Date & Time: May 4, 2011 at 1045 LT
Imphal - Lengpui
Crew on board:
Crew fatalities:
Pax on board:
Pax fatalities:
Other fatalities:
Total fatalities:
Captain / Total flying hours:
Captain / Total hours on type:
Aircraft flight hours:
Aircraft flight cycles:
Aircraft was operating a non scheduled flight Imphal–Lengpui with ten persons on board including one crew member. The aircraft took off normally from Imphal at 1000 hrs and subsequently came in contact with ATC Lengpui at 1023hrs. ATC Lengpui conveyed the latest available weather with visibility as 4500m. The pilot requested special VFR and the same was approved by tower controller. Visibility further dropped to 2000m and the pilot preferred holding, in coordination with ATC at 10 miles maintaining visual separation with terrain at an altitude of 6500 feet. The Pilot thereafter without any communication with ATC reported downwind for RWY 17 and subsequently reported for final. When the aircraft reported final, the controller after sighting the aircraft gave the landing clearance with wind as calm and RWY surface wet. The aircraft touched down well ahead of the landing threshold at a high speed with a remaining distance in which it was impossible to stop the aircraft. The aircraft could not stop within available length of runway and it climbed a 10 feet high platform constructed to install the Localizer antenna at the end of RWY 17. As the speed of the aircraft was high, it continued past the localizer platform and fell in a ravine approximately 60 feet deep. The accident occurred during day time. The occurrence was classified as an accident. The aircraft suffered substantial damage. However, all the 9 passengers and the pilot on board the aircraft escaped unhurt. There was no sign of pre/post impact fire.
- The pilot of VT-NES was unable to position correctly for a stabilized approach. As a consequence landed well ahead of the threshold with higher speed and overshot the runway length and fell into a ravine approximately 60 feet in depth. This happened due to poor skill level of the pilot.
- The weather conditions were marginal but within permitted minima. However the pilot’s inadequate experience on type and inadequate training affected his judgment and decision making ability. He chose to continue with the approach, which was grossly overshooting, rather than going around and following a missed approach procedure to divert or make another approach.
Pilot displayed poor airmanship. There was only one CB cell reported within aerodrome vicinity. He was however unable to negotiate the same and entered a dangerous weather phenomenon.
- The aircraft had fully serviceable weather radar on board however the pilot did not utilize the same. He did not switch it on due to perhaps ignorance or incompetency to use the same.
- The pilot was informed regularly about the weather at destination before and during the flight. He did not effectively utilize the weather information to plan the flight.
- The Operator North East Shuttles displayed organizational deficiencies, in that;
a) The operator did not ensure that the applicant met the minimum regulatory requirements of having undergone ten take offs and landings after PIC endorsement in the last six months at the
time of submitting application for issue of FATA. DGCA also failed to detect the flaws in the application form submitted by the operator in respect of involved pilot for the purpose of issue
b) After issuance of the FATA by DGCA the operator was required to subject the pilot through an assessment check of two hours and send a report to DGCA. The operator failed to meet
this requirement and did not send any such report to DGCA.
c) The pilot was not meeting the regulatory requirement of having flying experience of 100 hours before undertaking single pilot operation. The operator failed to ensure compliance to this requirement.
d) The Pilot was not cleared as per DGCA regulation to operate in airports situated in hilly terrain. M/S NES did not ensure adherence to DGCA requirement before releasing pilots to operate commercial flights.
e) The pilot had not undergone Indian Class I medical as required by DGCA.
f) The operator does not have emergency landing fields declared and the crew is not made aware of the same before undertaking the flight as required by DGCA.
- The availability of RESA would increase the safety margin in case of runway overrun. Runway 17 end was not visible from the tower. Visibility of full length of runway from ATC tower would increase the level of safety standard for immediate action in case of emergency. Equipment for Instrument Landing System has been installed but not made operational for the last few years. Availability of ILS would increase the level of safety standard.
Cause of the Accident:
The cause of the accident was inadequate skill level of the pilot to execute a safe landing during marginal weather condition.
Final Report:
VT-NES.pdf1.12 MB