Date & Time: May 22, 2010 at 0605 LT
Type of aircraft:
Boeing 737-800
Operator:
Registration:
VT-AXV
Survivors:
Yes
Schedule:
Dubai - Mangalore
MSN:
36333/2481
YOM:
2007
Flight number:
IX812
Country:
India
Region:
Asia
Crew on board:
6
Crew fatalities:
6
Pax on board:
160
Pax fatalities:
152
Other fatalities:
0
Total fatalities:
158
Captain / Total flying hours:
10215
Captain / Total hours on type:
2844
Copilot / Total flying hours:
3620
Copilot / Total hours on type:
3319
Aircraft flight hours:
7199
Aircraft flight cycles:
2833
Circumstances:
On final approach, aircraft was too high on the loc and on runway 24 threshold, its altitude was 200 feet instead of 50 with an approach speed of 160 knots instead of 144. Aircraft landed 5,200 feet past the runway threshold. Captain activated both thrust reverser but immediately after cancelled this action and engaged the aircraft in a take off configuration. Aircraft overrun runway, the right wing collided with the localizer antenna and crashed in flames in a wooded area located 500 meters further. 152 pax and all six crew were killed. Aircraft was completely destroyed.
Causes:
The Court of Inquiry determines that the cause of this accident was Captain's failure to discontinue the unstabilized approach and his persistence in continuing with the landing, despite three calls from the First Officer to go around and a number of warnings from the EGPWS.
Contributing Factors were:
1. In spite of availability of adequate rest period prior to the flight, the Captain was in prolonged sleep during flight, which could have led to sleep inertia. As a result of relatively short period of time between his awakening and the approach, it possibly led to impaired judgment. This aspect might have got accentuated while flying in the Window of Circadian Low (WOCL).
2. In the absence of Mangalore Area Control Radar (MSSR), due to unserviceability, the aircraft was given descent at a shorter distance on DME as compared to the normal. However, the flight crew did not plan the descent profile properly, resulting in remaining high on approach.
3. Probably in view of ambiguity in various instructions empowering the 'copilot' to initiate a 'go around ', the First Officer gave repeated calls to this effect, but did not take over the controls to actually discontinue the ill-fated approach.
Final Report:
VT-AXV.pdf4.43 MB