were assumed by a person lacking due professional formation and qualification for such. Even under an adverse condition, the prescribed procedure was not performed, namely, the use of the aircraft checklist.
- The fact that the aircraft was flying under icing conditions was confirmed by a statement of the female passenger in the cockpit (CVR). The FL210 (selected and maintained by the captain) gave rise to conditions favorable to severe icing on the aircraft structure. If the prevailing weather conditions are correlated with reduction of speed (attested by the radar rerun), the connection between loss of control in flight and degraded aircraft performance is duly established.
- The rotation of the aircraft after stalling may have contributed to the loss of references of the captain’s balance organs (vestibular system), making it impossible for him to associate the side of the turn made by the aircraft with the necessary corrective actions.
- The non-adherence to the aircraft checklists on the part of the captain, in addition to the deliberate adoption of non-prescribed procedures (disarmament of the starter and “seven killers”) raised doubts on the quality of the instruction delivered by the captain.
- The captain made an inappropriate flight level selection for his flight destined for São Paulo. Even after a higher flight level was offered to him, he decided to maintain FL 210. Also, after being informed about icing on the aircraft, he did not activate the Ice Protection System, as is expressly determined by the flight manual.
- The captain had the habit of making use of a checklist not prescribed for the aircraft, and this may have influenced his actions in response to the situation he was experiencing in flight.
- His recently earned technical qualification in the aircraft type; his inattention and distraction in flight; his attitude of non-compliance with operations and procedures prescribed in manuals; all of this contributed to the captain’s poor situational awareness.
- The flight plan was submitted via telephone. Therefore, it was not possible to determine the captain’s level of awareness of the real conditions along the route, since he did not report to the AIS office in SBMG. In any event, the selection of a freezing level for the flight, considering that the front was moving along the same proposed route, was indication of inappropriate planning.
- The investigation could neither determine the whole experience of the aircraft captain, nor whether his IFR flight experience was sufficient for conducting the proposed flight, since he made decisions which went against the best practices, such as, for example, selecting a flight level with known icing.
- With a compromised situational awareness, the pilot failed to correctly interpret the information available in the aircraft, as well as the information provided by the female passenger sitting in the cockpit, and he chose to maintain the flight level under inadequate weather conditions.
- The lack of monitoring/supervision of the activities performed by the captain allowed that behaviors and attitudes contrary to flight safety could be adopted in flight, as can be observed in this occurrence.
- Apparently, there was lack of an effective managerial supervision on the part of the aircraft operator, with regard to both the actions performed by the captain and the correction of the aircraft problems.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft E90 King Air near Amarillo: 2 killed

Date & Time: Dec 14, 2012 at 1805 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Oneal Aviation

Registration:

N67PS

Flight Phase:

Flight

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Site:

Plain, Valley

Schedule:

Amarillo - Fort Worth

MSN:

LW-112

YOM:

1974

Location:

Amarillo

Texas

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

1650

Aircraft flight hours:

8607

Circumstances:

During the cross-country instrument flight rules flight, the pilot was in contact with air traffic control personnel. The controller cleared the airplane to flight level 210 and gave the pilot permission to deviate east of the airplane's route to avoid weather and traffic. A review of radar data showed the airplane heading southward away from the departure airport and climbing to an altitude of about 14,800 feet mean sea level (msl). Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned north, and the controller queried the pilot about the turn; however, he did not respond. The airplane wreckage was located on ranch land with sections of the airplane's outer wing, engines, elevators, and vertical and horizontal stabilizers separated from the fuselage and scattered in several directions, which is consistent with an in-flight breakup before impact with terrain. A review of the weather information for the airplane's route of flight showed widely scattered thunderstorms and a southerly surface wind of 30 knots with gusts to 40 knots. An AIRMET active at the time advised of moderate turbulence below flight level 180. Three pilot reports made within 50 miles of the accident site indicated moderate turbulence and mountain wave activity. An assessment of the humidity and freezing level noted the potential for clear, light-mixed, or rime icing between 10,700 and 17,300 feet msl. Postaccident airplane examination did not reveal any mechanical malfunctions or anomalies with the airframe and engines that would have precluded normal operation. It's likely the airplane encountered heavy to extreme turbulence and icing conditions during the flight, which led to the pilot’s loss of control of the airplane and its subsequent in-flight breakup.

Probable cause:

The pilot’s loss of control of the airplane after encountering icing conditions and heavy to extreme turbulence and the subsequent exceedance of the airplane’s design limit, which led to an in-flight breakup.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft B90 King Air in Sturtevant

Date & Time: Oct 22, 2012 at 1830 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Direct Aviation

Registration:

N821DA

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Private

Survivors:

Yes

Site:

Schedule:

Jackson - Sturtevant

MSN:

LJ-406

YOM:

1968

Location:

Sturtevant

Wisconsin

Country:

Region:

Crew on board:

Crew fatalities:

Pax on board:

Pax fatalities:

Other fatalities:

Total fatalities:

Captain / Total flying hours:

2331

Captain / Total hours on type:

1425.00

Aircraft flight hours:

12637

Circumstances:

The aircraft collided with a fence and a ditch when it overran runway 8R (2,272 feet by 38 feet, asphalt) while landing at the Sylvania Airport (C89), Sturtevant, Wisconsin. The commercial pilot was not injured and his passenger received minor injuries. The airplane sustained damage to its fuselage and both wings. The airplane was registered to Direct Action Aviation LLC, and was operated by Skydive Midwest. The accident flight was conducted under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the flight, which was not operated on a flight plan. The flight originated from the Jackson County Airport-Reynolds Field (JXN), Jackson, Michigan, about 1800. The pilot reported that the landing approach was normal and when the airplane crossed the runway threshold it floated and he pulled the engine power levers to the stops. He stated that although he did not remember the airplane bouncing, his passenger told him that it had. He pulled the power levers to reverse, but there was no immediate reverse thrust. He applied brakes and felt the airplane accelerate. He recognized that he would not be able to stop the airplane on the remaining runway and attempted to steer it to the north. The airplane left the runway, impacted two ditches and came to rest on a highway. The pilot stated that he should have recognized that braking action would be significantly reduced with the possibility of hydroplaning, that pulling the power levers to the stops before touchdown induced a lag in realization of reverse thrust, and that he should have executed a go-around when the airplane floated before landing. The pilot reported no mechanical failures or malfunctions of the airplane. At 1853, weather conditions reported at the Kenosha regional Airport (ENW), located 6 miles south of the accident site, included heavy rain.

Probable cause:

The pilot's decision to continue the landing after touching down long and on a wet runway that reduced the airplane’s braking capability, which resulted in an overrun.

Final Report:

Crash of a Beechcraft King Air 90 in Lohegaon

Date & Time: Sep 7, 2012 at 2000 LT

Type of aircraft:

Operator:

Registration:

VT-KPC

Flight Phase:

Flight Type:

Training

Survivors:

Yes

Site: